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ABSTRACT 
The dissertation operates at two levels: an account of a problematic of self in the early philosophy of 
Wittgenstein and Sartre - which simultaneously supports a comparative study that claims 
convergence is significant, detailed and extensive. The thesis thus disputes the traditional - 'Divide' 
- reading of Sartre and Wittgenstein. 
The problematic is defined by the view that the self desires an ethical absolute and that this can only 
be achieved when a metaphysics of aesthetics is assumed. It is a certain concept of language and 
self, based on a saying-showing distinction. that so constitutes the problematic. and which is the 
focus of inquiry. This results in the following structure: §l Defines and defends the thesis' Art-and-
the-Ineffable' - and thus the generic principle of the present thesis. §2 Claims, firstly, (and perhaps 
for the first time), that Sartre has a philosophy of language that includes a formal principle of the 
ineffable and a - (Tractarian) saying-showing distinction: both of which are equally formative in 
his own (early) philosophy. Secondly. that the saying-showing distinction is identified with a 
concept of self. §3 Exposes the (previously neglected) early account of self in Sartre and 
Wittgenstein and, secondly, arh'1leS for four definitive points of convergence: that the self is bi-polar, 
non-substantive, eliminated, non-encounterable. ~..j. Presents modalities of the non-substantive self: 
as operational intentionality, as programmatic. and as a relation or attitude to the world (clinching 
the ethico-aesthetic structure). ~5 Claims convergence on some key aesthetic principles (including 
disinterestedness and sub specie aeternitatis), identifying them, in terms of Showing, with the self, 
and stating the proposed - dual - solution to the problematic: Aesthetic determination and Aesthetic 
deeds. The fonner is the self (a relational attitude) choosing it-self as an aesthetic relation to the 
world; the latter. represented here by Tractatus and Nausea, are limited wholes with a 
transcendental message that can only be shown: the self disclosing through a work of art the 
unsayable solution to the problematic. 
CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION [8J 
1. ART-AND -THE -INEFFABLE [19J 
2. SA YING-SHOWING; EMERGENCE OF SELF [38J 
3. THE SELF:I,MOI,-AUGE? [113J 
4. MODALITIES OF SELFHOOD: SELF AS VALUE [148J 
5. DIS-SOLVING THE ABSURD-RIDDLE?: 
THE AESTHETIC: DETERMINATION & DEEDS [178J 
BIBLIOGRAPHY [229J 
POEM [236J 
III 
Detailed Contents 
PART I: SAYING 
ABSTRACT ji 
Ii\'TRODUCTION 8 
(i) Objectives 9 
(ii) Problematic of Self 10 
(iii) Comparatiw Study 11 
§1. ART-AND -THE -Il\'EFFABLE (DEFENCE AND CL4RIFICATION) 19 
+ A1t-and-the-Inelfable?? 21 
+ Inconmlunicable and Unknowable? 22 
+ The Fact-Value distinction 24 
+ Emotions; The Generic-Specific distinction 29 
+ Saying the Unsayable? 34 
§2. SAYING-SHOWING; EMERGENCE OF SELF 38 
~2.1 THE !NEFF ABLE: FROM ART TO AESTHETICS 40 
~2.2 WITTGENSTEIN: SAYING AND SHOWING 41 
~2.3 SARTRE: LAJ"JGUAGE: PROBLEM AND POTENTIAL 49 
(i) A matter of method 50 
(ii) The ineffable and the possibility of showing: La Nausea 56 
+The ineffable 57 
+ Showing 60 
(iii) Saying and showing: toward the subject 66 
+/Yhat is Literature? I: Signification-Le Sens, Prose-Poetry 66 
+lI'hat is Literature? II: A (larger) problem of interpretation 72 
+The Writer and his Language 77 
+ Departure and Return 82 
·Being and Nothingness 85 
~2.4 CONVERGENCE: SE1\1ANTICS TO SELF 99 
+ Background to the indfable: Problem of real definition 100 
• Summary ofSartre's position 104 
• Key points: from semantics to self 107 
§3, THE SELF: I, MOl, - .-IUGE'! 113 
~3.1 Two SENSES OF SELF 114 
(i) Preliminary: 1& '1'. contingent-transcendent, Fact-Value? 115 
+ (Fact-)Value 117 
(ii) Sartre: Sdfand structures of Consciousness: Subject and Ego 119 
+Selfassubject 119 
• Self as ego (impure and pure reflection; embodied) 120 
(iii) Wittgenstein: Sclfas Metaphysical and Psychological 126 
• Self as psychological 127 
+ tV1etaphysical subject 131 
~3.2 THE MISSING SELF: FOUR COAIPARATWE ASPECTS 133 
(i) Bipolar 133 
(ii) Eliminated 135 
(iii) No-thing 137 
(iv) Non-encounterahle 142 
~4. MODALITIES OF SELFHOOD: SELF AS "ALUE H8 
~4.1 OPERATIVE INTENTIONALITY 149 
(i) Intentionality - and Will (Saftre) 150 
(ii) Will - and Intentionality (Wittgenstein) 155 
+ Inkntionalitv: II-om propositions to subject 156 
+ From suhjeL"l to ",ill 160 
(iii) Convergence: operali\c self 164 
~4. 2 RELA TUM - PR(lGRMfM,\ TIC SELF 165 
• Programmatic sclf 171 
~.3 ATTITUDE (NATURAL) 172 
~5. DIS--SOLVIl\'G TilE ABSURD RIDDLE?:- THE AESTHETIC 178 
~5.1 Problematic stakd: Self. Showing. Showing as Aesthetics 180 
+Two Preliminary Remarks 180 
(i) Framework- Ethics (Absurd-Riddle) 181 
~5.2 Pre-condition to solution: Ethic's and Aesthetics 'one and the same' 185 
~5.3 Solution to Problematic of Self 189 
(i) Paf1 I: (Conclusion I): :\cslhetic Attitude (The World as a Whole) 189 
• Disinterestedness. Sub specie aeternitis 190 
• Delcnnination and the Aesthetic Attitude 203 
• Addendum to :\csthetic Attitude: Epistemological. Philosophical'J 210 
(ii) Pm1 II: (Conclusion II): Lingua-Acsthetic-(Philo) Deeds 215 
~5.-1 PostScript: TIlc Problem of Being God 22-1 
BIBLlOGR,\PIIY 229 
PART II: SHOWING: 
Po.;'m 236 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
My supervisors, Chris Long and Andy Hamilton, for their support and belief in the project. Andy's 
unflagging interest, and his detailed criticism on the final drafts deserves special commendation, and I 
cannot thank him enough. Overall, I regret only that I could not foster the time needed to make this a 
better work, and more worthy of all the effort. 
I have benefited from the comments and works of David E. Cooper, from his interest and kindness as 
also that of other members of the Philosophy Department at Durham, especially Kathleen Nattrass, 
Paddy Fitzpatrick and Soren Reader; and from the comments of my external examiner, Marie McGinn. 
lowe a great deal, of the sayable and the unsayable, to my mam and dad - I thank them lastingly, as I 
do my brother Wayne for his sustained interest and support. 
No one had to suffer more than Alyson, lowe much to her, and to our remarkable children, Samuel, 
Alice (born October 1995), and Emily. Samuel was conceived in October 1992 and Emily born in 
October 1997, marking, in a sense, for me, the inner and outer limits of this dissertation. 
'The Thought Gang' offered, besides philosophical stimulation, friendship and intersubjectivity in a 
solipsistic endeavour - I thank Stuart (Hanscomb), Paul (MacDonald), Martin (Connor) and David 
(Mossley), for the times we shared, for the days, the all-night conversations, the debates, the Eidos 
evenings, the pubs, the triangular pool, the cafes, the book shops, the philosophy, etc. - for the facts, 
yes, but most of all for what can only be shown. And so, I should also like to mention David, John and 
Mal, as well as Phil Diggle, Bill Pollard, friends and special friends from the Corridor of Fonteyn, other 
acquaintances made over the years in Durham and, finally, for their support, Christine (and Roger), 
Joanne, and my grandmother. 
TO 
MAM AND DAD 
AND TO THE MEMORY OF 
MRS. CARMAN. 
n 
PART ONE 
SAYING 
vii 
INTRODUCTION 
Our problems are not abstract, but perhaps the most concrete 
that there are. 
(Tractatus 5.634 & 5.5563) 
To be sure, I can imagine what Heidegger means by Being and 
anxiety. Man feels the urge to run up against the limits of language 
... Kierkegaard too saw that there is this running up against 
something. 
(Wittgenstein, Conversations with Waismann, pp68) 
Even today I would rather read 'thrillers' than Wittgenstein. 
(Sartre, The Words, pp53) 
If philosophy has anything to do with wisdom 
there's certainly not a grain of that in Mind, 
and quite often a grain in the detective stories. 
(Wittgenstein, quoted by Malcolm in his Memoir) 
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INTRODUCTION 
Here we shall introduce the main objectives of the dissertation and the two main themes of the 
thesis - the problematic of self and the comparative study. In this introduction, where quotation is 
overdone, wc are to recall Benjamin's remarks: 
"Quotations in my works are like robbers by the roadside who make an anned attack and 
relieve an idler of his convictions" (Schl'({tell I, 571). This discovery of the modem function 
of quotations, according to Benjamin, ... was born ... out of the despair of the present and 
the desire to destroy it.' 1 
(i) Objectives 
The problematic is presented (through comparison) as a convergent thesis, one that is 
significant and extensive in both its dctails and as a whole (a vision of the self). This is not due to 
the comparatin: mcthod, but due to precise conceptual and historical connections. Throughout, 
an effort is made to establish these connections. and in support of this I have tried to remain close 
to the dctails of the texts while balancing this with evidence from both the broader context of the 
philosophy and, though sparingly. philo-historical connectionslinfluences (such as certain 
formative ideas found in Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard. Nietzsche). Although in general the 
approach is criticaL and although many objections to details are discussed (as well as the central 
objection to the thesis as a whole). not all issues are evaluated, for the main aim is to establish 
and put forward the thesis. not to offer a critique. 
The objectiYe of the comparatiyc level of the thesis is to dispute the traditional - 'Divide' -
reading of Sartre and Wittgenstein. Their (early) subject matter, in details and in breadth, is in 
fact COll\'Crgent. and, it is not what it is often thought to be. If then, these two philosophers each 
1 H. Arendt, in her Introduction to W. Benjamin's Illuminations, Fontana, (1973), pp43. 
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represent a side of a Divide. then it can only be by \'irtue of their differing approach. methodology 
- indirect communication aside - or temperament - and not their subject matter or philosophical 
concerns: and in fact. such a state of affairs is happily conceded. Wittgenstein' s Tractarian 
engagement with the problems of philosophy and the meaning of life is as concrete and 
existential as anything in Sartre's early writings. 
The order of material - lin!,'11istic prior to self - is much better suited to Wittgenstein's 
approach: but the laterality of writing (and thought too) is costly, even without a comparison. In 
fact. in wea\'ing together both the comparative and the problematic objectives the structure of the 
thesis becomes fairly complex - more so, as the problematic itself must be supported by many 
other individual (though integrated) claims - notably. the internal unity of the Tractatus, 
Tractattls's commitment to intentionality. Sartre's commitment to saying-showing. The 
structure is facilitated in being based around major section breaks which can usefully be seen to 
have independent as well as collective objectives. Independently, the prilllm:v objectives of each 
section break are such as stated in the abstract. 
(ii) Problematic of Self 
The majority of the thesis is the setting out of the framework from which emerges the 
problematic. It is thus only in the final chapter that the whole problem can be stated and the 
solution offered. Here, there is offered only the necessary outline - that there is a problem that 
requires a solution: the problem is existential and the solution would be salvation. Within this 
problem-solution framework. 'problematic' refers to that which is to be enunciated or supported 
as possihle though not necessarily realisable. The problem is that life is either absurd (Sartre) or 
it is a riddle (Wittgenstein). and it is so for the same reason: that it appears to lack ethical 
meaning or Value. 
All that is in the world is contingent: ethical value. unless it \\ere to be relative. and not 
then the value sought. would ha\'e to come from a standpoint outside the world. Moreover, the 
self is in a crucial sense bi-polar. one part. the empirical, exists in the world, the other, the 
subject, foundational. non-substantive and eliminated. is in a sense outside or at the limit of the 
world. Furthermore. the linguistic, emerging from the self, is itself and coextensively bi-polar, 
between 'ordinary' and 'poetic' discourse Thus, one pole, ordinary, denotative, instrumental, 
working as a sign: signification, (representation), limited to describing Facts (including the 
psychological) and world of phenomena in the world. and which cannot say anything about the 
world as a \\'hole or totality, but which offers. with reference to states of affairs, bedeutung, that 
which is necessary to the realm of Saying. The second pole, poetic, connotative. non-
instrumental, operating as symbol, offering sens or sinn, (expression), the presupposition to the 
former, identified with Value. the subject, and the world as a whole. and which itself cannot be 
represented. it being necessary to its realm of Showing. 
The subject is a relation and it relates to the world as an operative intentionality (involving 
will) that is programmatic - a systematic synthesis of consciousness constituting itself as a 
method of altering how the world appears. This methodological structure of consciousness is 
understood, finally and fundamentally. as an 'attitude' to the world. Only when the self chooses 
itself as aesthetic attitude will it distance itself from the (contingent) world. In this - aesthetic -
appreciation. the world is experienced from without. as a whole or totality, as an aesthetic object; 
the subject experiences itself as independent of the world. it sees that the ethical self, a no-thing, 
exists outside the world and outside language. that it can be encountered only when it chooses 
itself as aesthetic: aesthetic determination: the self resolving the problematic of it-self by 
choosing itself (a relation) as an aesthetic attitude \yith the resulting insight into its freedom, 
project and goal. The communication of the solution: aesthetic deeds: such deeds I am claiming 
are Tractatus and Xausea: limited wholes, with a transcendental message that is shown. 
(iii) Comparative Study 
Historical Rcmad:s (Wittgcnstcin). That 'The Divide' may in fact be superficial and harmful 
to our understanding of philosophy (and the present century) is a view with increasing coinage. 
The exagger:ltcd and persistent dichotomy can lead to a poverty of understanding, especially 
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when considering individual thinkers. Jean-Paul Sartre's contribution to philosophy, for example, 
is often reduced to an Existentialist doctrine of freedom and is hence, for all the richness there, 
underestimated. (No doubt the unfortunate popularity of his views - with the bourgeoisie of all 
people - has also contributed). On the other hand, the position of Ludwig Wittgenstein is still 
largely misunderstood - most especially the early Wittgenstein. Unlike Sartre, the richness of 
Wittgenstein's thinking has hardly been doubted, whatever it may ultimately mean. (Possibly his 
slow but presently sure assimilation into the popular waters of our time may similarly in time 
dilute his stature). Whereas Sartre's philosophical heritage is well known2 the case with 
Wittgenstein is not so straightforward. indeed, the possible allegiance of Wittgenstein's work to 
existential philosophy is neither new nor limited to my self: as I shall now indicate. 
The very ract that Wittgenstein was introduced to other Cambridge philosophers - and so 
to the whole network of English-speaking academic philosophers - through Bertrand 
Russell, has given the whole subsequent interpretation of Wittgenstein's ideas a 
Cambridge-orientated stamp. As a hy-product of this gulf, a gulf has opened up between 
our views of the academic Wittgenstein and Wittgenstein the man .... the preconceptions 
with which his English hearers approached him debarred them almost entirely from 
understanding th~ point of what he was saving .... We would have done better to see him as 
an integral and authentically Viennese genius ... whose intellectual problems and personal 
attitudes alike had been ronned in the neo-Kantian environment ofpre-1914, in which logic 
and ethics were essentially bound up with each other and with the critique of language. 3 
That Russell, the Positivists, and Ayer tried to interpret Wittgenstein exclusively as part of 
that (their) tradition, goes some way to explaining why Wittgenstein claimed they did not 
understand him. Wittgenstein - early and late - claimed that nobody in his lifetime understood 
him, his results \,"ere "variousl\' misunderstood, more or less mangled or watered down" (PI 
Preface). Like Nietzsche (in the preface to the Gay SCience'!). when Wittgenstein wrote what was 
to become a book. it \"as "for such men as are in sympathy with its spirit" CPR Forward). 
According to Wittgenstein. few were. and indeed today there is still such disagreement. 
2 G. McCulloch (1994), like Danto (1975), has endeavoured to translate Sartre's views into an Anglo-American 
idiom. 
3 Janik and Toulmin Wittgenstein's Vienna (1973), pp20/22. This work is as good a read as can be had on the philo-
historical background out of which the Tractatus emerges. 
4 'There would still remain room for doubt whether anyone who had never lived through similar experiences could be 
brought closer to the experience of this book'. 
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The presentlv dominant - and correct - interpretation of Wittgenstein as a thinker who 
hegan with logic and language does not wholly explain this mistake. for, as with early 
existentialists such as Weininger and Kraus. Wittgenstein's primary ethical concerns were 
integrated. for sound philosophical reasons, with logic and language. Wittgenstein used logic 
and language as a ladder to climb in order to look down and understand "the darkness of his 
time" (§5). Existentialists like Sartre, for similar reasons, chose to climb the ladder of 
consciousness (a matter of historical temperament). That Wittgenstein and Existentialists had 
different ladders for similar solutions to similar problems has been noted over the years by many 
competent scholars, though it rarely gets a hearing. 
In 1969 Erich Heller wrote of Wittgenstein 's work that 
It wi 11 one day be seen as a integral part of the tragically self-destnlcti ve design of European 
thought ... Of greater weight still would be the realisation that the name of Wittgenstein 
marks th\! historical point at \\'hich, most unexpectedly, the cool analytical intellect of 
British philosophy meets with those passions of mind and imagination which we associate 
first \\ith Nietzsche and then, in manifold crystallisation's, with such Austrians as Otto 
Weininger, Adolph Loos, Karl Kraus, Franz Kafka and Robert Musil ... It is in such a 
constellation of minds that Wittgenstein is truly at home, whereas in the history of British 
philosophy he 111a~' m\!relv "hold an important position", (E. Heller, VI/philosophical 
Notes, in 'Wittgenstein; the Man and his Philosophy,' (ed.) K.I. Fann, pp941) 
Somewhat later, 1975, in a similar vane. and similarly prophetically, Ian Hacking writes that: 
"We shall shortly have essays 'Wittgenstein and Schopenhauer' and 'Wittgenstein and 
Nietzsche'. Finally, we note that for the first time in two centuries there is a real and 
growing coincidence between the prohlems, though not the idioms, of some of the more 
important elements of Continental philosophy" (H11Y Does Language matter to Philosophy). 
At the 1977 Wittgenstein Symposium in Vienna, many brief papers hinted at the same 
possibility: 
Similarities between the outlook and approach of such thinkers as Pascal, Kierkegaard, 
Tolstoy and those of Wittgenstein are more than merely coincidental. Wittgenstein, in 
effect, is a religious existentialist. The special nature of his religiosity is, of course 
ineffahle. (Riesterer, TT'ittgel/steil1 and Ethics, 2nd Wittgenstein Symposium 1977) 
And in 1978 G. H. Von Wright himself wrote of Wittgenstein that: 'Broadly speaking, one can 
notice an alienation of (Wittgenstein's) influence from the typical logico-anal)1ical philosophy 
and an affiliation of it to thinking in the traditions of phenomenology, hermeneutics and even 
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Hegelianism's. Finally. another Wittgensteinian scholar, Allan Janik, expressed a similar view at 
around the same time: 
If Wittgenstein is a Weiningerian as I claim ... he, like Jaspers and also Lukacs, Heidegger 
and Berdyaev to name but a fe\\', is developing certain Kantian themes conceming the 
relation between subject and object, the primacy of the moral over the epistemological and 
the notion oftotalit~' \\'hich are characteristic of the Southwest Gennan Schoo1.6 
The claims of scholars to a Continental Wittgenstein could be extended to pages. But for all 
these indicators to another Wittgenstein - to an inclusive non-Divide Wittgenstein, for all the hot 
air inflating such a likelihood, and for all the ever increasing winds of time, there remains hardly 
a balloon in sight. 
Janik places Wittgenstcin's way of thinking in the Continental - nay, agam, m the 
Existential tradition. due to "a certain pre-eminence of moral concerns". This is excellent, and it 
offers a point from which to substantiate the claims, more so if it is combined with the following 
four views7: that Wittgenstein was (in the Tractafus) committed to (1) anti-scientism, (2) the 'fall 
of the self (attack on the pure ego), (3) 'background': the attempt to expose the conditions which 
influence, prejudice - maintain the Kierkegaardian 'illusion' (see below) - and ultimately prevent 
self-understanding.: these conditions can be historicaL social, psychological - or linguistic. (4) A 
'cultural critique': an assessment and diagnosis of the human condition seemlessly connected to 
the philosophical enterprise - (Trac/allis as ethical deed. ~5). 
Such was Wittgenstein's commitment. as the following thesis will seek to vindicate through 
a detailed consideration of point 3. the self. that draws on the 'moral concerns', the 'background', 
the anti-scient ism. and the whole as a philosophical - cultural - enterprise; some further 
comments on this final. underlying aspect conclude this introduction. 
5 'Wittgenstein in relation to his Times' in Wittgenstein and his Times (1982), pp108. (Ed.) B. McGuinness 
6 A. Janik, Essays on Wittgenstein and Weininger (1985), pp94 
7 Taken (though used freely) from D.E. Cooper 'Analytic and Continental Philosophy' (1994). These four 
characteristics are shown to be part of a five-part definition of Continental, as opposed to AnalytiC, philosophy. The 
fifth characteristic, informing ali of the above, is certain attitudes to language - such as the belief that it is the 
foundation of philosophy, that philosophical inquiry does not consist in the systematic rendering of rules. Here then, I 
should say, lies the difference between the two traditions: approach or method, as governed by attitude to language. 
Historical Rcmarlis: a shared heritage. The above quoted commentators could in fact have 
been more specific in identifying Wittgenstein's philosophical heritage. Aside from the many 
(auto)biographical references to influences. including especially Dostoievsky and Pascal, there are 
the many references to Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer and, taking Janik's lead, the pre-eminence 
of moral concerns when speaking of these authors. 
Kierkegaard, like Wittgenstein and Sartre, is, to borrow a term from Richard Rorty, an 
edifying philosopher8. The common interest of these three philosophers is in living a certain kind 
of moral life which is bound up with their philosophical writings and the desire to disclose this 
life to others. When also this desire to communicate is identified with indirect communication, 
with. as is its form in the present thesis. with showing as opposed to saying, then the philo-
historical point of origin for such edifying philosophers would seem to be Kierkegaard. This 
hypothesis is strengthened f~urther with the knowledge that both Wittgenstein and Sartre read and 
admired the works of Kierkegaard (Wittgenstein is quoted saying that Kierkegaard was the 
profoundest thinker of the last century). 
Besides indirect communication and freedom of (will) choice, a formative point of contact 
between the three philosophers is a concept of the self as a relation (§~). But these three concepts 
should not be separated: as edifying philosophers, all three see themselves, as authors, as 
uncovering or diagnosing an illusion. such that their readers can be freed from it. The illusion is 
that meaning is given with the world. that Christianity (Kierkegaard) or Science (Wittgenstein 
and Sartre) provide a fixed and objective body of knowledge that is value laden and through 
which existence can be justified. The diagnosis stresses the need for subjectivity and individual 
will, for the role of ill\\"ardness (or attitude). The natural relation to the world (§4) must be 
overcome. It is not now only a matter of what one does 'in the \\"orld', it is ones relation to the 
world as a whole: one must mediate one's relation to the world through an absolute. or at least an 
8 R.Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. 
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idea of an absolute. God or duty. Shunning the natural relation to the world entails - for the 
edifying philosopher - shunning natural (philosophical) responses. 
Here. with philosophical method. \ve ha\'e a point of convergence9. For all three 
philosophers. philosophical method must be converted: Argument becomes subservient to image, 
metaphor. simile. aphorism and irony. Silence ever increases its presence. In The Present Age 
(1940 - pp49fl) Kierkegaard says that only he (or she) \\ho remains silent can really talk, that 
silence is the necessary ideal, the essence of inwardness and the inner life10 : exactly as we will 
find in our accounts of Sartre and Wittgenstein. The method, its parts. all point to the necessity of 
Art. In Philosophy. problems do not necessarily have answers; they cannot be argued. explained 
or defined away. The point is and must be reached where explanations come to an end, where the 
problem can only be dis-solved. where the solution can only be presented by a subjectivity to a 
subjectivity. Moreover, as in The Sickness Unto Death, human behaviour is seen (by Wittgenstein 
and Sartre also) to be based on a fundamental desire to be God (§5) while simultaneously the 
structure of consciousness and subjecti\'ity ensures that such a condition is contradictory (§5.4). 
If Kierkegaard is the common point of historical convergence for many defining concepts, 
then Kant on Sartre and Schopenhauer on Wittgenstein are similarly formative relationships. It is 
not possible to understand the non logico-linguistic dimensions of the Tractatus without recourse 
to Schopenhauer. and many of the conceptual influences are noted passin!. In Schopenhauer we 
find much that is in the present thesis: the importance of art and the aesthetic experience of 
disinterestedness, the claim that the aesthetic offers a transcendental escape from the will, the 
claim that seeing the world aright is identical to willing the world aright, that good and bad 
willing alters only the limits of the world. that the will or limit is the self. In Schopenhauer too, 
we find many of the metaphors that are central to the late pages of the Tractatus: the 'eye', the 
9 In general and on the surface, as is clear from a glance at Being and Nothingness and Tractatus, approach and 
methodology are very different: this is where the Divide lurks. Nonetheless, as has been noted, methodology is 
certainly linked by the use of indirect communication and also, perhaps, by a common starting point: the attack on 
the cog ito - on this, see the appendix. 
10 Kierkegaard stresses the social, educational and intellectual importance of the distinction between 'talkitiveness' 
and silence in a way that strikingly resembles Wittgenstein's approach to 'daily life' and conversation. 
to 
'ladder", the 'limit', the 'riddle' (and philosophy as therapy) (WWR: II, p287; II. p80, .t9, 6; I, 
plO.t: 1. pIOO). This belies Schopenhauer's method as much as Wittgenstein's: again. a reliance 
on image. metaphor, example. on persuading and not arguing. And here, having indirectly 
reintroduced Sartre. Schopenhauer speaks of all motivation arising from a lack (WWR I, p196), 
of the need to promote the welfare of others if we wish or hope to increase or own (ibid., pp92). 
In Schopenhauer, as in Nietzsche - a formative influence on Sartre, and himself a 
Schopenhaurian in key essentials here. in all of these philosophers, and including Wittgenstein, 
there is to be found the main theme of our thesis. Thus. Nietzsche, 
One should speak only when one may not stay silent, and then only of that which one has 
overcome - even1hing else is chatter, 'literature', lack of breeding. My \vritings speak ollly 
of 111\' overcoming: T am in them, together with everything that was inimical to me, ego 
ipsissinills [my vcr}' 0\\11 self], indeed, if vet a prouder expression can pennitted, ego 
ipsissinl1lnl [my ilU1ennost seltl' 11 
This is just one of many locutions of the theme found throughout Nietzsche's works. A similar 
situation is found in Schopenhauer, as in the following account of our forthcoming thesis: 
When my teaching reaches its highest point, it assumes a negative character ... thus it can 
speak here anI}' of ",hat is denied or given up; ... but what is gained in place of this, what is 
laid hold of, it is forced to describe as nothing .... this may very well lie in the limitation of 
our point of view, NO\\, it is precisel}' here that the mystic proceeds positively. 12 
If here we have intimations of a Divide free philosophical community, and if such a prospect is 
unappealing. then we may wish to turn to Moore or Russell. But then, here is Russell: 
Mysticism is to be commended as an attitude towards life, not as a creed (p29) .... The 
elimination of ethical considerations from philosophy is both scientifically necessary and -
though this might seem a paradox - an ethical advance .... Thus the ethical interests which 
have often inspired philosophers must remain in the background: some kind of ethical 
interest may inspire the whole study (p45), ... paradox, that a philosophy which does not 
seek to impose upon the world its 0\\11 conceptions of good and evil is not only more likely 
to achieve truth, but is also the outcome of a higher ethical standpoint [there will be] a 
realisation of the limits of human power .... The good which it concems us to remember is 
the good which it lies in our power to create - the good in our own lives and in our attitude 
towards the world (p47). ". Human beings carulOt, of course, wholly transcend human 
nature: something subjecti\'e. if onl}' the interest that detennines the direction of our 
attention. must remain in all our thought (p48)'. 
This is from 'Mysticism and Logic'. written in 191.t. Here Russell is in effect summarising key 
aspects of Wittgcnstein 's final position (see below. especially ~5). at the time when it is presumed 
11 Nietzsche (19) Human, All Too Human. pp209 
12 Schopenhauer, World as Will and Representation. II, pp612 
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Wittgenstein had barely begun to think about his first Tractatarian proposition. Moreover, the 
above quotation from Russell's essay on mysticism encapsulates much of the subject matter to 
follow, in what is a very clearly non-Divide problematic of self. 
In reading Wittgenstein, as in reading Sartre, and unlike reading many other philosophers 
(especially Schopenhauer), one is stmck by the outward continuity between their work and the 
lives they lead. These authors are not dead, their intentionality is not a textual fallacy (and philo-
biographical matters should not be ignored): but as subjects they exist at the limit, as, it will be 
seen (§5) a transcendental message that is shown. But all remains situated, and showing, for all 
its formality, finds a place in saying, in the world, in actions (§3.l), such that both Sartre and 
Wittgenstein choose a life that shows: 
The intellect of man is forced to choose 
Perfection of the life or of the work, 
And if it take the second must refuse 
A heavenly mansion, raging in the dark. 
(Yeats, The Choice). 
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~1 
ART -AND-THE-INEFFABLE 
(CLARIFICATION AND DEFENSE) 1 
There are indeed things that cannot be put into words. They 
make themselves manifest. 
They are what is mystical. 
(Tractatus, 6.522) 
If the reality which one wants to signify is one word, it must 
be given to the reader by other words ... besides ... the 
greatest riches of the psychic life are silent. 
(What is Literature, pp122) 
The for-itself is always something other 
than what can be saidof it. (BN 439). 
1 A version of this chapter appeared in Philosophical Writings, No.5, May 1997. 
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§1 
This chapter aims to dcfend the generic concept of art-and-the-ineffable - and hence the 
remainder of the thesis - mainly by clarifying what is not necessarily entailed in holding such a 
thesis. Some prevalent prevailing presuppositions, the basis of most criticism of art-and-the-
ineffable. are laid bare as nasty misconceptions. Through this criticism and the rejection of a fit 
of misconceptions we havc the emergence of a more specific concept of art-and-the-ineffable -
one held by many philosophers. The basic tenets of such a thesis are held also, however, by the 
early Wittgenstein and Sartre. Their particular art-and-the-ineffable thesis, which is a cocktail of 
ideas idiosyncratic. traditional and original. is founded on poly-polar principle that is aesthetic, it 
is to be understood in terms of modalities. and is identified with the metaphysical subject (§3.liii 
& §4) and the problematic of self that directs this thesis. 
The approach in this chapter is thus: we work within a methodological limitation - that is, 
bv art. in what follows. the referent will be linguistic art. Generically the subject may be 
Literature or. better, poetry. Such art is paradigmed by metaphor and thus includes metonymy, 
synecdoche and other figurative modes of language. It excludes what I have termed, for want of a 
better term, ordinal), language - language taken as literal, discursive. denotative or significative. 
The objections to the idea of the ineffable that is transcended by art would seem to gain most 
force ,,,hen the art form is language itself. or at least a certain use of language, as trope. 2 (It is 
just this notion of art. of 'lingua-aesthetic deeds', that is central to the remainder of the thesis). 
2 D. Davidson is right to argue that if discourse does furnish itself with two meanings, literal and metaphoric, then 
this should not be understood as the view that sentences and phrases possess within themselves two meanings; but 
rather, that a sentence or phrase can be taken either literally or metaphorically, after which arises the question of its 
meaning and truth value - of which, in either case, the sentence mayor may not possess. But of course, as far as 
Davidson is concerned, metaphor is devoid of cognitive content, says nothing beyond the literal, and, taken 
metaphorically, a sentence is without meaning. See, for example, 'What Metaphors Mean' in S. Sacks (1978), pp29-
45. 
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Within this framework the opening section defines the concept 'art-and-the-ineffable'. Then, a 
short section clarifies \\'hat is the merely contingent relation of the ineffable to the 
incommunicable and the unknowable. This is followed by another short section that clarifies the 
central importance of a fact-value distinction. and what this entails. Next, in the long central 
section, the non-commitment to. and non-identification with. some relationship with emotions or 
the expression or representation of emotions is discussed: this entails a discussion of the' generic-
specific distinction', as well as the further idea that 'art embodies its meaning'. Two final 
considerations as taken from Kennick's Art and the Ineffable allow us to conclude this generic 
clarification, and do so with a final section on the issue in art-and-the-ineffable: the putative 
possibility of saying the unsayable. At this point the particular formulation of Wittgenstein and 
Sartre can and is allowed to stand clear. Finally, when still on the subject of approach, it should 
be noted that much of this chapter is commentator lead, a valid approach given that a central aim 
of this chapter is to defend a thesis . 
• Art-and-the-Ineffable?? 
In speaking of the ineffable we are speaking of a formal principle: obviously there is in 
practice the common experience of not being able to find. for psychological, physiological, social 
or cultural reasons, the words needed to define or describe a particular thought, feeling or 
sensation. It follows that the ineffable in practice is of linguistical, psychological, physiological, 
and even, Heaven and Hades forbid, sociological importance: but is of little philosophical interest. 
The ineffable in principle pertains to a formal and structural limitation within language itself. 
Combine this with a theory of art and we have the following (generically formulated) tri-part 
doctrine. Art-and-the-ineffable states that (a) Ordinary language constitutes its own formal limits 
to what can be said. (b) About such presumed ineffabilia something can in fact be communicated: 
by or through art. That is, art facilitates the transcending of the limits by communicating 
something in a sense, described multi-variously as, for example, 'indicating' or 'suggesting' or 
'showing'. (c) What is communicated, though similarly the formulation can and does vary 
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enormously, will be certain key truths. of religion, of ethics. and of aesthetics (of an abstract or 
intuitive meaning); of the self - as the precondition of the sayable, and as situationedness of 
private emotional states; of the metaphysical nature of the world, as essence or underlying reality. 
That this generic definition constitutes the claim of art-and-the-ineffable is unproblematic, 
it is held by many people including a whole tradition of our greatest philosophers and thinkers. 
However. the validity of the claim is dogged through the ages by controversy and criticism. In 
contemporary debate we are referred to W. E. Kennick's 1961 established paper Art and the 
InejJable3. This classic and inOuential work (itself influenced by Alice Ambrose's The Problem 
of Linguistic Inadeql.fGcy4) remains representative today of the approach taken by critics of art-
and-the-ineffable. 
The following analysis will reveal the fundamental weaknesses of a criticism which is either 
misplaced or steeped in bias. thus indicating the direction a fruitful criticism would have to take. 
In so doing, the representative views of Sartre and Wittgenstein are put fonvard . 
• Incommunicable and Unknowable? 
Is the ineffable the incommunicable. the unknowable, is it hence the mystical, and is it 
necessarily so? 
'Ineffable' is from the Latin. a compound of the prefix 'in', used to express negation and 
privation, and effabilis: to speak out. Hence, strictly speaking, the ineffable is not that which 
cannot be expressed, but a privation or negation of what can be expressed. If 'speaking out' could 
regain the attribute or quality that it is without. and which it formally possessed before loss, it 
could then express (or represent) itself fully. The loss of the ejJabilis may well be due to 
subjectivity. to. in Sartre for example. History: to, in Wittgenstein for example, the conditions of 
logical representation. In either case. that which we can 'speak out' about is limited, and limited 
3 W.E. Kennick, 'Art and The Ineffable', The Journal of Philosophy, LVIII, No.12, June 1961, pp309-320. 
4 A. Ambrose, 'The Problem of Linguistic Inadequacy' in M.Black (1963), pp14-35. 
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because it is conditioned as pri\'ative. Naturally. if this loss can be regained then the inherent 
privation can be transcended. Traditionally. religious experience and art have been seen as means 
of regaining the lost qualities or attributes. The distinctive feature of literature (as art) is its non-
literal use of language. It is in this sense that we can offer in philosophy and in aesthetics (and on 
the street) the following definition of 'ineffable': 'That which cannot be communicated, nor even 
expressed perhaps, by words (in their literal uses, at least)'5. This suggests, a truth of what 
follows, that a non-literal use of language can express what is otherwise lost in 'speaking out'. 
Naturally enough, the ineffable can be identified to the incommunicable, such is the case in 
Zen, where the ultimate mystery of life remains always inexpressible. Also, some things - we 
think of truths - may well be both ineffable and unknowable. as Kant also asserted about things-
in-themselves. This must not be confused. however, with the view that a person can, firstly, know 
something. though be unable. in principle. to say what it is: 'Though I was thwarted of my wish 
to know more. I was conscious of what it was that my mind was too clouded to see' (Augustine, 
Confessions bk.. 20): and secondly. that a person can then communicate this knowledge through 
some other method. a deed. including an aesthetic deed. This latter claim will be supported in 
what follows: as to the fonner. there is no shortage of arguments, and if need be more could be 
invented. I should rather invoke Augustine and Wittgenstein, the latter once said of Augustine 
that the conception must be important if so great a mind held it. In fact. it is cardinal as far as art-
and-the-ineffable is concerned that the ineffable certainly is communicable (it can be 'shown' for 
example). and in this sense it is lIsual(v identified with new knO\yledge (often in terms of 
intuition). and a second non-literal sense or meaning. It was Kant (and transcendental idealism) 
that give this claim to limits its theoretical respectability and grounded it. as did Wittgenstein and 
Sartre, in a concept of the subject. Thus, in what reads like a summary of much that is to follow. 
The subiect of the categories cannot by thinking the categories acquire a concept of itself as 
an object of the categories. For in order to think them, its pure self-consciousness, which is 
what was to be explained, must itselfbe presupposed (CPR, B422). 
In recent ti Illes what is now the thanatos of the nefandous objectifies itself 1Il the 
5 My emphasis - from D.E. Cooper (ed.), 'Ineffability', in A Companion to Aesthetics, pp221. 
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proliferation of textual debate between the poles of Ricoeur and Davidson. This is a massive 
debate, entercd by the present dissertation through its accounts of double meaning theory in 
Wittgenstcin and Sartre. But for thc present, singularly required is a clear recognition that art-
and-the-incffable accepts and argues for double meaning, and does so, in language as art, at the 
level of semantics (and also the lcyel of hermeneutics). The cognitive limits of the ordinary 
language (significative) pole are taken to be transcendable by a second non-literal cognitive 
content, drawn in experience from the poetic (symbolic) pole of a proposition as it opens up 
further realms of possible meanings. The point that we must take with us is this: that neither the 
ineffable nor art-and-the-ineffable is either necessarily incommunicable nor necessarily 
unknowable (prevalent and misleading assumptions, even among non-philosophers): and in fact, 
art-and-the-ineffable is a generic affirmation of the possibility of language transcendent 
experiences and their communicability: where a claim to knowledge (intuition, insight) will be 
made, and where the ,'cry existcnce of art-and-the-ineffable identifies the hope of the 
communicable: the point of art-and-the-ineffable is that the formal limitation on communicating 
is transcended in its reciprocity with the formal principle of 'showing' or 'suggesting'. In short, 
thc ineffable and art-and-the-ineffable can not justifiably be dismissed as 'mystical' in either the 
primary sense of pertaining to a reality beyond all apprehension or in the pejorative sense of 
,'ague speculation and belief without basis. If it is necessarily mystical, art-and-the-ineffable is so 
as a communicable communication of Being or Truth between self and ultimate reality (universe 
and/or God) . 
• The Fact-Value distinction 
The second key and too often overlooked aspect of art-and-the-ineffable consists III a 
distinction. that between fact and value. This ancient acquaintance haunts philosophy, it has a 
distinguishcd but chcqucrcd history - its purposc. since the Stoics and in the powerful systems of 
Kant and the Tractarian Wittgcnstcin. is to protcct through segregation a pure non-derivative (i.e. 
foundational) realm. Facts. the realm of science and empirical data, are bounded, given and 
classifiable (and Ycrifiable). Value is a matter of clarification or appropriation, or attitude to, the 
empirically vcrifiable facts of e:xistence. For Wittgenstein, value is identified with will, a silent 
attitude that changes the meaning of the world as a whole for the converted individual, but does 
not, because it cannot, effect the facts (6.43)6. The moral (and religious) implications are 
immense and cannot for Stoics or Wittgenstein be annexed from a consideration of art. Of the 
moral dimcnsion. Murdoch is surely right when she says that 
Post-Kant ian developments in moral philosophy outside the Hegelian tradition have been 
largely attempts at ditTerent versions of this fact-value distinction, which also appears in 
its more histrionic fonn in Sartre's e:xistentialism (ell soi and pour soi) and Heidegger's 
contrast of "everydayness" with heroic authenticity. 7 
Aside from the traditional identification of the fact-value distinction to morality, it must 
be observed that the relevance of the fact-value distinction to the propositions of language is 
neither as new or as peculiar as may be thought and indeed pre-dates Kant. Carnap saliently 
reminds us that 'The opinion that metaphysical propositions have no sense because they do not 
concern any facts. has already been expressed by Hume'. in the Enquiry8. In both Wittgenstein 
and Sartre. the metaphysical will become one with the moral and the aesthetic (below). A. 1. 
Aycr. like Carnap. embraces and places himself in this tradition. In his preface to Language, 
Truth and Logic, Ayer writes that 
The vie\vs which are put forward in this treatise derive from the doctrines of Bertrand 
Russell and Wiltgenstein, which are themselves the logical outcome of the empiricism of 
Berkeley and Humc. Like Humc, I divide all genuine propositions into two classes: those 
which, in his tenninology, concem "relations of ideas", and those which concem "matters 
of t~lct". 
Neither. in this propositional context and with the moral imperative, IS the relevance of the 
6 This does not entail that the two realms - fact-value - are pure and independent. As Rorty says, 'To use one set 
of sentences to describe ourselves is already to choose an attitude toward ourselves, whereas to use another set of 
true sentences is to adopt a contrary attitude' (Philosophy in the Mirror of Nature, pp364). As to Wittgenstein and 
Sartre, the relation between Fact (empirical self) and Value (attitudinal self) is discussed below, §3.1 i, and passim. 
7 Iris Murdoch Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals. Penguin, 1992, Chapter Two 'Fact and Value'. 
8 R. Carnap Philosophy and Logical Syntax. London, 1935. pp35/6 - and the final chapter of Hume's Enquiry. I do 
not address - directly - Carnap's criticism of Wittgenstein's' ineffability thesis. His criticism is directed especially 
against the propositions of the Tractatus: 'instead of keeping silent, he writes a whole philosophical book' (pp38), 
and his arguments are perhaps based on a (then endemic and) basic misunderstanding or a misrepresentation of 
the latter pages of the Tractatus. The foundation for such a reading may well have been the insistence of taking the 
Tracfatus' metaphysical propositions as normative when they must be regarded as descriptive. Of course, at one 
level, much of the present thesis is directed against the Positivist's misunderstanding. 
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fact-value distinction to Art peripheral or nove\. Susanne Langer has pointed out that: 
Poetry is quite generally regarded as communication, not of facts, but of the values the poet 
puts upon facts which, simply as facts, are as well known to us as to him. . .. [They] 
constitute what he says; the values are given by the way he says it. His aim ... is to make us 
share his particular way of experiencing the familiar events and conditions of the world. 9 
Rarely in tmth is it or has it been held that either the propositionally ineffable or art-and-
the-ineffable has anything to do with what are taken to be facts, i.e. the objects of scientific 
discovery and description. empirically verifiable states of affairs. (Though as we shall see things 
become more complicated in the phenomenological tradition, and the ontology of Sartre and 
Heidcgger in particular raises objections to the possibility of describing Being, objections which 
they. and especially Heidegger. clearly endorse, see §2.3-4. especially §2.3iii Being and 
Nothingness). Whereas facts are taken to constitute the realm of the sayable and are said to be 
satisfactorily represented or signified by literal discourse. the ineffable, even when conceived in 
terms of emotion, is seen to pertain to something empirically non verifiable. The fact-value 
distinction can take many forms. and it can be embraced in different domains, even within the 
confines of the existential subject and ali there are various levels to be dealt with - the linguistic 
(literal and figurative). the epistemological (perception and image) and the ontological (body and 
consciousness). And a particular commitment to the fact-value distinction is accepted by both 
Wittgenstein and Sartre and constitutes an important premise of their ineffability thesis (see 
below §2.2 and §2.3). Nonetheless. the singular stmctural point to note is this: that where art-
and-the-ineffable is concerned, the endemic fact-value premise cannot be ignored or overlooked; 
if it is not recognised or acknowledged then only misinterpretation can ensue. neither critical 
affirmation or castigation \"ill have foundation or justification. 
The commitment of art-and-the-ineffable to the fact-value distinction thus naturally pre-
empts and leaves foundationless many attacks on the doctrine. A particular and commonly used 
line of attack is ably mobilised by Kcnnick (1961). He characterises the ineffability thesis as 
9 Susanne Langer, Problems of Arl, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1957, pp146 
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holding that sentences 'say nothing or literally express no fact' (182) 10. The problem, he then 
maintains. is that when we consider the sentence, say. 'God is good'. then according to 'the 
mystical theologian' the sentence 'cannot literally be about God. cannot literary express a fact'. 
In all this we agree. Kennick then says that the theologian would nevertheless hold that the 
sentence is not without sense - again we agree - for 'metaphorically or symbolically it is about 
God and does express a fact'. My emphasis marks the point of departure. The mistake of 
identifying a metaphorical sense of a sentence. or better, the sense of a sentence metaphorically 
constmed. with the expression or representation of a fact leads Kennick into an unnecessary and 
illegitimate argument against the possibility of certain sentences expressing a second non-literal 
meaning. 'God is good' is of course a sentence with sense: but the sentence cannot, in any of 
numerous yariations on the same theme, be said to be expressing a fact - to begin with, neither 
subject nor predicate refer to anything empirically identifiable in the world. Taken literally. the 
sentence 'God is good' is without sense (sinn - though it has meaning, bedeutung, see next 
chapter). as \"ith the sentence 'The moon is a ghostly galleon', and as with the following 
proposition: 
Cogito. Ergo. Sum. -
The fathomless whiteness of your body 
The sun sleeping between our chests 
Our lips stilling oceans 
Our touching leaving the sky bereft, 
To the enllamed earth say only: I am. 
Some less emotionally absorbed critics of the ineffability thesis, in respect of the above 
difficulty. do recognise the imp0l1ance of the (linguistic) fact-value distinction. Henceforth, 
W.P.Alston (1956)11, in his dialogue between Jfvsticus and Phi/%gos, considers arguments for 
and against the possibility that the term 'God', for example, is one which either predicates or 
concepts can be applied to. 'To say that God is ineffable is to say that no concepts apply to Him', 
that He is unconceptualisablc (507). Alston's starting point is. he claims, in the 'philosophical 
10 Not necessarily equivalent rules, the former is readily identifiable with the logical positivists, the latter with 
Wittgenstein, the conflation endemic. 
11 W. Alston, 'Ineffability', Philosophical Review 65, October 1956, pp506-502. 
27 
tradition in which we ... can apply a conccpt to x whenever wc predicate an)1hing of x', and in 
which to do so is 'equivalent to saying x is conceptualizable' (508). Thus understood, the 
grammatical form of, say. 'God is good' is misleading, for it looks as if we are attaching a 
predicate (i.e. concept) to God when we are not. The proposition is said to be of the same status 
as 'King Arthur is fictitious': no predicate is attached to King Arthur. Nonetheless, it is argued, 
understanding the sentence means identifying the phrase 'God', therefore some condition of 
meaning, and hence concept, must. it seems, hold. But this does not, as is pointed out, effect the 
original claim: I could just as easily identify a person I do not know, Jane or Richard II, by saying 
'the girl \"hose picture was in last nights paper' or 'the character in Shakespeare's play'; in 
neither case do I predicate anything of the person: nor do I form a concept of them. Given a 
particular and persuasive theory of meaning. proper names have a non-conceptual status. The 
point being brought out by Alston's A(vsficlIs is that propositions which contain such phrases 
display a misleading grammatical form. so that when we say, for example, 'God is ineffable', 
ineffable is not predicating anything. Identifying x as ineffable is not to imply anything about 
what sort of entity x is. Another point as we are not predicating anything of x, we are not 
therefore in such cases speaking prescriptively. This is the position of Wittgenstein in the 
Tractatlls. To say 'Whereof one cannot speak. thereof one must remain silent' (7) is not to say 
anything about the x we canl10t speak of: the statement is purely, with the rest of the metaphysical 
propositions in the Tractatus. descriptive. To say God, art, self is ineffable is not to contravene 
the law of non-contradiction: it is to describe a state of affairs. A further point made by Alston is 
that some of these non-factual and therefore non-conceptualizable matters, including God, are 
such that they must be categorised undcr the umbrella term Value. This returns us to the main 
moral "ith \\'hich this discussion of the fact-value distinction began. It is one thing to dispute 
the cohercnce or validity of such a position. and its resulting theory of meaning: such a dialogue 
is clearly necessary. but not recognising its place in the scheme of things for theorists of art-and-
the-ineffable (such as for example Wittgcnstein) is something else altogether. 
The fact-value distinction is cnIcial and perhaps necessary to art-and-the-ineffable: the 
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many criticisms and arguments pitched against art-and-the-ineffable which take no account of a 
foundational premise are themselvcs without sense and serve only to mislead. 
• Emotions; The Generic-Specific distinction 
There is a second common and fundamental mistake made by philosopher-critics, one that 
generates still further spurious arguments and criticism, and consideration of which constitutes 
the promised third aspect of art-and-the-ineffable. In this case, it is not that a foundational 
premise has been overlooked or ignored, rather, such a premise has been attributed where none 
might nor need cxist. 
As art-and-the-ineffable necd have nothing to do with the practical difficulty of accurately 
stating particular feelings or emotions (abo\'e), then any criticism is spurious which is based 
solely on a view of art as being expressi\'e or mimetic of feelings or emotions which must 
otherwise remain inchoate. Although in fact both Wittgenstein and Sartre claim that language 
does ha\'e a problem in conveying emotional states (see §2.2), and although neither are against 
the idea that art can more readily express such emotional states, nevertheless there is for both 
philosophers far more to the ineffable than the emotional. It is not presently possible or desirable 
to argue for a theory of art that avoids commitment to the expression or representation of 
emotions: more to the point no such argument is required. Art mayor may not express or 
represent all the ineffable emotion it likes. What matters is that we are aware of the serious 
limitations inherent in the works of those critics \\'ho presume such a thesis is (a) a necessary 
condition of art-and-the-incffable and. (b). a sufficient condition of art-and-the-ineffable: in both 
cascs thc\' are mistaken, their arguments are not and cannot be validated by the fact that many 
art-and-the-ineffabilists do claim as part of their doctrine the view that art does express or 
represent emotion. This is often an empirical and contingent matter, drawing no breath from a 
formal principle: but when. as \"ith somc theoreticians, such a principle is invoked in an 
explanation of how dumb emotions find expression in art. then still this is one part of a wider 
principle and does not on its o\\'n guarantce that principle and cannot, therefore, be legitimately 
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used as a premise for an attack on art-and-the-ineffable. 
Nonetheless. for good or ill (the latter I ,,,ould suggest). the view that art conveys emotions, 
that it or the artist express or represent emotional states, is one with a great tradition in 
philosophy of art. Some consideration of the specific principles involved in such criticism would 
then seem to be called for, and will in fact prove fruitful in other ways. For it is not enough. 
perhaps. to state the generic confusions that structure much criticism - even though it is just such 
a confusion that underlies the most common attack on art-and-the-ineffable: the putative 
impossibility of art expressing otherwise ineffable emotions. This very offensive is usually 
conducted along the lines that there are two contrasting sets of terms used to express emotions, 
general and specific. The former are said to be abstract, inaccurate, imprecise; the latter are said 
to be concrete. accurate. precise. Kennick. for example, characterises art-and-the-ineffable as 
holding that all descriptions of emotions must come from the former group. (Empirically, this 
may "cll bc true: precise terms do not appear applicable [usefll11y applicable?] to the emotions; 
but logically. there is no reason why they should not). As an a priori claim, such a 'discovery' is 
seen by Kennick as 'uninformative'. How, asks Kennick, is it possible to maintain that art, 
'assuming that works of art are expressions of emotions', expresses emotions precisely, when all 
this can mean. when followed through. is that some works of art are good, successful or better at 
expressing emotions. The arf,'1lment (fully stated) is valid. but irrelevant to most art-and-the-
ineffable theories because it is based upon an erroneous premise, that works of art are defined in 
terms of artefacts that express emotion. In fact the thesis that language generalises and art 
particularises is not one that art-and-the-ineffable is bound to: rather, it appears bound up with 
those ,,·ho hold that the ineffable is exclllsive~v concerned with those emotional experiences that 
,111. as the expression of emotion. is said to communicate. 
A similar idea to that based on the above noted generic/specific distinction is found in Alice 
Ambroses' pre-Kennick paper 1I7e Prohlelll of linguistic Inadequacy. She says that to some 
extent the ineffable thesis depends upon the vicw that it is the 'Communication of the 
concreteness of our experience [that] is impossible' (29). Ambrose offers as a reason the idea that 
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'specificity always escapes embodiment in general terms'. She quotes Whitehead to the effect that 
art aims to embody what it indicates. and claims the statement is self-contradictory: what would it 
be like for the 'experience indicated by a colour word to be incorporated in the language?' She 
continues. 
Apparently the experience itself would be in the position of a word. But in that case the 
embodiment would function to indicate something beyond itself. It would then not be an 
embodiment, but a symbol - the original unsatisfactory substitute for the experience. The 
only meaning we can give to the expressed aim that what the symbol inadequately stands 
for should be embodied in the symbol is that what the symbol stands for should replace the 
symbol. (29) 
These are cmcial issues and it is especially disappointing to be faced with such a misleading 
picture - there are too many problems here. The first statement - that experience should be in the 
position of a \yord - is without justification: we cannot countenance this particular dismissal of 
Whitehead (and by proxy the ineffable) who. with Russell and Wittgenstein, excepted - with 
modifications - a basic tenet of Fregean semantics. That is, he unit of meaning is the proposition 
and not the word. or sign: this is a cardinal point (discussed below, §2.2,) adhered to also by 
phenomcnoligists such as Sartre (§2.3i ). and one which there is no reason within the present 
(inclusive) debate not to apply equally whcther wc takc a scntence literally or metaphorically. 
Returni ng thus to Ambrose' s first point. we can state that the experience would have to be 
'in the position or a sentence or a phrase. not 'a word'. Take. for an expansive example, the 
word 'belly' or the word 'breath' or the word 'sea' or the word 'pulse' or the word 'day'; what in 
each case is the semantic source of experience? It is a sign, a meaning, it is not, as Wittgenstein 
helps us to see. a symbol - that which bears meaning and sense (sinn). Now, take the proposition 
'your belly is the breath of the sea and the pulse of the day' 12. What. again. is the semantic source 
of the experience'? In both parts of the example, as sign and then as symbol (proposition), a 
phenomenological description may \\ell be endless - but for different reasons, as based on the 
bedel/tum!. sinn distinction. Nonetheless. what for certain can be said is that there is a qualitati"e 
difference in experiencing this unit as a sign and as a symbol; and that this is theoretically 
12 A proposition, by Octavio Paz, that must be taken metaphorically - unless we are to deny that the poetry of Paz, 
Shakespeare, Dante, Goethe, Keats et at has meaning? 
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explained in terms of the latter having both meaning and sense l3 . 
If now we proceed to Ambroses' next poine to say that the word - or, to be generous, the 
proposition - indicates something beyond itself and functions therefore as a 'symbol', this is 
equally spurious. For example, Kennick. who in all this is lead by the hand of Alice, but who sees 
more, quotes Miss Ambrose as follows (my lettering): 
[a] Suppose we require that tenns describing experience be made less and less general until 
finally a point is reached where they carry in themselves what they indicate. [b] At this 
point one would apparentl)' not have a symbol at all, but the experience. [c] An experience, 
not a symbol, would now be a constituent of the description, in which case understanding a 
statement about someone' s experience would consist in having the experience. 111is is to 
say the symbol would incorporate its referent only by no longer referring to something 
beyond itself. But then it would no long.er be a symbol. (Quoted from Kennick [1961], 
pp3\9) 
It is a priori tempting to accept 'a' as a real possibility, i.e. a position on which both 
effabilists and ineffabilists could agree upon. On the other hand, it does not follow that words, 
'terms', could ever be the experience itself. It becomes clear that something queer has happened 
in this argument. The point 'terms' reach when they carry in themselves what they indicate is 
not. I do not believe. an experience - nor obviously is it a symbol: it is, as has elsewhere been 
stated, that of embodiment. Admittedly. the word 'embodiment' suggests experience (even for 
philosophers). but we no\\' know not to allow diction to lead us astray. If we are to make any 
sense of this concept and these arguments we must mean by 'embodiment' expression, and not 
experience14 . Again. we must be careful not to be led astray by the ordinary meaning. Thus the 
term 'expression' is to be understood in the same way that Roger Scruton uses it, i.e. 
intransitivcly15. Hence. the usual use of expression (in art) is transitive. such that the question 
arises as to what is being expressed (by a poem. say); \yhereas intransitively expressiveness is 
identified with the art-work, or rather \yith the 'power' or 'effect' of the work. In this sense, the 
impact of a work of art is not specifiable in any \yay other than by direct reference back to the 
13 The cognitive status of this sinn is irrelevant in the present circumstances, as is the question of truth, the 
semantic consideration is primary ( see also note 2 above). 
14 The notion that works of art are 'iconic embodiments of their meaning or significance' is one that Stephen Mulhall 
considers in some detail in his On Being in the World: Wittgenstein and Heidegger on Seeing Aspects, Routledge, 
1990. 
15 R.Scruton, The Aesthetic Understanding, Carcanet Press, 1983. 
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work itself. to the art-work as a whole. Both embodiment. which entails expression. and symbol, 
are thus pre-conditions of an experience. not the experience itself. Statement 'a' - the supposition 
that we require terms which describe experience to reach a point where they carry in themselves 
what they indicate - this then seems in fact to be false. But even if true, statement 'b' (that 
originally terms are not symbols but experiences) is certainly false - the argument may be valid, 
its premises and conclusion are all false. In effect. what we should read at 'c' is the following: 'an 
expression is the description that is offered when the terms that describe an experience reach the 
point where they carry in themselves what they indicate'. 
That embodiment could function to indicate something beyond itself we can agree, but we 
assert, with the company of Wittgenstein, that this is not an experience itself and it can only be 
understood by referring back to the ,york itself. Further, that this then entails that this 
embodiment is a symbol (having both meaning and sense) clearly and patently does not follow. 
Embodiment. the formal structure. entails meaning; sense, a possibility, requires representation 
(cf. detailed discussion at §2.2). Finally. as experience is not embodiment. and as embodiment as 
expression is. must be, an intransitive quality, then even if we ignored the other counter-
arguments. it would not ensue that this symbol was the 'original unsatisfactory substitute for the 
experience': Unless. a singular possibility, we are founding the arguments on a particular view of 
art as (transitively) expressing emotions. Such a position is of course maintained by some 
philosophers of art. but if such a view is to be seen as a necessary condition of art-and-the-
ineffable. and thereby used to inform one's arguments against art-and-the-ineffable, as in the 
above examples. then naturally one's criticisms must be found wanting. 
That art is the expression of emotions is a bacterial view: since Rousseau, Romanticism has 
spread it wide and insidious. unfortunately there appears to be no antidote, and it thrives to an 
alarming cxtent in the criticisms of art-and-the-ineffablc: the criticisms of Ambrose and Kennick 
arc no more than representative. 
Kennick in fact opens his attack on art-and-the-ineffable by stating that there is 'no 
condction in aesthetics more deeply rooted than that ,yorks of art expresses what cannot be 
33 
cxpressed in ordinary discourse' (309). As a generic claim this is fairly uncontroversial (though it 
must be stresscd contra Kennick that it does not entail expressing emotions and expression is to 
be understood. I believe, as intransitive). As to this conviction, he plans to show that 'the 
principlc arguments that have bcen offered in its favour are without substance'. He then cites 
PralL Dewey. and Langer as exponents of this \'iew and summarises their positions thus: 
Prall says that language cannot name the feelings that works of art embody and convey; 
Dc\\c\' says that language cannot reproduce the feelings that works of art express and 
evokc; and Mrs. Langer says that language cannot give us insight into, or knowledge of, 
feelings, whereas works of art can. (311). 
A good cnough summary, perhaps, but why these three? An all too conveniently emotional 
trinity. 
It is clear that Kennick. Ambrosc. and the neo-positivist tradition of criticism they may well 
represent. cannot. for all the validity of their arguments, succeed in showing that 'the principle 
argumcnts' of art-and-the-inef[able are 'without substance'. Whether we ignore the fact-value 
distinction. or whether the premise for a general attack on art-and-the-inef[able is that art objects 
represent or express (in the transitive sense) emotions or feelings, or whether it is the narrower 
point regarding thc generic-specific distinction. or finally whether it is the claim that art-and-the-
ineffable is committed to the vicw that art communicates concrete experience and its coroUary 
that art objects cannot embody what they indicate (meaning), when any of these positions is 
assumed as a premise for an attack on art-and-the-ineffable, then it is like marching in arms into 
a deserted and snowy Moscow, guns. flags. and pens waving in the cold empty air. 
• Saying the Unsayable? 
Two final points require some comment before closing this defence via clarification of art-
and-the-ineffable. and again in Kennick we find them ably and representatively stated. They 
return us to an earlier issue, but make different points. to the key issue, that of communication. 
Regarding thc idea that a work of art is a vchicle of communication. this, he believes, is 
essentially unproblematic: but that. such a notion implies 'that there is something wrong with 
ordinary discourse' (310). Such a complaint. hc says. is unfounded. unreasonable or no complaint 
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at all, it is like a man complaining 'that there must be something wrong with his protractor 
because with it he could not draw a square circle' (318). If Kennick has here identified the 
'complaint" against ordinary discourse then. for good or ill, his condemnation would stand. But 
alas, this is representative of another common mistake or misrepresentation: Kennick and 
company are all excited over a clay hare. The suggestion, embodied in the concept of art-and-the-
ineffable, is not in fact, that there is something wrong with ordinary discourse; rather, it is that 
such discourse is limited. in the same way, we might well say, that our audio, tactile or visual 
field is limited. 
'Works of art may serye as vehicles of illumination and enlightenment but they do not do 
so by saying the unsayable, communicating the incommunicable .... What works of art say can be 
said in words' (320). It has already been made absolutely clear that the ineffable and the 
incommunicable are not the evening and morning star. More to the point, the claim of art-and-
the-ineffable is never (as far as I am aware) that works of art say the unsayable. lfworks of art do 
say something, as linguistic works of art undoubtedly do, then yes of course they do and must say 
it with words: what they say, if they say, is the sayable, i.e., drawing on the fact-value 
distinction. the literal. But works of art do not say the unsayable. Art-and-the-ineffable holds that 
works of art. as works of art (and here to our apparent disadvantage we are still speaking of 
linguistic works of art). define themselves by a second, non-literal. non factual, cognitive content. 
Just how we shall characterise this is the subject of much of the rest of the dissertation. 
Nonetheless. one thing is proYisionalIy and thankfully clear. The existence of a second non-literal 
meaning is not something that is communicated in the sense that it is said. Such communication 
is spoken of variously as connotation. suggestion. or as an image, a picture, showing. Just how 
such a second non-literal cognitiye content arises is itself constituted by different philosophers in 
differing terms - ambiguity. resonance, expression. These are large and troublesome questions -
but the single point in the picture that we need to hold on to is that art-and-the-ineffable does not 
claim to be saying the unsayable. the latter - in for example, Sartre and Wittgenstein - is said to 
be shown. 
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Saying is not showing. and works of art do not say the unsayable. they show the unsayable. 
Frank Ramsey's quip apropos the Traclatus, that what cannot be said cannot be whistled either, 
is notable for its self-refutability: some of us may well be fortunate enough to be able to whistle 
the score of Beethoven's Seventh Symphony, but say it, no. Not because it is in an untranslatable 
language or medium. but because it is a non conceptual medium. an indirect language. 
Of course, the view that language shows what it formally cannot say is typified in a most 
original and rigorous way by Wittgenstein in his Tractatus. The Tractatus does not permit of 
metaphysical statements that say anything. The inexpressible is also the ineffable 
(unaussprechlich). it is this that shows itself. To quote from that erudite and empathic study of 
the Tracfatus. Max Black's 'Companion'. Wittgenstein's 
book cannot he held to 'say' anything, for it would be a howler to take it as consisting of 
empirical statements. But there remains the altemative of treating many of his remarks as 
Connal statements, . showing' something that can he shown. Then they will he in no worse 
case than logical and mathematical statements and there \vill be no theoretical barrier to 
their use in rational communication. 16 
A more complete defence of art-and-the-incffable would have to include the affirmation of a 
particular doctrine such as Wittgenstein's - indeed. in the early works of Wittgenstein and Sartre 
we find such an account of art-and-the-ineffable, one that holds fl1rther interest as it impinges 
upon a concept of self that. with its commitment to the framework set out above, and its ethical 
(existential) ideaL constitutes the problematic that will direct the remainder of this thesis. 
Before proceeding, we should end here by noting that. like so much in philosophy, the 
target which critics of aI1-and-the-ineffable aim at often has less reality than they assume; in this 
case. less reality than for example Beethoven's Tenth Symphony. It would appear (and this is all 
too familiar) that such philosophers are prone to creating their own subject of pleasure, that their 
projects defend their prejudices. psychology and ideology clothed as philosophy. case studies for 
the historians of Therapeutical Philosophy. It is a misleading picture that they paint, and at the 
very least it leads them and their readers to misunderstandings and erroneous conclusions. It is 
against such misrepresentation that art-and-the-ineffable. like the transcendental, must these days 
16 M. Black, A Companion to Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus', Cambridge University Press, 1964. pp381 
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defend itself. 
Still. it is not that the picture which holds these philosophers captive is wholly incorrect, 
though as \ve saw in parts it is. Perhaps indeed it is a comforting picture: that everything can be 
said. that Art is in fact art. that Art is a pretence to new insights, to a spurious realm of meaning 
and communication. And perhaps the alternative to such a picture would be The Wager, and 
perhaps the anxiety that art and ethics is one is too much - and yet, for all this, I believe the 
greater anxiety lies ultimately in the denial of the existence of judgements and experience that 
can OI1~V he shown, where, as is the case, emphasis falls back on human action, on the situated 
selL and on the possible as theoretically possible through Art: if religion, ideology and philosophy 
faiL succeeding in fact only insofar as they show us something of value. then a pure metaphysics 
of showing, in terms of a metaphysics of aesthetics, may well succeed. 
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§2 
SAYING-SHOWING; 
EMERGENCE OF SELF 
[It is] in language that the limit can be drawn ... the metaphysical 
subject, the limit of the world. 
(Tractatus, 5.641) 
The pour soi is always something other than can be said of it. '" 
Ordinarily, to describe something is a process of making explicit 
by aiming at the structures of a particular essence. Now freedom 
has no essence. Indefinable and unnamable, is freedom also 
indescribable? 
(Being and Nothingness, pp439). 
[The poet] considers words as a trap to catch fleeing reality, 
rather than as indicators which throw himself into the midst of 
things. In short, all language is for him the mirror of the world. 
(What is Literature?, pp6) 
What can be shown, cannot be said. 
(Tractatus, Preface) 
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§2 
Firstly, (at §2.1) some cautionary comments on what some would see as a contentious inner 
shin from a theory of art-and-the-ineffab1e. (as described above in §l, and as entailed 
throughout), to the theory of aesthetic experience which is found in Sartre and Wittgenstein, and 
which underpins their concept of art-and-the-ineffable. and which is to be central to the 
problematic of self. Next. §2.2 summarises Wittgenstein's Tractarian notion of the ineffable and 
its corollary the saying-showing distinction. It is not necessary to dwell on these well known 
concepts - at least when the emphasis is on the linguistic dimension - and a brief forward-looking 
exegesis is given. On the other hand. that Sartre is even philosophically interested in language 
may be contentious. Thus the first section of §2.3 begins with an attempt to confirm Sartre's 
interest in. and relation to, language. in terms of his methodology. The two remaining sections 
then set out to prove that Sartre is in fact committed to a notion of language in terms of the 
ineffable and a saying-showing distinction. The case for Sartre and such a thesis is not well 
known, and is perhaps being made for the first time, this necessitates much detail, and the 
lengthy discussion (in three PaJ1S) incorporates many minor as well as major points, including 
comments on his concept of the 'image' (and imagination) as this also entails the crucial 
linguistic notion of Ie sens; the discussion also includes an important sub-section on my 
interpretation of What is Literature?, Ie sens and poetI)', a necessary addition for both the 
intrinsic claim and its \yider theoretical import to the aesthetic solution. §2 . ..t. begins with some 
comments on a traditional philosophical notion of definition which helps. as first indicated in the 
discussion of Sal1re, to explain yia contextualization. Sartre's (and to a lesser extent 
Wittgenstcin 's) commitment to linguistic inadequacy and the ineffable. An attempt to offer some 
such philo-historical background must be seen as particularly important in the case of Sartre. The 
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remainder of this final section summarises. firstly, the lengthy discussion of Sartre, and secondly 
the key points of convergence between the two philosophers. and does so by shifting the emphasis 
from the ineffable to the possibili~v of (aesthetic) showing and the self. 
~2.1 THE INEFFABLE: FROM ART TO AESTHETICS 
It was stated above (§J) that it is out of art-and-the-ineffable that a particular aesthetic 
emerges. To some this will be very contentious, at least prima facie, for any supposed 
coextensivity between art and aesthetics cannot be taken for granted. Supposing that the account 
of the ineffable and showing that is being drawn on in Wittgenstein and Sartre does entail some 
notion of aesthetic experience, even so, in itself this is insufficient to assume that any demands 
were thereby being made on a theory of Art. Recall that Kant for example claims, persuasively 
with much particularity. that our aesthetic sensibilities are initially aroused by our experience of 
nature. The claim thel1. is not that art and aesthetics are coextensive, or that they are so in the 
philosophy of Sal1re and Wittgenstein, problematically or otherwise. No such claim could be 
reasonably upheld in the present work. The claim is that as far as the works under discussion are 
concerned. the aesthetics of showing (in §5) does, for good or ilL draw on a theory of art. It does 
so. as shall be seen. in its demands upon the concept of disinterestedness. Disinterestedness, since 
at least the time of Kant in the Western canon. has consistently been taken to be an ingredient of 
aesthetic experience. And more specifically, it has been and is identified with the aesthetic 
attitude. It is this disinterested attitude, that of a non-utilitarian 'purposeless purpose', that can, 
and is sometimes taken as central to an understanding of the nature of Art. The theory of art that 
is found in the early works of Wittgenstein and Sartre is committed to such a thesis. Art exists as 
an unreality. and at a distance: it is the resulting and reciprocal disinterestedness which 
characterises, and identifies. art with the aesthetic experience of art. with the aesthetic attitude. 
For purposes here. the following suffices: that neither of the following two points is taken 
for granted: firstly. any move from cut to aesthetics. or, secondly, the fact that it is a move that 
both Wittgenstein and Sartre made in their early thought and which is therefore entailed in the 
following discussion. This second point will be made clear in the final chapter. 
~2.2 WITTGENSTEIN: SAYING AND SHOWING 
So much has been said on the Tractarian account of the ineffable and the saying-showing 
distinction, much of it by now (thankfully) uncontentious, that here my intention is to do little 
more than outline Wittgenstein's position, with an obvious emphasis on those aspects - still 
contentious - which will permit the important comparison to Sartre, the self and aesthetic 
showing. The following, after a preparatory comment, is divided into four parts: an outline of 
what Wittgenstcin terms the lIlysliche, its relation to 'saying' and then 'showing', and finally a 
conclusion. 
Wittgenstein in his own preface to the Tractatus introduces an important preliminary point: 
'The whole sense of the book might be summed up in the following words: what can be said at all 
can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence (T pp3)'. It is 
cmcial to the present thesis that this statement of intent - and all it implies - (which includes it 
will be seen what Wittgenstein calls the lIlystiche as well as the self) is taken as definitive. This 
should not raise any eyebrows. the evidence is overwhelming, both internal and external, for an 
interpretation of the Tractatus as being a \\ork \\hich is internally unified by an ethical doctrine l . 
The present thesis does offer evidence in support of Wittgenstein's claim - most especially, that 
the concepts of showing, self, and matters of value are inextricable, and bound up with the 
Tractaflls as a work that must properly speaking be understood as an ethical and aesthetic deed. 
Holding all this together is the central distinction between saying and showing: the logical form 
of symbolic, propositional representation which. along with mystical pronouncements, cannot be 
stated. The bi-surface stmcture of the Tracfatlls: atomistic ontology, picture theory and science, 
1 See many of the works listed in the bibliography, including the excellent philo-historical account in Janik, A and 
Toulmin, S (1973) Wittgenstein's Vienna. 
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against self, solipsism, ethics and aesthetics, is held together by the saying-showing distinction. 
The Tractalus is not, so a claim of the present thesis nms, a work on logic and language with an 
appendage to the self, ethics, and value. Fe\\' conceptions, as will be seen, could be further from 
the truth. 
The MJ'stiche. What is beyond the meaning of all propositions is what Wittgenstein calls 'the 
lIIystiche'. To draw together all the forms of Wittgenstein's generic mystiche is to picture his 
pantheon of the ineffable. the very existence of which implicates the doctrine of showing. With 
only smoke damage to this picture the lIIystiche can be placed under four headings. One: The 
truths of logic (6. 12fl). Two: The way propositions acquire sense, picture (3.262, 4.022, 4. 12fl). 
Three: The possibility of the laws of nature (6.36). Four: Matters of value (5.62, 6.421, 6.44/5, 
6.52 J -2, 7). 
Possibly no one engaged in a study of Sartre has as yet been concerned to any worthwhile 
extent with the truths of logic, and in the present work only a minimum comparative requirement 
will be satisfied, and done so passilll. Nor. in this study, is there too much concern with points 
Two and Three: the exception is some important remarks made below regarding the problem of 
defining essences. which therefore includes both the form of scientific laws and pictorial and 
logical forll/. The thesis can therefore continue discussing the mystiche within terms of its and the 
Tractallls' central concern. that of Value. 
'How things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is higher' 
(6.432). The fact-value distinction in the Tractatus (below, passinl) is a matter of semantics 
embedded in ontology. Facts, we will see, are in the realm of saying; Value in that of showing, 
where Value is given a universaL non-relative status2. In the realm of Value, of what 'is higher', 
2 In introducing a universal-non-relative distinction into his account of value Wittgenstein is making what could be a 
Kantian distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives. A concrete example which supports this view 
is offered in his Lecture on Ethics (LE), a work from the very beginning of Wittgenstein's mid-period, and very similar 
in content to his Tractarian position. In this lecture Wittgenstein distinguishes between a 'good tennis player' and 
'Good'. The former is the sayable, a fact in the world - it is contingent, empirical, verifiable etc., but the latter is 
universal, a matter of the world as a whole: it is, as a judgement, what ought to be the case. It is also a necessary 
condition of the former, and it finds itself in the realm of the ineffable. 
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Wittgenstcin places logical form. ethics. aesthetics, the ethical will. the metaphysical subject and 
philosophical inquiry itself: they are all seen as being transcendental (6.·n 1ft). Thus in what 
follows. unless otherwise stated, the mystical, Value, is to be understood in a specifically ethical 
and aesthetic sense, including of course, the account of self as (metaphysical)-subject. 
Sa~ling. Wittgenstein's early philosophy would seem to rest on his conception of language 
which, in turn. depends upon the picture theory of meaning and the implied doctrine of saying 
and showi ng. According to this all pictorial representations pertain in virtue of what Wittgenstein 
calls logical form, ·the form of reality' (2.181). Logical form is the minimum and necessary 
requirement and is common to any and all pictures. The determinate way names are concatenated 
to each other as a picturing relation Wittgenstein calls 'pictorial form': 'Pictorial form is the 
possibility that things are related to one another [i.e. in the world] in the same way as the 
elements of a picture' (2.151). The correlative elements of picture and world are names and 
objects. A name denotes an object (a simple thing)3; where these objects are the foundational 
constituents of reality. A (determinate - by the objects they represent) concatenation of names 
forms an elementary proposition "'hich is the basic picturing unit, representing a possible 
situation. assemblage of objects or 'a fact [which] is the existence of a state of affairs' (2.). 
Central to this structure is a tcchnical distinction between 'sense' and 'meaning' (adopted 
from Frege, but modified). Names can havc meaning but not sense, and propositions can have 
sense but not meaning (3.3). A name has meaning when it does in fact represent (3.221) - 'stand 
proxy for' - an object. A proposition has sense when it does in fact correlate - 'represent' - a 
possible state of affairs. arrangcment of objects or fact (3.1-1-). In both these affirmative cases, 
name and proposition are each said to be. respectively. 'simple sign' (3.202) and 'sign' (3. 14ft). 
Mcaning (hedeutllng) is a matter of a particular and determinate structure, obtained when a 
simple sign dcnotes or refcrs to an object (verbal, psychic. graphic, physical) in a state of affairs. 
3 Meta-arguably an object and a simple thing are not identifiable - but this does not effect the case. Glock (1996) 
following Hacker claims they are identifiable. 
The meaning of a picture IS both determinate and experimental. 'A proposition possesses 
essential and accidental features. Accidental features are those that result from the particular way 
the propositional sign is produced [i.e. the structure of the sentence). Essential features [i.e. 
verifiable states of affairs] are those without which the proposition could not express sense' 
(3.34). Sense (sinn) is a formal possibility. 'What a picture represents is its sense' and it is this 
'agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality [that) constitutes its truth or falsity' 
(2.22112). Hence, each name in the picture must refer to an object in the situation; the objects are 
given and determinate, but the truth or falsity of a proposition (picture) is experimental: 'In order 
to tell whether a picture is true or false we must compare it to reality' (2.223). Thus, any 
proposition with meaning can be asserted. experimentally. and only then can it be verified by 
comparing it to reality. The formal limit to what can be - legitimately - said, is constrained to 
propositions by both sense and meaning. Ultimately, this comes down to facts, the empirically 
verifiable, the terrain of natural science: 'The world is the totality of facts ... If all the true 
elementary propositions are given. the result is a complete description of the world'. This is a 
description of 'how' the world is. and is of far less importance than the ethical (and thus 
aesthetic) existential experience 'that' the world exists: 'How things are in the world is a matter 
of complete indifference for what is higher' (1.. '+.26. 6'-+32). 
For all its cursoriness the above account omits one crucial feature of the central structure of 
the picture theory of meaning. Sense (sinn) is. as stated, a fonnal possibility - but it is also a 
mental event. It is this feature which ultimately answers the vexed question: 'How do the 
clements of a picture actually relate to the world?' ('isomorphic representation' can only be part 
of the answer). Such a relationship Wittgenstein calls 'pictorial' (2.1514). It is said to be a 
correlation bet\\een the pictures elements and the situation it represents. It is this pictorial 
relationship that introduces a 'method of projection' (3.11). That is, provided that other 
necessary (combinational) criteria have been fulfilled. what is left IS this: an elementary 
proposition constitutes the possihilill' of depiction - actual depiction depending upon a method of 
projection (2.15130. Thus. a 'propositional sign' would have within its structure the formal 
possibility of sense: 'a proposition does not actuallv contain its sense. but does contain the 
possibility of expressing it' n .13(). As far as sense is concerned. its content is added to the given 
form. Without content the propositional sign does not depict, which means it does not become a 
symbol. The sign becomes a symbol through a method of projection. 'A proposition includes all 
that the projection includes' it does not contain 'what is projected' (3.13). 
The claim, regarding the self in the following chapters, is that this method of projection 
involves an intentional structure that entails the self, and that this in turn formulates the actual as 
opposed to formal possibility of sense and. therefore, (aesthetic) showing. For the present, 
however. \\"e are satisfied that an important exegetical requirement has been fulfilled: that of 
identifying the semantic source of the 'intentional-self, the metaphysical subject, in a detail of 
the picture theory of meaning and the possibility of saying. What then of the possibility of 
showing? 
Showing. If the sayable is the Factual and the contingent, what remains. and what lies beyond 
language. will be Value and necessity. The sayable is concerned with the objects or simples 
which are in the world: value is concerned \\"ith the world as a whole. Propositions express facts, 
contingencies. Value and logic are not contingencies, but necessary structures (of the world as a 
whole), they are in this (Kantian) sense transcendental. Thus. although value propositions are not 
and cannot be excluded from the Tractarian account of propositions. their importance rests within 
this very fact. A value proposition is significant in that it attempts to say something which can 
only be ShO\\"11 - it pushes against the limits of language, as Wittgenstein elsewhere says. 
Matters of value. as with the rest of the ineffable can. nevertheless, claims Wittgenstein, be 
shown. In order for a proposition to picture. it is dependent upon a logical structure which it must 
share with reality: logical (and also. pictorial) form (above). This underlying structure, common 
to all propositions. constituting the very possibility of saying. can only be shown. For in order to 
picture logical (pictorial) form one would have to stand outside any attempt at picturing: but then, 
one could not picture at all! A picture cannot both step outside itself and depict itself: 'What can 
be said can only be said by means of a proposition, and so nothing that is necessary for the 
understanding of all propositions can be said' (N 25). Given Wittgenstein's account of 
propositions. their necessary, prerequisite features are beyond representation. Thus for example, 
the pseudo-propositions of logic (those with formal concepts) do not deal with facts, they have no 
application to the world: they are non-sense - and it is in this, their being non-sensicaL that, says 
Wittgenstein. they show something. Similarly, with tautologies and contradictions, exactly 
because they say nothing about the world. the logical properties of language and world are shown. 
Ordinary (denoting) propositions show their underlying logical structure in their application. 
(3.262). 
Finally. propositions pertaining to value and life are also non-sensical. Value propositions 
are pseudo-propositions. \yithout sense: for example, 'The world of the happy man is a different 
one from that of the unhappy man' (6.·B). This does not refer to anything in the world, it does 
not s~v any1hing. It will be seen that all propositions which are not describing the states of affairs 
of 'natural science'. propositions that are in fact concerned with value or what Wittgenstein terms 
the 'world as a whole' are non-sensical. say nothing. And such propositions, about the world as a 
whole. show us something about that world. The claim is that value propositions show something 
of the first impOl1ance. in this case. as I shall now outline. about Value. (life), and self. 
Conclusions. Here. five key points of lasting interpretative value will be noted. Firstly, the bi-
polarity of language \\'ith the claim to showing ensures that the ineffable is not necessarily the 
incommunicable (see above. ~ I): it is what cannot be said. the ineffable if it is thus to be 
communicated. \\ill have to be sho)l'n. 
The second main point of this conclusion hinges on the fact that such matters as those that 
cannot be said are not gibberish or nonsense. Yes. they lack sense (sinn), but this is a technical 
distinction \\'hich has been blurred by the intellectual sloth of ordinary language as practised by 
an audience that comes to the gathering with its own agenda. The status in the Tractatus of what 
cannot be said is unequivocal: such statements arc not nonsense. they lack sinn and are what is 
most important in life. The fact that some things cannot be said but can be shown is not due to 
some confusion of logic - it is not something to be removed by logical analysis. Metaphysics is 
non-sense, its statements unverifiable - this much, the roots of truth for some, the Positivists saw. 
But why were Ayer and co. afraid to look up from the roots to the crown? Metaphysics is non-
sense, its statements are unverifiable and thus it is \\'hat is most important in life. On this the 
Tractatlfs is as clear as a tree in a wheat field. That the truths which are metaphysics can only be 
shown is an ontological fact. something, for Wittgenstein, to admire and defend. For what is 
shown is something of importance, of the first importance. 
A third - and centrally important - consequence of the above discussion is the satisfaction of 
an exegetical requirement: that of identi(ving the semantic source of the 'intentional-self (the 
main subject of the remainder of this thesis) in a detail of the picture theory of meaning and the 
possibility of saying. Facts, including the ego or psychological self, and the propositions of 
natural science constitute the sayable. Ethics. aesthetics, logical form and the metaphysical pole 
of the bi-polar self are to be found in the realm of value, in the realm of the ineffable and 
showing. Propositions of value that involve judgement highlight this claim: for traditionally, a 
judgement is an act-object term. the object sense will always be true or false, a matter of belief, 
whereas the act sense depends upon a propositional attitude, a matter of decision. Choice, and not 
belief is, clearly is for Sartre. the point where we are to locate the (original) self. The self is in the 
realm of value and \\'ill have to be shown. 
The fourth main point concerns Wittgenstein's bedeutllng-sinn distinction. Sartre divides 
his semantic into two. this is based on a tcchnical distinction bctween signification-sens, a 
distinction that in both form and application mirrors Wittgenstein's bedeufllng-sinn distinction, 
as \\'e shall go on to see. 
Fifth and final main point. Sartre's signification-sens distinction underlies a generic and 
practical claim. that the bi-polarity of language, between sign and symbol, between saying and 
showing. is the founding principIc behind a distinction between poetry and prose. I should say 
that similarly Wittgenstein' s account of saying-showing supports such a generic and practical 
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use of language. 
This claim. that Wittgenstein's YCI)' specifically formulated saying-showing distinction 
supports a generic and practical account of language in terms of (and similar to Sartre's) prose-
poetry distinction, is first of all based on the above exegesis and secondly on further evidence. 
The abovc exegesis revcaled the following points. (a) Value propositions, those that show, do not 
represent an actual or possible state of affairs in the world. (b) Value propositions are, necessarily 
are, according to Wittgenstein's position, depicting the world as a whole. (c) Clearly, value 
propositions are concerned with Value, as opposed to fact. Each of these three principles is 
painlcssly idcntified with neccssal)' conditions of (a contemporary ontology of) art, of language 
(fiction, paradigmatically poetry) as art: Value (not fact): not in the world ('unreal', as Sartre will 
have it): depicting, as do art objects. a complete or self-contained world. Equally, these principles 
indicate an affinity with an aesthetic relation to the world: each of the three positions entails the 
principlc of distance and disintercstedness. Here then, is a multi-layered web of (aesthetic) 
principles that the saying-showing distinction identifies itself with. 
The elucidation of the aesthetic nature of the saying-showing distinction, along the points 
just not cd, is the subject of §5 "'here flll1her evidence is drawn upon. Here, in the semantic 
fundamentals of Wittgenstein's saying-showing distinction, we are content to draw attention to 
the (often neglected but) cl1lci<i1 acsthetic dimension of the saying-showing distinction. 
It will be a key theme of our conclusions that this aesthetic dimension (and the principles 
"'hich it relics upon) is not fortunate, but causal to the logical and linguistic doctrines of the 
Trac/allis. as clearly and rigorously envisaged by Wittgenstein. It is central in its contribution to 
firstly, sol\'ing the apparent paradox that the Tractatus is meaningless and Wittgenstein should 
haye remained silent (its propositions, the propositions of philosophy. falling under the same 
conditions as those of Value 16.53 and ~5]) and, secondly, the problematic of self, which is 
Wittgenstein's and Sartre's main (C;lrly) concern. 
§2.3 SARTRE: LANGUAGE: PROBLEM AND POTENTIAL 
The mall1 alln here will be to delineate in Sartre's writings a commitment to the 
linguistically ineffable and the saying-showing doctrine. Such a commitment naturally aligns 
Sartre with Wittgenstein's position (accepting some differences) in the Tractalus. The method is 
to pursue the line of inquiry through certain key works - aside from which, the clearest or most 
detailed account that Sartre gives of his views on language is to be found in four notable short 
pieces, ',·JlIlinadab' or The Fantastic Considered as Language, Black Orpheus, A plea for 
Intellectllals and the extended essay on 'Mallarme'4. Nothing in any of these works contradicts 
what is being claimed here - on the contrary. the choice has been limited (to other key works) for 
the sake of brevity. Thus, [or the initial formulation of the ineffable and showing (and for future 
long-term reasons) Nallsea (1938) (and briefly The Psychology of Imagination {1940}). For 
detail and development towards the self What is Li terature'? (1947) and, then, this work again in 
the context of a critical assessment of my interpretation. Then, for clarification and development 
in key areas, brief consideration of two short works, the interview given in 1965 and published as 
The Writer and his Langllage, and the essay Departure and Return (1946). Finally, Being and 
Nothingness (1943). The same notion of the ineffable and saying-showing distinction is to be 
found in all these \\'orks. and with only slight differences in formulation. The 1965 interview is 
included paJ1ly in order to sUpp0l1 an additional claim of continuity, that Sartre's early 
philosophical position concerning the (lingua-aesthetic) self is one that is upheld in the later 
\\Titings. although in those works it is subsumed under his social and political agenda. 5 
4 It is of more than a passing interest that Sartre devoted so much of his time to the study of poets - such as Genet, 
Baudelaire, Mallarme and Flaubert. We can date his work on Mallarme to 1952. The one hundred or so pages which 
we have is all that seems to be left after hundreds of pages were lost in a fire in Sartre's Paris apartment. It appears 
that Sartre's ambition was to accommodate what he saw as Mallarme's importance with his complexity, in a massive 
Flaurbertian like biography. (Cf. introduction to Mallarme, 1986). This is another example of Sartre's acute 
intellectual awareness - of Mallarme's' poems, besides the example of Paul Ricoeur, a critic of no less credibility and 
stature than G.Steiner has said: 'With them [Mallarme's poems] Western literature and speech consciousness enter 
a new phase ... after Mallarme ... the change is immense and we are only now beginning to grasp it' (Steiner, 1975, 
pp186f). 
5 A thorough defence of Sartre's continuity on these points could be obtained via a stUdy of these early works in 
conjunction with Flaubert (1970). For secondary evidence, see also Howells (1979) and Goldthorpe (1984). 
Socio-political agenda or not. it may well be thought that Sartre had nothing (of interest?) 
to say on the subject of language. That in fact. there was not even a foundation out of which a 
particular thesis could emerge. There is in Sartre's works a philosophy of language, and some 
comments on the place of lanf,'l.lage in his philosophy, besides their intrinsic interest, are in order 
before extricating any specific thesis. 
(i) A matter of method 
G. I lave YOU ever thought of doing a philosophy of language') 
SarIn>. No. Language must be studied within a philosophy, but it cmmot be the basis for a 
philosophy. I think that a philosophy of language could be dram1 out of my philosophy, but 
there is no philosophY of Innguagc that could be imposed upon it. 6 
Wittgensteinian's and others may feel inclined to doubt whether Sartre had much if 
any1hing to say on the subject of language (of significance?). Certainly, studies on Sartre rarely 
discuss in much detail ,,,hatever views on langlIage he may have held7. Sartre's views on 
literature have faired better. This is not surprising, for Sartre has consistently and explicitly 
contributed to Litcrature. for cxample. as both critic/philosopher in What Is Literature? and as 
man of literature in his plays, short stories and novels. Sal1re has not it may seem, consistently 
and (very oftcn) explicitly contributcd to 'a philosophy of language [which would have to be] 
drawn out of my philosophy' (ibid.). Is this a lack of concern for language - or could it be non-
rcductively a mattcr of mcthod or tcmperament and attitude? For certain, his views on language 
are dispcrsed throughout his vast oeuvre of philosophical. literary, and other writings, rendering 
6 Interview in 1975, in Schilpp (1981) The Philosophy of J-P Sartre, pp17. 
7 Admittedly, Caws, Manser, and Danto have chapters on language. But what of Barnes, Aronson, Grene, 
Warnock, Thody and McCulloch? It is a pity, for in the brief treatments of Caws, Danto and Manser there are hints 
at the rich potential which a fuller study would offer. Manser, for example, does discuss Sartre's account of language 
as technique (as presented in a short section of Being and Nothingness), and does so in relation to linguistic 
philosophy. However, the three studies which I shall draw on are notably more detailed and expansive accounts, 
Howells (1979) and Goldthorpe (1984 & 1991) - whose study of Nausea (1991) - and language - is more insightful 
than most other works. The truth is, where Sartre and language (not literature) is concerned, even the studies of 
Howells and Goldthorpe have done no more than map some of the contours of a large and otherwise undisturbed 
continent. 
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uneasy any task of formulation. 
There is no doubt that Sartre has a different attitude to language than that of his 
contemporary analytic philosophers, and to Wittgenstein: this much is certain. 8 The essence of 
this difference will be found in the fact that Sartre does not attempt to consider in isolation the 
structure of lanf,'1Iage or the way it expresses meaning: except that is. where language poses a 
particular difficulty as he works through his ontologicaL ethical. and - later - political problems. 
(Of course. the opposite is true of Wittgenstein, he only considers ethics and ontology in isolation 
when they pose particular difficulties as he works through his linguistic problems). Thus Sartre: 
While psychological and historical problems exist with regard to the existence, the learning 
and the use of a particular language, there is no special problem concerning what is called 
the discovery or invention of language. Language is not a phenomenon added on to being-
for-others. It is originally being-for-others. (BN 372). 
Sal1re sees lanf,'1rage as a form of life - to borrow an appropriate term. Language as a 
scientific project such as linguistics. or the study of language as the basis for philosophical 
method. "ould not at all suit Sartre: 
Linguistic research can be mistaken here ... Social facts such as invasions, great 
thoroughfares, commercial relations seem to be the essential causes of linguistic changes. 
But this is because the question is not placed on the true level of the concrete. Also, we 
find only' what we arc looking for. (BN 514). 
Or again. in a criticism of Brice Parain that could for sound philosophical reasons be directed 
toward the early Wittgenstein and his approach (see belo\\'. section on 'Departure and Return'): 
The linguist usually acts like a man sure of his ideas and concerned only with knowing 
\\hcther the old and traditional institution of language renders them accurately. Thus, he 
may study the parallelism of the logical and the grammatical, as if, on the one hand, logic 
were given in the heaven of ideas and, on the other, granm1ar were given on earth. Thus 
one looks about for a French equivalent for the Gennan word 'stimmung' ... and that the 
only question that arises is that of its expression. But language thus considered is 
anOn)'1110us. Words are tossed on the table, killed and cooked, like dead fish. In short, the 
lingllist does not stud~' the language as it is spoken ... (LPE: DR 127f) 
Sartre's contextual approach to language introduces a second contributing factor in the 
obscuring of his real concern with lang11age: as a form of life and activity. language cannot be 
discussed. he belie\'es. in isolation from the human body. It is the case that when Sartre is 
8 Manser (1966) and Danto (1975) have the merit of noting that Sartre's views on language are similar to those 
found in the anglo-tradition, and that the apparent and real differences are due to a difference of attitude, and hence 
method. 
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discussing the human body. especially in Being and Nothingness, in its modes of existence and its 
situations in the world. he is not. if he is taken at his word. discussing the body in isolation from 
language. On the contrary. as he says at one point in Being and Nothingness: 
The problem of language is exactly parallel to the problem of the body and the descriptions 
\\hich apply in the one case also apply in the other. ... I am language .... I am what I say. 
Language is not an instinct of the constituted human creature, nor is it an invention of our 
sUhjectivity. It fonns part orthe hllmall cOllditioll (BN 372 & 373). 
Or again. as he says in the later work. What is Literature?: 
We are within language as within our body. Wefeel it spontaneously while going beyond it 
towards other ends ... we perceive it when it is someone else who is using it ... The word is 
a certain particular moment of action and has no meaning outside it. In certain cases of 
aphasia the possibilities of acting, of understanding situations, and of having nonnal 
relations with the other sc'\. are lost. (WL II). 
For Sartre the problem of langllage comes into being only in the situated use of language. 
The usc theory of meaning in Wittgenstcin's later work is familiar: 'For a large class of 
cases - though not for all - in which wc employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the 
meaning of a word is its use in the language ... And the meaning of a name is sometimes 
explained by pointing to its hearer' (PT .n). Moreover, there is strong textual evidence to support 
the claim that this theory was present and active (as part of the structure of intentionallity) in the 
Tractatlls "The way language signifies is mirrored in its use" (NB 11.9.16). And, one of three 
direct references to the possibility. "In order to recognise a symbol by its sign we must observe 
how it is used with a sense' (3.326). 
For Sartre also. meaning and understanding are dependent upon use. Thus, 'Belonging to 
the human race is defined by the use of very elementary and very general techniques: ... [such as] 
to know how to speak.' (BN 512). And Wittgenstein: 'To understand a language means to be 
master of a technique.' (PI 199). For both philosophers. technique is not learned by studying the 
structure of language. rather. again. the emphasis is on intersubjective - public - use or activity: 
"It is the blow of the axc \\'hich re\'eals the axe' (BN 519). 'The very fact of the Other's existence 
results in the fact of the collecti\'c ownership of techniques' (BN 512). And Wittgenstein: 'What 
is essenti:J1 is to see that the same thing can come before our minds \\hen we hear the wind and 
the application still be different. Has it the same meaning both times? T think we shall say not' 
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(PI 198). 
In fact. the idea that meaning is revcaled through the application of a sentence is just as 
dominant in Sartre's scmantics as it is Wittgenstein's. 'The word therefore has only a purely 
virtual existence outside of complex and active organisations which integrate it. It cannot exist 
"in" a consciousness or unconscious before the use which is made of it: the sentence is not made 
out of words' (LPE 72). Meaning is dependent upon a reciprocal relationship. Sentences, the 
units of meaning, can only be understood in their full context, otherwise meanings 'Will lose 
their colour and their life once they arc out of the water' (LPE 73). Here Sartre has expressed in 
his own characteristic \\'ay the Fregean9 thought which underlies much philosophy this century, 
including his own and Wittgenstein's from the Tractatus to Philosophical investigations, namely, 
that a something. word. object. sentence. only has meaning when it is considered in its context 
and in relation to its (functional) whole. The point here. and it links this Sartrian methodology to 
future concerns. is to emphasise Man 'sfinite freedom. Words alone can be seen as having 
objective - or at least 'given' meanings. For example 'chestnut tree' carries with it self an 
inherited and some\\'hat fixed body of meanings. The speaker would seem to be bound to this 
'given'. On the other hand. claims Sartre. if the sentence 'pre-exists the word' as the unit of 
meaning. 'We are referred to the speaker as the concrete foundation of his speech', for the 
sentence can only be interpreted in terms of a given 'which one wishes to designate while its 
designation 'itselfsupposes other ends in relation to which it is only a means'. (BN 515t), More 
and more it will be seen that 'The created sentence stands for the created being' (NE 159). The 
context of language. or a sentence. is its use. and in this sense language is seen as a tool. 'With 
respect to words [they] are tools' (SG 303). Words, at least for the writer of prose, 'Are useful 
conventions, tools \\'hich gradually wear out and which one thrown away when they are no longer 
serviceable' (WL 5). And Willgenstein: ,Tt is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools 
of language. and of the ways they are used' (PI 23). It is as tools to be used in various human 
9 If this entails the question: 'Did Sartre read Frege?' The answer is unknown. But it is known that he was well 
acquainted with the works of Russell. 
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activities and situations that the notions of 'language game' and 'form of life' re-enters into the 
discussion. 'Words. for example: I wanted my own words. But the ones I use have been dragged 
through I don't know how many consciences: they arrange themselves in my head by virtue of the 
habits I have picked up from the others'. And so language itself 'is a characteristic part of a large 
group of activities - talking. writing. travelling on a bus. meeting a man etc.' (Sartre, IN, 
'Erostratus'. ppl25 and Wittgenstcin LA 2). Human reality is inside language, the 'first moment' 
of language is one of exteriority: 
I regard language as something we are inside. Language is a kind of vast reality, what I 
would call a practico-inert entity, and I am in constant touch with it - not in so far as I utter 
speech but precisely in so far as it is primarily, for me, something which encompasses me 
and from which I am able to take things. It is only subsequently' that I discover its function, 
as communication. . .. I do not see language as being something which is inside me .... I 
possess it, 10\\11 it, as something extemal to m~·self. (PLWL 77/8). 
Lanf,'l.Iage is one part of human activity: it is not an inner, private, activity. and it cannot be 
undcrstood in isolation from the body: language must be understood within a concrete 
contextualizcd framework. 
It is the differences in method that help to obscure the fact that Sartre regarded language as 
important. and that there is to be found throughout his writings a perennial interest with 
language. though it is of1en an implicit concern - here Manser's point could be invoked, that 
language is in fact of the first importance to Sartre. that his acute awareness of its role and 
potential lead him to use it in a way which will disclose to his readers its importance; it is 
through the use of language. through the reciprocity of text and reader that an insight into the 
various fundamental attitudes involved is achieved. Thus. 
It might be claimed that he is less interested in purely philosophical issues that arise in its 
[Ianguage's I boundaries hecallse he regards it as more important as a human activity than 
do so man~' who talk about "linguistic philosophy". He finds less need to discuss it in 
isolation because he sets language in relation to the rest of human activities, even makes it 
more central. (Manser, 1966, ppJ(5). 
With language. the pOllr soi 's relation to the world is complete in the sense that it is given a 
language and that thereforc there are no gaps in its linguistic awareness of the world ('except in 
the trivial sense of not knowing the name for a particular object'). It is for this reason that Sartre 
speaks of language as a "world'·. Nothing thcn. can be said about language as a whole, for any 
particular utterance (proposition) presupposes the ,,·hole. As Wittgenstein has it in the 
Notebooks: 'What can be said can only be said by means of a proposition. and so nothing that is 
necessary for the understanding of all propositions can be said' (NB 25). This correct way of 
seeing Sartre' s relation to language will help us understand some developments found in the 
chapters on self and aesthetics. for an important Sartrian (and Wittgensteinian) concept is that of 
the world as a totality or whole. 
It is interesting to conclude these remarks on Sartre's philosophical approach to language 
with some comments on a similarity of attitude to traditional philosophy that ultimate depends on 
the above ,·iews. There is in the writings of both Sartre and Wittgenstein (especially in the late 
works) an ambivalent and uneasy relationship to traditional philosophy - and at times reflection 
in general. Sartre's clearest expression of this distmst is found in Nausea: 'Thoughts are the 
dullest things on earth .... I exist. I think I exist. If only I could prevent myself from thinking!' 
(Nl.:J...J./5). In the novel the main protagonist gives up his intellectual - reflective - occupation: the 
historical study on Rollebon. \\hich he had used to 'justify existence'. This reflective raison de 
eIre is gradually replaced by a move toward creative, imaginative endeavour. In Being and 
Nothingness there is the uneasy idea. burdensome in The Age of Reason, that philosophic 
reflection can cause the anxiety and nausea it is in fact attempting to cure. Philosophical 
problems. and in Nausea words themselves. are seen as a kind of disease to be cured - with 
philosophy as 'An effective weapon· IO . If language is inadequate when confronted with (a 
contingent) reality. it is up to philosophers and ordinary users to revive and cure it. Recall 
Wittgenstein's remark: 'The philosophic treatment of a question is like the treatment of an 
illness' (PI 255). The solution to the 'illness' is found for Sartre in human activity: language is a 
form of life. Wittgenstein's later solution is also to be found in forms of life and language games, 
though his treatment is the analysis of langl1age itself. But we must beware, Wittgenstein tells us, 
of 'The dogmatism into which we fall so easily in doing philosophy' (PI 131). Both 
10 As noted by Caws (1979) from which, on pp17, I take the quote of Sartre's from his Search for Method (1963), 
pp6. 
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philosophers. ambivalent in their subject. see the stmggle with language as central to their 
approach. Sartre echoes his own ,-iew when he comments on the writer Parain that 'He is word-
sick and wants to be cured. He suffers at feeling out of gear with language' (LPE DR 127). 
Wittgenstein: 'Philosophy is a battleground against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means 
of language' (PI 109). Philosophical problems arise when 'Language goes on holiday' (PI 38). 
For Sartre. as Roquentin. language is continually slipping off 'on holiday': 'Absurdity: another 
word: I am struggling against words: over there I touched the thing. '" That root there was 
nothing in relation to which it was not absurd. Oh, how can I put that into words?' (N 185). 
Unlike Wittgenstein. Roquentin's (metaphysical) illness has so undermined his search for 
meaning in existence that he lapses into metaphysical (and occasionally - i.e. blank diary 
'entries') linguistic despair: 'I don't even bother to look for words ... and I don't fix anything' (N 
17). 
The only way to Ii:-..: the illness as either philosopher or writer is through language, an 
attempt to bestow meaning and understanding on an indifferent world through language: an 
attempt which. for Roquentin. fails if pursued in reflection and criticism (historical study). It is 
this failure which persuades Roqllentin to turn to art. and write a novel. Similarly, as will be seen, 
Wittgenstein's early Tractarian ambivalence to traditional philosophy and reflection is manifest 
in his Romantic appropriation of the unsayable. of how little traditional philosophy achieves 
when it solycs all the problems set before it. and in the affirmation of art through his aesthetics in 
the Tractallis. 
(ii) The ineffable and the possibility of showing: La Nausee 
Silencc is a hole in the Being of Sartrc's writings; particularly Nausea. What is Literature? 
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Being and Yolhil1gness. 11 Silence: actual. potential. imaginary; social, philosophical. 
metaphysical. aesthetic. What is silent. or what we are silent about obviously is not necessarily 
that which. it is sometimes claimed, can not be spoken of, but which can only be indicated or 
'shown'; nor less is it that which is sometimes claimed to be incommunicable (cf. ~l). Although 
in the Tractalus and in parts of Sartre's writings, the silent is in fact equated with the ineffable, it 
is not al\yays so, neither is it consistently identified with the incommunicable. Iris Murdoch is 
typically perceptive on this: 'It is only Sartre's practical interests that put him in need of speech; 
his ideal is not the actual silence of Rimbaud but the intellectual silence of Mallarme' (Murdoch, 
1953, pp146). 
Of course. at a social or psychological level to remain silent over something is revelatory, at 
the very least it shows us something of the person involved: 'Silence itself is defined in 
relationship to words. as the pause in music receives its meaning from the group of notes around 
it. This silence is a moment of language: being silent is not being dumb; it is to refuse to speak, 
and therefore to keep on speaking' (WL 14). This, a commonplace, is also common to Sartre. 
But it should not be confused with that other silence of Sartre's (and Wittgenstein's) that is 
sometimes constitutive of the ineffable. but never necessarily the unknowable: from the outset we 
should be wary of equating the silent with the ineffable, and the ineffable with the unknowable. 
If and when there is an identity of sorts between these concepts. then it shall be stated. 
• The ineffable 
We should not lay claim to an objective text, to a singular correct reading of Nausea. The 
many lines of thought found in 'val/sea arc not to be denied. The very openness of a text that 
depends upon symbols and not signs is being affirmed in the following reading. Nausea is a 
remarkable work of fiction: it deals with political (class) issues, the relation of art and society, 
11 Sartre's many comments on silence seem often to recall Heidegger - but are in any case worthy of study. 
However, research itself remains silent to this phenomenon. Bindeman's The Poetics of Silence (1981) manages to 
discuss the comparative views of Wittgenstein and Heidegger on silence without a single mention of Sartre. That 
could have been an achievement, were it not in the context of a PhD. 
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and with other philosophical themes such as contingency, induction, perception, mind/body, the 
nature of time and authenticity. It also commits itself to the topic of this thesis: the problematic 
of self, the relation between (linguistic) art and the situated self. Indeed, a point to be 
acknowledged from the outset. one in line with received opinion 12, is that Nausea is. at one level, 
a sustained engagement with the philosophical problem of language, not merely language in 
terms of communication but, primarily, with language-and-Being. 
Nausea makes persistent reference to an inadequacy of language: acknowledging that a 
level of grasping the world is beyond ordinary discourse. There is constant and clear recognition 
that some thing, or things. are in a sense beyond language, or rather, beyond a certain kind of 
language. what may be termed propositional 13. but that, nonetheless, such ineffable matters can 
somehow be expressed. In fact. yarious narrative techniques are used in Nausea to denote the 
inadequacy of language, including most obviously the continued use of blank and minimalist 
diary entries. It is fair to say. of course. that many such techniques are equally intended by Sartre 
to show. besides the ineffable nature of certain of Roquentin's experiences, the distorting 
inOuence of language if and "'hen it is used descriptively: by not writing Roquentin is avoiding at 
least one mode of bad faith (i.e. a false ordering of experience). But perhaps more perspicuous, at 
least in an inquiry such as ours. is what the novel/journal 'says'. 
On the \'ery opening page of the noycI the narrator attempts but fails to offer an adequate 
description of such a banal unity of objects as a box containing ink and pen (N 9). If this is due 
to a 'mere' neurosis. it soon becomes clear that such an 'ailliction' is. as with Wittgenstein, 
metaphysical and not psychological. In fact. the novel/journal relays a constant struggle between 
both language - contingent world (en soi), and language - value14 (pour soi): language struggling 
12 For example, see Goldthorpe (1991), Howells (1979), and Danto (1975). 
13 To avoid clumsy expressions I shall henceforth have recourse to use the term 'propositional' to refer to what I 
have identified as the ordinary, significative pole of language or a sentence (as sign) as opposed to the poetic, 
reflexive pole (as symbol) which, it is claimed, shows what the former cannot say. Similarly, I will refer to the latter 
as 'non-propositional' language. 
14 In what follows there will be many an occasion to speak of 'value' and a 'fact-value distinction' (as we did in §1 
and again with Wittgenstein earlier); with Sartre this will be a developing notion, a fuller treatment is best suited to 
the opening of ~4 
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betwecn object and subject. Roquentin. the narrator, is for all complcte purposes Sartre himself: 
'For all intensive reasons. I was Roqucntin' (W 171) Roqucntin, as would be expected, 'want[s] 
no secrets, no spiritual condition. nothing ineffable' (N 21). Nevertheless, as the novel progresses 
the reader is shown that Roquentin will at the \'ery least have to relent to, if not embrace. the idea 
of the ineffable. 
Roquentin is trying to complete his research into the historical figure Rollcbon. As readers 
we witness an increase in Roqucntin's awareness of his situation paralleled only by the decrease 
of his faith in languagc. An attempt to rcconstruct the truth or meaning ofa person's life through 
the language of an historical study becomcs to be seen as futile. Rollebon's ideas have become 
unnameable: 'The idea is still there, the unnameable idea' (N 60). Moreover, within Roquentin's 
own life. interpersonal linguistic exchange also becomes to be seen as futile: 'We barely exchange 
a few words. What would be thc use?' Roquentin docsn't 'even bothcr to look for words' 
because 'thcy don't fix an~1hing' (N 17). Words remain only on his lips, rcfusing to 'settle on 
the thing'. for things, objects, 'havc broken free from their names' (N 180). 'Words had 
disappeared and with them the meaning of things' (N 182). In short, in Nausea any hope of 
language, and hence thought ordering the world is abandoned. This, as has been noted by others 
(such as Danto). is intercsting in itself. for what must have been abandoned is a prior view: that 
there is a common relation. a stmcture, betwcen language and reality which ensures that 
language is go\'erned by cCl1ain laws that ensure our experiences of reality are ordered and 
represented by our language - hardly an uncommon VIew. Once Roquentin rejects this co-
stmcture. as bad faith. a false ordering of the ,,'orId, and once he then takes the further step of not 
seeking allY other conceptual connection between language and reality, then his attempts at 
ordering his experiences of the world ,,,ill have to come, so the novel makes us believe, in a 
rcvelation. in what others might term a mystical expericnce. That this is what happens is clear 
from reading the wholc noveL it is also made clear in the (now famous) metaphysical and 
narrative culmination of the novel (to be discussed below). where Roquentin finds the 'key to 
existence' in his confrontation with the roots of an old chestnut tree. 
I am struggling against "OlLis, That root - there was nothing in relation to \\hich it was 
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not ahsurd. How can I put that into words? I saw that the bark \\'as still black. Black? I 
felt the word suhside, empty itsdf of its meaning ... black like the circle did not e:-;ist. ... I 
was on f~llniliar ground, I had already scmtinised, \\'ith the same anxiety, UIUlameable 
objects, I had alreaJ\' tried - in vain - to think something abollt them. (N 185f) 
There are passages too numerous to mention, though perhaps not quite as effective, where 
Roquentin undergoes the same experience: i.e. a revelation, one that causes the experience of 
nausea. Where signification should hold office, the bmte contingent existence of things runs 
amok. It is the failure of language to impose meaning on an apparently alien reality. 
For Satire the would be realist. a material external world of objects exists, indubitably, 
though it is alien and contingent. But external reality does not exist as the world, as a scheme of 
relations - c\:ccpt as constituted by the pOllr soi. The relation that is experienced as holding 
betwcen objects, wc might \\ant to call it a law of nature, can be seen to bc inexpressible because 
the relation is prior to 'my world'. Description of such a world is therefore inadequate15 because 
there is no commitment to the belief in a necessary relation between language, objects, and the 
experiencc of objects. Subjectivity intrudes between the experience and the description of objects: 
this relation is. it will be seen. a priori. and remains prior to, and the pre-condition of, the 
ordinary significati\'e stmcture of a proposition. 
All objects, Being, a set of relations. the world as we experience it. drawing as it does on 
history (of language as much as anything) and subjecti\'ity: a background, Being itself is, given a 
dominant theory of nominal and real definition. ineffable. Given this same theory of definition, 
only Being its in particularity, pat1icular objects, can be defined and described. It is just such a 
theory of definition that Sartre subscribes to and that helps us to see (below) the reasons for 
Sartre's surprisingly large commitment to the ineffable. 
• Showing 
Unlike Wittgenstcin. Sartre does not systematically use a precise term equivalent to what in 
15 The insights found in J. L. Austin's discussion of language as descriptive and performative may if pursued be of 
some value here. I.e., since to speak is to act, then instrumental language is, necessarily, engaged; description does 
not contrast with linguistic performance. 
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English is rendered as ·showing'. though the list of translated synonyms for the concept that is 
deployed is significant. most importantly. given their context, we ha\'e 'revealing', 'presenting', 
and of course 'showing' itself. 
Sartre's commitment to showing. as with the ineffable, draws on many strands of his 
thought. This makes Sartrc's position more difficult to state than WiUgenstein's, and much 
spade work is needed before his position can be stated with some authority (in our concluding 
sections on l3eing and Nothingness and Convergence). What then, is entailed by this concept of 
'showing'? Clearly, it is important to the convergent aspect of the thesis that the comparison with 
Wittgenstein reveals a position that is at least similar. But the thesis shall go further, and claim 
that Sartre's doctrine is identifiable with Wittgenstein's (accepting one or two differences of 
detail). 
The concept of showing in Sartre will be. as in Wittgenstein. the semantic counterpart to 
saying. That is. with regard to the basic principle, to the aforementioned bi-polarity of language, 
the ordinary and poetic poles. it is the latter that manages to disclose what the former inherently 
constitutes as the ineffable: matters of value. The cardinal point here, to re-state it, is that 
showing is, for both philosophers. a matter of communication and Being, it is to be understood 
semantically and in a dialectical relationship. That is, showing both reveals (displays) some new 
meaning to the subject. and this meaning. as insight, can itself only be shown16. The nature or 
stmcture of this new meaning is ethico-aesthetic (§5.2). 
There is then. in }\'alfsea, a twist: a twist I say from the impossibility of saying to the 
actuality of showing. Nameless disorientation discloses a new orientation, an insight. Roquentin: 
. And suddenly, all at once. the veil is torn a\yay. I have understood, I have seen' (N 181). Such 
insight or understanding is of a different character than the failed propositional 'naming' attempt 
16 The above considerations should not be allowed to deny or overlook an important factor: in Nausea it is the 
viscosity of Being (in-itself) that acts as mediator to the self, and does so in terms of a feeling - nausea. Nausea is 
the feeling which accompanies the revelation of Being: it is thus part, a physiological part, of the structure of 
showing. Clearly then, Nausea introduces another kind of showing: nausea and anxiety are a showing, a revelation 
to the self, in introspection, of the self as a freedom. However, this strikes me as not having an aesthetic content, 
and is therefore of no further interest to the present inquiry. 
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to grasp thc mcaning of objccts and the \\orId as constituted by them. In this revelation, the 
meaning of the object. qlla phenomcnon. and as part of that which constitutes the world, my 
world, is revcaled to me the pour soi. The novel makes clear that it is through such revelations 
(the 'pebble' and tree episodes are representative) that the meaning ofRoquentin's life is grasped. 
Moreover, because of the nature of this experience the insight itself can only be expressed in a 
non-propositional. prcsentational manner (i.e. within a novel such as Nausea - cf. §5.3). It is not 
a mattcr of languagc losing or having no meaning. Rather, it is a matter of a particular identity 
bctween language and thc thinking subjcct, a symbolic. non-significatory relation, that results in 
both a limitation and its possible transcendence. 
The P.\ycho!ogJ' of Imagination. Elucidation at this early stage is best achieved by brief 
consideration of the philosophical origin of the points just noted. points that will become cardinal 
in the following chapters. Also. the following discussion of image (and imaging) wi}] be drawn 
on in the final chapter when we discuss aesthetic attitude. 
In The Psychologv of Imagination Sartre states that there are 'two main irreducible 
attitudes of consciousness'. pcrccption and imagination ( 'attitudes' is emphasised for important 
rcasons that will become apparent in the rcmainder of the dissertation). He then says that there 
are two main diffcrences bctween imagination and perception. These are, one (1): imagination 
posits the imagincd objcct "as a nothingness", as absent. existing elsewhere, or "in some neutral 
mode that prcscinds from existence entirely." (Flynn 1975, pp432). Two (2): Sartre states that the 
image suffers from an "essential poverty". By this he intends that images are 'given as a whole'. 
They arc characterised by an cssential poverty in that (a). as the observer makes them up (s)he 
cannot bc surprised by thcm. and (b). given as a whole they are exhausted on appearance. That is, 
\'ague as they often are. it is impossible in any case to go on extracting information from an 
image: all that it contains is givcn at once. An cxample will illustrate and support this point. 
If I wcre to imaginc, say. the facade of the British Museum. it may seem that I have a 
pcrfect imagc of it. Ho\\cvcr. unlcss I already know for cxample the number of columns around 
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the door, then the definite number of columns cannot be extracted from the image (I could 
produce successive images. all with differing numbers of columns). But the essential point is that 
no further inFormation can be extracted from the given en singular image except what is already, 
on its appearance, given. Now, on the other hand, as far as perception is concerned, it is 
characterised by the fact that it is inexhaustible, that it can always disclose to us something 
further. To perceive the British Museum facade is to be capable of extracting further details, we 
can move around it, counting more columns as we do so. and acquiring ever increasing amounts 
of detail. Perceptual experience is not en singular; it is a living and real relation between self and 
world: ever more information is extractable from the stream of perception. 
It should be noted that although the material for images is provided by perception, images 
themselves ..... can arise only at the cost of perceptual consciousness" (TPI 61). Nevertheless, 
images are of a fundamentally diFferent order when compared to perceptions. They are neither 
copIes nor reproductions of what is perceived (Hume). Nor are images 'perfectly definite' 
(Berkeley). Images are frequently vague and perfectly indefinite. in the sense that on inspection 
they yield no Further inFormation. The image offers all the information it contains on its initial 
en singular appearance: while a real object of perception is potentially inexhaustible. Sartre's 
distinction will appear too clear cut for many. However, it's significance (if not its general truth) 
could be established from two of Sartre's premises - premises that resound with insight. (1), his 
illustration and discussion of the image as 'essential poverty'. and (2), his observation that the 
image is always present-absent 
If I no\\' fonn an im;lg~ orrctcr, m\ imaginative consciousness includes a certain positing of 
the c\istencc ofPcter, in so far as he is at this very moment in Berlin or London. But while 
he appears to me as an image, this Peter who is in London, appears to me absent. This 
ahs~n(e is <Ietually. the essential nothingness of the imagined object, and is enough to 
distinguish it from perception (TPI 209). 
With perception conceived of in terms of 'pure thought', reflection. and open to potentially 
inexhaustible information. it is. at least in Sartre's early philosophy. identifiable with 
propositional language and conceptual knowledge and signification. The image. by contrast 
·impure'. unrcflectivc. non-significative. given as a world-as-a-whole. and exhausted on 
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appearance. is not identifiable \\ith nor suited to propositional knowledge. Imagination itself is 
identified with 'impure' or incomplete unreflective consciousness - and is in any case always a 
part of apprehension. Yet. when an object is apprehended imaginatively its presence is 
transcended by a 'dc-realised object' which. though present to an unreflective consciousness, as 
sens. is actually absent: its presence is ·magical'. Thus, although Sartre sees mental images, like 
thoughts, as being ultimately dependent upon perception, elements of mental images remain, 
necessarily. beyond reflection - and thus beyond ordinary - propositional - linguistic formulation. 
Moreover. in perception. our understanding of the qualities and relations of objects involves 
modes of apprehension \\hich are not explicitly conscious, which are unreflective, (which involve 
what becomes in Being ond Nothingness the pre-reflective cogito), and which fail to grasp Ie 
sens. This is very important to what follows, in The Psychology of Imagination it is what Sartre 
calls the .'lens of an object that escapes the perceptual mode of consciousness. We never have 
complete apprehension - and nor therefore e[[ability. 
Return to Nausea. The enigmatic .'lens docs reqUIre the more concrete embodiment of 
propositional lanh'l.lage. \,hat Sartre will later can 'instmmental' language, being defined as 
significatory. The escaping sens of the empirical world, of for example the roots of the chestnut 
tree in NOl/seo. is not apprehended through reflective and conceptualised thought. and therefore 
poetic or non-signiricative language: rather. it is revealed. presented. shml'l1, through its 
unreflective haunting absence. For SaI1re the reality of the factual, contingent world, is 
something that can only be grasped by a self that apprehends the world in a non-propositional 
manner. Therefore, drmving no doubt on the principle of identity, this reality can only be 
expressed as what Sartre would call an un-reality: it cannot be represented in the sign/signified 
stmcture. 
In XOl/.\"eo there is the attempt to establish the extent to "'hich language may be possessed 
by the 'impure' pre-reflective. intuitive and imaginative. and therefore be dependent upon an 
indirect mode of communication. that of SC'IIS. and this so whether it is dealing with the reality of 
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the factual empirical world or, for that mattcr. with the selfs apprehension of this world. This 
leads Sartre to a point on which he has naturally been criticised - that of having what has been 
called a 'curious theory of the incommensurability of language and reality'. Here it will be worth 
the effort to quote extensivcly (in three parts) from an informative and encapsulating footnote 
taken from Goldthorpe's study (a footnote with further relevance to a central criticism of the 
Tractatus and the status of its propositions). Goldthorpe states that 
A. D. Nuttall makes no distinction bctween Sartre and Roquentin, [and] takes Sartre to task 
for his 'curious theory of incommensurability', for indulging in superfluous metaphor when 
the ostensive pronoun that should sutTice, and for using ordinary language (,root', 'black') 
while profoundly and misguidedly mistmsting it. This leaves Sartre in 'what is, logically, a 
prett:-' bad spot". If Sartre has really shown us in this piece of writing that the tree-root is 
bc\'ond language ". then he has pragmatically, refuted himself, since the thesis directly 
implics that language can do no such thing. If on the other hand ... Sartre has entirely failed 
to c:\press the ll1\'st(T\' of the tree-root, then his thesis is safe, though presumably it remains 
U1H.:ommunicatcd'. [Scc i1 Commoll SAy: Philosophy alld the Literaty Imagination (London: 
Chatto & Windus, '74), ppI91-3]. 
Nuttal's empathic reading of the problem of language and communication in Nausea is rare and 
welcome. The limit and transcendence of language is, as stated above, a key theme of the work - a 
point too often overlooked. But Goldthorpc is equally perceptive in her criticism of Nuttals' 
unfortunately misguided conclusion. Goldthorpe continues. 
Sartre's distinction betwccn 'signification' and the twofold implication of 'seils' goes some 
way to meeting this objection. Roquentin experiences a failure of the 'signifying' function 
of languag.e (hy which Sartre elsewhere [i.c. fI7/Ot is Literature?] sets much store); Sartre 
compensates for this by attrihuting to him a language which may create a 'seils' for the 
readcr, if not for Roquentin. 
For Sartre it is the symbolic pole of language that succeeds through its existence as sens. The use 
of this in place of language as a signifying function is exemplified, as will be seen, with language 
as art, that which will, in Sartrc. apprehend the world as an un-reality. creating a sens for the 
reader: what cannot be signified is what cannot be said. but it is this that can be communicated -
shown - by /a sens. This raises many questions regarding Sartre' s writings themselves, including 
.,Val/sea and Being and .Volhingncss. qucstions which will be shortly addressed, similarly, it raises 
a question regarding the specific passage in question, the description of the chestnut tree root. On 
this, the final instalment from Goldthorpe's footnote. 
Intcrcstingly. Nuttal's fonnulation of Sartre's ditTiculty echoes one of Sartre's favourite 
aphorisms: 'If thc \\Tiling. in the chestnut-tree passage succeeds, it fails, and, if it fails, it 
sllcceeds (Conll/1011 S/I)" pIt)}). Or. as Sartre often puts it, 'loser \\i IlS'. (Go1dthorpe 1991, 
pp217t) 
This early formulation of the limits of saying and the possibility of showing - in Nausea and 
The Psychology of Imagination - suggests that the ineffable, as the real object (quo phenomenon -
'root', 'black ') is caused by a failure in significative language (saying) that is overcome by a 
second sense. 10 sens, which shows what cannot be said. As with the Tractatus, the possibility of 
showing. of regaining what language has lost in ordinary usage, this possibility is inherent in 
language itself. 
With this, Nausea (and The P_~vchologv of Imagination) can be left for the present, and 
attention tllrned to 1Fhaf is Literature? For it is in this work that Sartre gives most weight, 
through considered discussion. to the idea of 10 sens as the semantic consolation in the ineffable 
and, in so doing. consolidates his saying-showing distinction. 
(III) Saying and showing: toward the subject 
• What is Literature? I: Signification-Le sens, Prose and Poetry 
From thc outset we must be aware that Sartrc's proneness to rushing ahead without rigorous 
editorial control is especially apparent in What is Literature? His terminology is often untidy, his 
distinctions understated. his syntax condemned to be free and roam: clear readings and 
conclusions are not easy to come by. Some may well see these characteristics as indistinguishable 
from the vcry best of Continental Philosophy. Whatever. the present discussion of What is 
Literature? ,,,ill sustain the weight of the comparison to Wittgenstein because (a) it is a correct -
careful and objective - interpretation of that one aspect of What is Literature? that concerns the 
present thesis: the senssignification distinction. (b) Secondly. the said interpretation is 
hermeneutically situated within. and is in accord with, the other early texts that are under 
discussion. In short. although What is Literature? is an untidy and sometimes ambiguous work, 
the line of thought which is pursued here is defended as being a correct reading of one, crucial 
and central aspect of the text. This withstanding. and due to the wider and the fundamental 
importancc of thc prose/poctry distinction. thc question of our interpretation, taken at the core 
issuc. is itself commcntcd upon in thc vcry ncxt section. 
Thc main aim of thc this section then. will be to give an account of the sens-signification 
distinction as presented in What is Literature?: this technical distinction underpins a generic 
concept of lanb'lIage along Tractarian lines. identified by Sartre in terms of language as 
scientific/fact based: prose. and. secondly. as language as literal)'/Value based: poetic. It is this, 
Sartre's sens-signification distinction. most fully articulated in What is Literature?, and its 
structural relation to self and aesthetics that is central to the limits and transcendence of language 
as generated in the problematic of self. 
It is clear from a now famous footnote that Sartre in What is Literature? conceives of a part 
of the 'psychic life' of experience as the 'living movement' or the immediate experience of 'the 
thing itself - the tree the ashtray', which 'escapc[sl' the 'subjective representation' of language. 
Such that. if this 'reality which one wants to signify is one word. it must be given to the reader by 
other \vords'. If an author claims to give us a sign, continues Sartre, that is both the 'objective 
essence' and the' immediate psychic datum', then the author has disregarded 'the rhetorical law' 
and 'Can be charged. besides, with having forgotten that the greatest riches of the psychic life are 
silent' (WL l21f. nIl). The reality. or 'essence' of something, is to be understood as that which 
is distinct from its accidental traits - i.e. the Jorlllal relation between them. As Sartre sees 
thought and language as interdependent. this idea can be seen as an elaboration of the view first 
found in .\'Qllsea: that a realm of psychic activity is not directly answerable to conceptual thinking 
and, hence, is beyond ordinary propositional expression. The idea is, I think, that language can 
disclose an actual reality or essence. the relation between objects, to an individual consciousness, 
but that this. quo-incommunicable. must be convcyed through what Howell's terms 'the 
suggestive powcrs of languagc' (1 7Howells, 1979 pp 188). The reality of certain psychic 
17 On the same page Howells notes that Sartre's problem and proposed solution, that of expressing reality, was 
similarly addressed by Bergson, where, in Fiser's words, 'the poet can use the word or 'symbol' to convey indirectly 
states of mind or soul'. We may also note that the essence of such a proposed problem/solution is to be found in 
numerous philosophies, including Dufrenne's The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience. 
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experiences requires words other than those that signify the experience: signification alone does 
not suffice. 
The sens-signification distinction derives, it was seen, from the epistemological 
distinction first formulated in The P.)ychology of imagination between sign and image (see last 
section). In What is Literature? Sartre maintains that words (i.e., in what follows. the sentence as 
unit of meaning). that words in ordinary communication are used as signs. When words are 
experienced as signs then their meaning will be derived from what they signify. Signs are tools 
through which we refer to objects in the world, they are, says Sartre. 'transparent'. Meaning is 
limited to what can be signified. which is. broadly speaking, particular objects or facts. When 
words - as scntcnces - are used also as images. they are both sign and image. As an image they 
are opaquc and expcricnced as an objcct in thcir own right. In this. they still signify, but now 
they hm'e a second sense. That is. words \\'hich are experienced as images have signification and 
Ie sens. giving thcm a second, non-signifYing sense. 
In practical and general terms the signification-sens distinction of What is Literature? 
takes the form of a distinction bctween prose and poetry. The former turns out to be 
charactcrisablc as denotativc. discursivc. and instrumental. While denoting or referring it 
implies no flJrthcr attributcs: it is thc idcal language of logic and science. Poetic discourse, on the 
other hand. is typificd by mctaphor. symbol. and myth, it is characterisable as connotative and 
non-instrumcntal. Tn addition to a primary meaning, denoting or referring, it implies further 
attributcs: it is the idcal language of fiction and story-telling. The language of prose is seen as a 
transparent mcans of reference to objects beyond itself, words are as conventional signs; poetic 
discoursc is secn as opaque. as using words as (natural) objects which embody a suggestive 
meaning - drawing on history as subjcctivity. 
This is a position which (given more time) I would argue Sartre held to throughout his 
Iife iS . Certainly. it is clear enough in the 1965 intervicw (see below), and for sure it is explicit in 
18 A distinction, it should be noted, for continuity in Sartre's thought is too often doubted, that is finely developed and 
extensively used in the late and massive study on Flaubert. 
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his inquiries into the poets Baudelaire (l9-l7) and Saint Genet (1952). thus, for example: 
The siglum "XVJI" sign{{ies a certain century, but in museums that entire period clings like 
a vcil, like a spider's web, to the curls of a wig, escapes in whiffs from a sedan chair. In 
producing his tirst poem as an object, Genet transfonns the signljlcafion of the words into a 
meaning [SG 304 D. 
The defining characteristic of prose is that it IS 'used' to communicate meaning; 'Prose is. in 
essence, utilitarian'. 'I would readily define the prose-writer as a man who makes use of words'. 
The words of prose are 'transparent'. we look at the world through them, they are 'signs', 
instrumental. in that they refer beyond themselves. 
Here is a passage reminiscent of the Tractatus (5.01) and its given relation between an 
elementary proposition (also Sartre' s basic unit of meaning) and its truth function (meaning) . 
Prose is employcd in discourse~ its suhstance is by nature significative; that is, the words 
are lirst or all not objccts but designations for objects; it is not tirst of all a matter of 
knowing whether they please or displease in themselves, but \vhether they correctly indicate 
a certain thing or a certain notion. Thus, it often happens that we find ourselves possessing 
a certain idea that someone has taught us by means of words without being able to recall a 
singk one of the words which have transmitted it to us (WL 11). 
The language of prose is conceptual. it is the language of propositional communication: words 
signify particular objects or ideas. 
The poet (like the painter with his colours) will attempt to communicate with material 
rather than use words conceptually. that is transparently. With poetic writing, what was the 
translucence of "'ords becomes the opacity of words. In order to elucidate his conception of 
poetry Salire uses an analogy to other aIiistic creation. in particular to painting. On this, he must 
be allowed to speak for himself. 
For the artist, the colour, the bouquet, the tinkling of the spoon on the saucer, are things in 
the highest degree. Ik stops at the quality of the sound or the fonn .... It is this colour 
ohject that he is going to transfer to the canvass, and the only modification he will make it 
undergo is that he will transfonn it into an imaginary object. He is therefore as far as he 
can he from considering colours and signs as a language. 
Sartre then offers some examples from which he concludes. And thus. 
The greatness and error of Klee lie in his attempt to make a painting both sign and object. 
... The painter does not want to dra\\ signs on his canvass he wants to create a thing. And if 
he PUiS together red, yel I O\\', and grcen, there is no reason \\hy this collection of colours 
should ha\'e a delinahk significance, that is, should refer particularly to another object. ... 
Tintoretto did not choose thai :\ellow rin in the sky above Golgotha to sigl1([v anguish or to 
provoke it. It is anguish and yelhm sky at the same time. ... it is an anguish which has 
hecol11~ thing ... suhmerged and impasted by the qualities peculiar to things, by their 
impcnneability, their c:xtcnsion, thcir c:Xkmalalit~·, ... That is. it is no longer readable. (WL 
20 
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In short .. It is like an immense and vain effort ... to express what their nature keeps them from 
expressing' (ibid.). Sartre then goes on to give a similar illustration of how it is the same with 
music. 'The significance of melody - if one can still speak of significance - is nothing outside the 
melody itself. unlike ideas. which can be adequately rendered in several ways. Call it joyous or 
sad. It will always be over and above anything you can say about it' (ibid.). 
This unsayable aspect of art has little to do "'ith it representing 'passions' (ibid.), i.e. 
emotions (§ I). Furthermore. it does not represent at all: it expresses (and later Sartre will speak 
of expressing 'sensory meanings ... desires'). Nevertheless. with, for example. Picasso's 
Guanaco 'Something is said that can never quite be heard and that would take an infinity of 
words to express', while 'Picasso's long harlequins' are 'haunted with inexplicable meaning' 
(WL 4). 
Next. Sartre informs the reader that what is left unsayable in art is to be somehow equated 
with meaning and. in this sense. poetic writing is to be identified \"ith painting and music: 
One does not paint meanings; one does not put them to music. Under these conditions, who 
would dare require that the painter or musician conunit himself? On the other hand, the 
writer deals with meanings. Still, a distinction must be made. The empire of signs is 
prose; poetry is on the side oCpainting, sculpture, and music (WL 4). 
He continues. in a defence of poetryl9. to define its difference to prose along the lines that it 
'serves' words. \"hereas prose uses. 'utilises' words: 'Poets are men who refuse to utilise 
language' (WL 5). The search for tmth. continues Sartre. takes place 'in and by language 
conceived as a cer1ain kind of instmment'. Tmth then. is not the aim of language when such 
language is conceived as poetry (note here the presupposition: the artists intention). Nor do poets 
'dream of nalliing the world ... they name nothing at all'; in fact. poets do not 'speak, neither do 
they keep silent: it is something different' (ibid.). 
Sartre then gives an account of language, as he sees it conceived by the poet. which bears 
resemblance to Wittgenstein's account of the role of language in showing in the Tractatus. 
For the poet, language is a structure of the extemal world .... Instead of first knowing things 
b\' their name, it seems that tirst he has a silent contact with them .... He sees in the word 
19 A defence which is interestingly neglected by many commentators (it's easier to be committed to the obvious). In 
this, as in key fundamentals, and as in much that is very bad, Le Capra and his 'study' of Sartre leads the way. 
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the inwge ... the I'f!rhai i/1/age he chooses for its resemblance to the [object] is not 
necessarily the word we use to desigllate these objects. . .. he considers words as a trap to 
catch tleeing. reality rather than as indicators which throw him out of himself into the midst 
of things. (WL 6 - my emphasis). 
'In short'. concludes Sartre. 'all language is for him [the poet] the mirror of the world' (ibid.). 
The re-affirmation of image and Ie sens as the means of a 'silent contact' not otherwise possible 
in the signifying - 'designating' - relation between words and the world, and the claim to their 
trapping some other 'fleeting reality'. positions us perfectly for a concluding summary of these 
first clear steps, found in What is Literature?, toward the subject and aesthetics in Sartre's 
account of language. 
Conclusions. What is Literature.') introduces us to the view that the mealllng conveyed by 
poetic language and the other pure arts is expressed in the sensory qualities of the art object itself 
(though they are intertwined with expressi\"e qualities which Sartre sees as common to human 
experience)2o. Thus, what is ineffable but potentially showable in What is Literature? includes 
sensory meanings. pel1aining to 'desire' and emotion. What is important in this to the present 
study is not the linking of the ineffable to emotions. but the claim that the art object - poetic 
language (word as image) - embodies a meaning beyond ordinary propositional language and 
which can only therefore be sho\\'n: this meaning is a value, referring to the world as a whole or 
totality (~5). 
A notion first encountered in Nausea is developed in What is Literature?: what Sartre terms 
an 'essence'. that is. the formal relation between objects, between the given that is experienced as 
the world. (IS 'my world' (dependent upon my-self as attitudinal relation to the world - cf. §4.3), 
this relation is again found to be ineffable. Central to this idea. to What is Literature?, and to the 
present thesis. is the introduction and articulation of the notion of poetic language in its bi-
polarity with language as prose. The fonner is able of regaining the lost sens of language. Crucial 
20 This is a view Sartre shares with Merleau-Ponty, see Kaelin (1966). I have in this chapter forestalled many other 
points of contact between the two philosophers. It seems clear that an interchange of their ideas on language and 
silence took place at some level and at some time. See especially Merleau-Ponty's 'The voices of Silence (dedicated 
to Sartre), in Merleau-Ponty (ed.) Johnson (1993) 
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features arc that Ie sens is able to expresses the moment of totality as if it were complete; whereas 
significativc IclIlguage exprcsscs the ongoing dialectic of experience: and is part of that dialectic. 
Poctry stills the dialectic. the totality or unity is isolated or distanced (§5) from its context of 
action. In this. poetry is said to exhibit an objective structure of the world: poetic discourse is seen 
as having thc same status as painting. music, and sculpture: colours, sounds and the words of 
poetry are objects in themselves. On the other hand, whereas in prose a name represents an 
object; in poetry a word is a set of phonetic and semantic qualities, lacking conceptual 
communication becausc they do not represent anything outside of themselves. 
This distinction betwecn prose and poetry. founded on the signification-sens distinction, is 
identificd. to reiterate thc most important point with the subject. The ineffable is the formal 
relation bctwccn objects. it is transcended by Ie sens, and this relation itself depends in fact upon 
the pour .mi. or Freedom as foundation. 
The failure \\'ithin significative languagc (saying) that is overcome by a second sense, Ie 
seils (showing). is the revelation of thc self: Ie sens reveals. conveys Freedom. Just as we can 
signify - name - particular objects. when freedom itself is manifested in particular and concrete 
situations \\'c can speak of it - signify it - as the T (§3 and §-I-). The source of the concrete T, 
however, original freedom. the universal. is the foundation and presupposition - the background -
to meaningful. significativc. languagc: it is therefore. or so it would seem at this point in our 
inquiry. pcrpctually bcyond thc sayable rcalm of signification . 
• What is Literature? II: A (larger) problem of Interpretation?: Prose and 
Poetry?? - and Engaged Literature?? 
Thcrc are further crucial aspects and dcvclopments to note in the following two sections of 
this chaptcr bcfore wc can finally clinch the full importance of the saying-showing distinction 
in Sartre's philosophy. this with rcfcrence to his masterpiece Being and Nothingness. Firstly, 
howcvcr, ,,'c must considcr a crucial point of intcrpretation. 
The discussion of What is Literatllre? began "ith a warning. it having all the appearance of 
a hastily asscmbled work. Spccifically. we are concerned to know whether Sartre's position is 
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clear or ambiguous. and secondly whether there is any ambivalence on Sartre's part to what he 
does say. Prilllofacie there docs indeed appear to be some ambiguity in Sartre's position, and this 
due to the given structural relation between the two poles of language, prose-poetry; the 
resulting tension is because of Sartre's adherence, in What is Literature?, to a literature of 
engagement. Does this not conflict (a) with the very idea of a prose-poetry distinction, and (b) 
with the notion of poetic language per se and, finally, (c) \yith the aesthetic project as a whole? It 
may appear so. for a morally engaged literature will have to describe social truths and prescribe 
an ideology: needs that on the face of it are as much satisfied by the significative function of a 
proposition as they are threatened by its symbolic or metaphoric function. 
We begin with the prose-poetry distinction. At one point in What is Literature?, referring 
to this distinction. Sartre says: 'There is nothing in common bctween these two acts of writing 
except the movement of the hand which traces the lettcrs' (WL 10). This is supported. we would 
think, by the statement that one aim of the poctry-prose distinction is to account for the fact, as 
Sartre secs it. that some forms of literature .. i.e. poetic forms - are of the same status as other arts 
(he mentions painting and music). and cannot and nor should he want them to be, socially or 
politically cngaged: 
'At kast" , critics say triumphantly, 'you can't even dream of committing it [poetry]'. 
Indeed. But why should I want to? Because it uses words as docs prose? But it does not 
use them in the same way, and it docs not even lise them at all. I should rather say that it 
serves them. (WL -I). 
We shall return shortly to the issue of poetry and engagement, but continue now with its 
presupposition, and the comment by Sarlre that the 'two acts of writing' having 'nothing in 
common'? 
We shall appeal here to an inclusive approach to the language and concepts of What is 
Literatllre? (and also the other early works). Such a reading contradicts What is Literature?'s 
early direct comment. and other later suggestive comments, that there is a dccisive breach 
bctwecn the language as prose and as poetry. Rather. 'Poetic language rises out of the ruins of 
prosc' (WL 2-1-). Poetic languagc. it is indicated over and over again. will retain some vestige of 
conceptual meaning: poetry will al\yays havc some propositional success - on which traditionally 
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it depends for its me(lning21 . Indeed. without at least some minimum signification a proposition 
would be completely meaningless. this applies equally whether the proposition be poetically, 
metaphorically. constmed or otherwise. Similarly, prose will always contain an element of sens, 
always a trace of the subject (and history), of what is, in the context of a scientific language, 
failure (echec): 'the driest prose always contains a bit of poetl)" (WL 25). 
Sartre recognises there can never be a radical separation of language as prose and as poetry, 
that any ideal of language is forlorn: neither the ideal of prose, a complete (scientific) description 
of the world. nor the ideal of Sartre (Socrates and others): intellectual silence (Mallarme, indeed 
a certain poetry, is close - hence Sartre's fascination with the poet). As ideals. as edifices of hope, 
both prose and poetry fail. EYen the greatest prose must fail. a point recognised by Laing and 
Cooper in a work singularly and peerlessly endorsed by Sartre: 
Sarlre recognises that the prose \\Titer, at his moment of success, having arrived at 
meanings that outstrip the language, meanings that are in a sense secreted between the lines 
of the page, cannot do more than reveal what he cannot say. All great prose is a special 
kind of failure. 22 
Prose fails. A proposition. as Suppol1ed by What is Literature?, the other early works of Sartre, 
and this dissel1ation. is bi-polar. meaning is constituted on a scale between sign and symbol, 
between signification and sens: reciprocity holds: no clear breach exists: and there is on Sartre's 
part no ambiyalence in this: only. in What is Literatllre?, some ambiguity, rooted in the 
occasional careless expression. But this ambiguity is readily dispersed, and consensus attained, by 
an appeal to the overall (contextualised) picture of Sartre's semantics both in What is Literature? 
and other works 
Prose fails. but the entailed semantic and descriptive loss to Science is in fact a gain to Art 
and the Subject: through the unayoidable intmsion of Ie sens. through echec. prose will always, it 
follows. have some possibility of communicating - showing - the incommunicable (the self and 
21 Of course the reverse is possible, as we see in the works of Polanyi with his account of 'tacit' understanding. 
Indeed, there is strong textual evidence supporting the view - as I do - that Sartre took poetiC (Le. metaphoric) 
meaning - la sens - as primary. I.e. as the necessary background to signification. This point will emerge as we 
proceed. 
22 Laing/Cooper (1964), Reason and Violence. pp19. 
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realm ofyalue): cOI1\'ersely. poetry. yia its trace o[ signification. will always retain the possibility 
of describing the world. This principle. discussed by Sartre in terms of the sign-symbol identity 
of propositions, simple as it is. supports. for good or ill, the generic, the (acknowledged) massive 
hermeneutical complexity when confronted by a text. Where then. on this great shifting ri\'er bed 
of meaning, do we place a poem. or a work such as What is Literature? itself? More pertinent to 
the present. how does the affirmed reciprocity of prose and poetry effect the second of our two 
possible objections, the question of engagement? 
Clearly. the language of prose can to a useful extent be engaged: description and 
prescription of social tmths is to a large extent possible. The concern then is not with what we 
may now perceive as the difficulties of a ji.tI~v engaged - morally directed - prose (difficulties 
recognised by Sartre himself): but rather with the very possibility of a - morally - engaged poetry. 
On this. one fundamental point of imp0l1ance has already emerged: in degree, poetry will always 
be engaged just as prose will not: the sign-symbol identity of propositions ensures this, and no 
choice on Sartre's part will change that fact. Nonetheless, the more language depends upon sens 
and symbol the less suitable it would seem to become for engagement. The writer must choose, 
the principle of bi-polarity supports a choice of emphasis: sign and signification or symbol and 
image. Sartre, notably in the early works. elects for the latter. indirect mode of communicating 
his thoughts (and is much criticised [or it). Our main thesis supports that choice and the question 
here now concerns the problem of whether the \'iews of What is Literature? will reliably 
synthesise with our main claims. This ultimately depends on what way and to what extent poetry 
- sho\\'ing - can said to be morally engaged. as it clearly is in Wittgenstein's account. 
We must accept. due to the overwhelming textual evidence. that at the time of What is 
Lilera/ure) Sa11re did not want to engage poetry (or the other pure arts) in the same way that he 
did prose: "'you can't even dream of committing it [poetry]". Indeed. But why should I want 
to?' (WL -l). Indeed. but surely some level or some sense of commitment, that is engagement is 
called for'? Yes. a logical necessity: \\e sa\\ that the reciprocity of the sens-signification 
distinction forces the way open for a poetry of engagement. 
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Hcncc. crucially. and as statcd in What is Literature? signification holds language as 
'reflectivencss of the social body'. while this is surpassed in Ie sens 'in the state of non-reflective 
reflectivencss' (WL ~2). Thc distinction bctween prose and poetry. and the surpassing of 
language ovcr idcology is due to it being (affiliated to and) alienated from the 'social body'. Thus, 
the sensc in which Sartre must and will have poetry engaged is insofar as it is a 'non-reflective 
reflectiveness'. What is at stake then. in the surpassing of poetry, is the revelation of - pre-
reflectivc - Original Freedom: the self. 
For Sartre. as for Wittgcnstein. lanf,l uage is more than communication (which signification 
takes care of): primarily, it is an expression of Freedom and of the relation between 'I' and 
world, thc elucidation of Bcing. the attempt to disclose Value. We are thus not here dealing with 
a Fall from ordinary significati\'e usage to poetic symbolic usage: it is only the latter that reveals -
shows - the self. the relation bctween those in the park by the sprawling black roots of the tree of 
knowledge and a God (real or ideal) aspired to: with such revelation the individuals freedom is, 
as in Delphic tradition. increa.'i·ed. 
The language of Ie S(,IIS creates the possibility of greater individual freedom: it is in this 
sense that it is engaged. As Satirc is happy to concede (above). this is not engaged in the way 
prose is: poetry can not be directly committed to an ideology, to social truths which depend upon 
accurate dcscriptions. Howcver. in the \yay poetry elucidates (shows) Being and discloses 
Original Freedom. poetry is - morally - engaged, though de facto this is both less direct than is 
the case with prose and, importantly. more foundational. 
We conclude thus. on the issue of poetry and moral engagement, as we did on the above 
issue of its presupposition. the relation between prose and poetry: that there is no ambivalence in 
Sartrc's position. that ycs thcrc is some initial ambiguity, but that this will be dispersed on a 
closer contcxtualised and inclusive reading. Moreover. on the issue of moral engagement, the 
claim to non-ambivalence (in the reading of What is Literature?) is fully supported by central 
claims of this thesis - aesthetic determination and deeds (especially §5.3), the structural identity 
between the ethical and the aesthetic (~5.2). Fact and Value (notably §3.1i). 
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One last word. pertaining to the third and final of the possible objections in our reading of 
What is Literatllre?: the aesthetic project as a whole. In fact. as I have just indicated, the above 
considerations are not to be taken in isolation from the central themes of this thesis and the 
proposal of an acsthetic solution to the problematic of self: and here, for the first timc. there is 
both no ambiguity but a definite ambivalence in Sartre's position. The (thankful) lack of 
ambiguity defines the ambivalence: for all the (above) argued for engagement of art and the 
aesthetic - as foundationally identified with original freedom. and this coupled with an synthesis 
between original freedom and action. it remains clear that the Sartrian (and existential) ideal of 
the primacy of action is only indirectly realised in any symbolic relation to the world. Poetry is 
less directly cngaged than prose. and the poet. in identifying himself with the 'unrealisable' (§5), 
finds himself less engaged than the \\'fiter of prose: may indeed find himself in bad faith. Any 
aesthetic entrapment in bad faith does indeed concern the aesthetic solution as a whole and, for 
this reason. while acknowledging that our inquiry into the interpretation of What is Literature? 
reveals a potential objection. Sartrc's clear ambivalence with the aesthetic. I shall treat of it (at 
§5.4) after presenting the full case for the aesthetic. with which we can now continue . 
• Tile Writer and Ilis Language 
In 1965 Sartre gave an interview with Pierre Verstraeten that was published under the title 
The TVriter and his Language. This late interview is useful in that (a) it clarifies aspects of the 
prose/poetry distinctioll. (b) It supports a (lesser) claim: that of continuity in Sartre's doctrines of 
art and the ineffable. (c) The inte\l'iew is revealing because (unlike in the earlier - the pre late-
fifties - texts and intervie\\'s) Sartre articulates his views with, he claims, a new and direct 
method of communication: by using what is essentially the language of prose. This way, Sartre 
hopes to a\'oid the 'ambif,'l.lity' which he so intentionally embraced and used so as to 
communicate his ideas in the pre 1954 works23 . 
23 In the Force of Circumstance Simon De Beauvoir locates 1954 as the point at which he loses faith in a certain 
literary method and its corollary 'Art as salvation'. 
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In communicating his ideas Sartre now hopes to shun what he would have been pleased of 
at the time of What is Literatllre?: the apparent paradox of that work. For it is to be recalled that 
the central prose/poctry distinction of this work, and Sartre's view that poetic language is open to 
suggestivc and non-signifiablc meanings (and is also therefore non-computable), and then in 
reading What is Literature? it is to be noticed that it is replete with poetic, connotative \vriting -
especially metaphor. It follows [rom what Sartre says in that work. that often what the text says it 
does not say, and what it docs not say (denote) it does 'say' (connote, show). This - indirect -
method o[ communication is of coursc central to the carly works of Sartre. The idea that 
language must be used beyond its significatory properties, that, to borrow a later term, it must 
symbolise its mcanings: 'When I wrote Being and Nothingness it was uniquely to communicate 
thoughts by means of symbols' (BN 83). 
In the intervicw Sartrc still speaks of thc poetry/prose distinction: 'I don't think the poetic 
intention implies communication to the samc extent'. Poetry is 'deeply narcissistic' a kind of 
self-satisfaction - 'at least has been since Romanticism'. This is not a negative judgement says 
Sartre, simply 'descriptive'. Obviously Sartre is not so keen on his early distinction, nevertheless, 
there remains more than an acknowledgement of its foundational justification, that of Ie sens 
beyond signification. Thus, after a brief summary of what he still valued from the earlier view he 
goes on to c.'\plain his present "iews. 
What was original1~1 refusal to communicate or ignorance of the fact of communication at 
the time when I was making. '\\'orucastJes' remains as a residue, as a kind ofconmull1ication 
over and ahove the actual organs or communication (PLWL Ill). 
Sartre, consequently. broadens the scopc of his earlier poetry distinction to include 'literary' 
prose. This is to be distinguished from both philosophical prose and 'Scientific language'. The 
latter is 'pure application, action, and knowledge in the technical sense of the term. It makes no 
reference to man' (PL: WL Ill). Philosophic language falls somewhere between the literary and 
scientific modes of expression. It maintains an element of Ie sens, that part which Sartre at 
times, especially in the later writings. identifies as its 'ambiguity': ·It always contains concealed 
literary prose'. Husscrl's idea of philosophy as a rigorous science becomes that of 'a madman of 
78 
genius' (PW:WL 112). Moreovcr. it is again. as in What is Literature? the failure of such prose 
that constitutes its very capacity for success. The philosopher. because he is the loser, wins: 
On the other hand, precisel:- because philosophy always contains concealed literary prose, 
amhiguity of tenns, any tenlls, the concept is interesting because it retains a depth which 
does allow it, through those ambiguities, to get a tighter grip on that sentence of literary 
prose which already contains - but in a condensed [onn, not as yet aware of itself - the 
meaning. which it will he philosophy's task to render. (PLWL 112). 
Unlike the positivists. Sartre - and Wittgenstein - see the very failure of signifying or fact-based 
language as the necessary pre-requisite for a fl.lller meaning emerging from the necessary 
background. 
The special problem that literary and philosophical prose have. compared to scientific 
language. is that thcy arc 'conccrned with the creator of the sciences' - i.e. Ie sens and showing 
has a pclliicular relation to the self. What 'noll" interests Sartre as a philosopher he says is 
'communicating \\ith the readcr' (surely with a touch of irony - though many Anglophers, and 
some Contiphers. may choke in a fit of dissent at such a notion). By 'communicating' Sartre is 
again speaking of writing: 'The goal is always something that takes you back to the person who 
writes'. This is not the banality it first appears. Moreover. it takes us to the heart of the ineffable 
and showing in Scllire's philosophy: thc self as consciousness. Thus: 
What distinguishes the' \\Titer' is that he is a person who believes that language is object of 
total communication, and who believes this not in spite of the problems of language - the 
tiK( that one \\orl! has several meanings, or that syntax is often ambiguous - but because of 
(hem - What I mean is this: if YOU use words only in order to communicate, there is clearly a 
certain residuum, something not covered. That is to say, we have these symbols which 
designate an absent object and \\hich are able to designate it as possessing such and such a 
meaning and furthennore as occupying such and such a concrete position in relation to other 
objects, but the symbols to not reproduce \\"hat one might call the 'flesh and blood' object. 
(PLWL S4t). 
This rcsults. S<l\'S Salire. III a 'ccrtain kind of linguistic pesslllllsm': 'There is always this 
residuum of incommunicability'. For cxample. no matter in how much detail I describe, say, my 
fcclings. 'Bcyond a certain point thc reality of those feclings will no longer correspond to the 
manner in which I choose to atiiculate them'. This is because 'language as pure symbol can only 
designatc thc thing signified in strictIy conccptual terms' and because 'there is a relationship 
bctwccn signification and signifier and this is a retroactiYe. centripetal relationship by which 
words bCCOlIlC changcd' (PL:WL ~5). Signification is 'the logical entity constituted by words, the 
79 
meaning of a sentence'. The intention, the self. is the signifier (the thing signified is the object) 
(PL:WL X6). The 'retroactive' relationship is understood in terms of words possessing their own 
history and standing in a particular social or cultural relation to language: there are many 
language games: 'I am already conditioned by my history in the words I use'. It's the writer's job 
to attain equivalence: 'That is what we call style'. Then: 'Basically I think everything is 
expressible provided you find the right expression for it' (PL:WL 88). 
What this means in reality is working with that aspect of the word which relates to its own 
history or to the signifier considered as history. This to some extent means working in the 
dark; one is none to sure of what one is doing. The literary task is as it were a twofold one: 
it involves aiming at signification while at the same time charging it with something which 
must give you things as pn.::scnt. (PL:WL 88). 
Verstraeten thinks this position to be close to that of the literary positivists. Sartre agrees 
that adherents of this view represent 'a kind of literary positivism' (PL:WL 87) who conclude 
'that the idea of being able to attain the thing signified and thus to communicate it is illusory'. 
However. Sartre remains keen to distinguish himself from positivist theories of non-
communication. He says that the thing signified will always 'be the product of a certain relativity 
- psychological. psycho-analytical - 'and so rather than be deluded they would prefer to 'do 
without communication altogether'. Sartre responds to this, in an important passage, by citing 
Merleau-Ponty and the 'Visible'24: and then says 'the signifier is signified'. Consequently, 
thcrc is a vcr\, close relationship of being between the thing signified which signification 
misses, and the signifier \\'ho is at the same time signified by his signification .... Language 
appears to me as that which designates me in so t:1r as I attempt to designate the object 
(PLWL 90). 
Hence, importantly. and as Verstraeten points out, in an attempt to avoid the incommunicable, 
Sartre has had to resort to ontolo!,'y. 
Sartre believes that his dual concept of linguistic meaning and the invocation to poetic 
language is such that he has avoided the charge of positivist non-communication. Poetry will 
communicate that which can't be signified (though the sharp distinction of What is Literature? 
has been blunted). On this. the follO\\'ing from Sartre is well worth quoting in detail. 
The l'OIllTcte universal must al\\ll\,S impl~' a kind of self-awareness that is other than 
24 A work which seems to have influenced Sartre and which was itself influenced by the Heidegger that understood 
Being as language. 
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conceptual, a kind of awareness that is awareness of Wish, a\\areness of History .... 111ere 
arc certain relationships to life, ... \\hich refer us back to ourselves at the same time 
retclTing us back to the universe. Strictly speaking then the wish is not directly related to 
articulation, as Lacan says. My language is incapable of designating my deep-seated wish, 
hence another non-positivist theory of non-conununication - that one can never, except 
through vague approximations set in perspective, furnish by means of language an 
equivalent for the phenomenon of desire - whereas I maintain that one does furnish 
precisely such an equivalent in poetry and in that going beyond the kernel of meaning 
through signification \\hich is prose. Particularly in poetry, though, one furnishes this 
equivalent through the use of words not in so far as these are uttered for their own sake, but 
in so far as the level below articulation is at work in their very reality, i.e. in so far as the 
densitv of the word in fact refers us back precisely to what has insinuated itself into it 
without having produced it. There is no deliberate expression of wish. Articulation is not 
designed to express wish, but the wish insinuates itself into the articulation of it. (PL:WL 
103t} 
Verstracten agrees with the 'decpcr significance' of Sartre's views, that poetic language 
may. becausc it transcends denotati\"e limitations, and because the self itself is beyond these 
signification's: it is the signifier, that 'Poetry may show man what he is, may actually be his 
lucidity, and awake him in arcas of darkness of which he is not yct in control' (PL:WL 106). 
This in fact recalls a remark from what bccame the Notebooks For An Ethics, 
SUdl language [as prayerl is not il!(onllalil'e, it teaches nothing .... Whence the particular 
poelic character of prayer, \\hereby one speaks without saying anything ... [through] 
appearance ... since there is a deeper-lying truth (NE, pp219). 
Returning to the intervicw, Baudelaire is offered as an example: Sartre states that he objectifies 
his wish. desire. or expcricnce of the cmpirical world in 'the poetic moment', such that 'desire 
objectifics itself through words. but abo\"c and bcyond their articulation' (PL:WL 107). 
As in What is Literature), Sartre has citcd desires and feelings as being beyond articulation. 
In Being and Nothingness he had donc the same, suggesting that 'pain ... is not named in 
consciousncss. for it is not kl1 0 \1'11. .., Pure pain as the simple "lived" can not be reached; it 
belongs to the category of indefinablcs and indescribables'. Pain is not a psychic object, it is part 
of the 'non-thetic project of the For-itself: wc apprehend it only through the world'. And again, 
'The suffcring of \\hich wc speak is ncvcr exactly that which \\e feel' (BN 333 & 91). In the 
inter\'iew. howevcr. Sarlre is clearer in stating that he does not belicve feelings and desires to be 
incommunicable. Thcy arc com·cyed. shown against signification by poetry - or language which 
functions as symbol through la sel1s. Indecd, the idea that feelings and emotions are ineffable 
(and unknown) but may be communicated is pCf\'ash'c to Sartre's philosophy. This is an 
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important re\'elation. and certainly not without significance to art-and-the-ineffable. But as was 
noted in § I. such a notion. though common to art-and-the-ineffable, has had too much critical 
attention at the expense of further or. (I would say), more interesting philosophical commitments 
to the ineffable. Sartre's comments in the interview help to clarify not only the discursi\'e remarks 
on the emotions and the ineffable in What is Literature? but also the scattered comments in Being 
and Nothingness: and this, plus the generic significance of such a view, is as far as the issue will 
be taken. 
Of more immediate concern to the present inquiry are the following, now summarised 
points. In the interview of 1965 Satire yet again, and with clarity, states his belief in a linguistic 
inadequacy. It is ascertained in the present circumstances \'ia his study of the sign, signification, 
signified. signifier relation. Here though, there is both clarification and development. What began 
as essentially a metaphysical rumination on the problem of the ineffable in Nausea, to the 
ineffable in an explicitly philosophical context in The Psychologv of imagination - along the 
lines of an epistemological distinction between perception and imagination. The emphasis then 
befell an explicit semantic distinction in What is Literature? - between prose and poetry. In the 
present interview, conducted twenly years later, these distinctions are relied upon, and the 
doctrines of the ineffable and showing are maintained. Furthermore, the self, as signifier, is 
again present to the problematic of the ineffable. But now two seemingly new claims have 
emerged - firstly, that the ineffable and the self are structurally linked, as would be suggested 
given Sartre's ontology. Secondly, Satire utilises the prose/poetry distinction to incorporate, 
besides the scientific and the literal. philosophical language. Philosophy. he states, always 
'contains concealed literary prose ... the concept is interesting because it retains a depth' which 
does not allO\\ it to be rendered. 
The introduction to the ineffable - and the possibility of showing (through Ie sens) - of the 
philosophical project. and the significance of the ineffable to ontology and self, these, coupled 
with clarification of earlier aspects, these are the key points which are to be taken forward from 
the account of the 1965 interview with Verstraeten. 
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• Departure and Return. 
This essay offers itself as an uncomplicated junction. conjoining the previous inquiries to 
the final section on Being and .\'othingness. Of more importance. the essay is interesting in the 
present context not only because in it Sartre deals 'with his views on language,25 but also because 
he does so through a discussion of the French philosopher Brice Parain. In fact there are 
numerous references to Parain spread throughout Sartre's writings, worthy of study. This 
notwithstanding. the aim is only to draw attention to those aspects in the said essay which will 
move the present discussion forward in its current direction. 
Parain developed a theory of language close to that found in the Tractatus. He sought a 
perfect language ill which the philosophical problems of an imperfect language could not arise -
silence played an imp0l1ant role. His solution was to restrict language to a single function, not 
the early Wittgensteinian one of natural science through the representation and verification of 
facts. but that of giving orders. 
It has been suggested that Sartre became increasingly sympathetic to Parain' s ideas26, 
moving from some explicit criticisms. as found in the present essay, to implicit acceptance in the 
later works (especially by the time of Flal/bert [1970]). The essay Departure and Return is 
complex. this is perhaps due to Sartre's known willingness to enter into the structures of thought 
of his suq,ject. and there is a difficulty in disentangling Sartre's own opinion from the ideas under 
discussion. Still. some matters are clear - and can be stated with reasonable impunity. For 
example. that at this time Sar1re isgel1era/~v critical of Para in's position. 
Tht: totality of languagt: is siknce, for one must be situated in the midst of language in 
ordcr to speak. Ho\\c\'cr, in the case with \\'hich we are concemed, totalization is 
impossible for man, sincc it would have to be achieved by means of words. And Parain's 
silt:nce is only a big optimistic m~th (LPE:DR 157). 
An 'optimistic myth") indeed. and one that is shared by the ever optimistic Sartre (for a reader 
25 J.Fell Heidegger and Sartre (1979), supports his initial claim that the essay can be read as a critique of 'certain 
Heideggerian notions', including that of 'I am situated in language'. Although for Sartre language is not exactly the 
house of Being, there are close similarities to Heidegger's position on language and silence. On Sartre and 
Heidegger see especially J.Fell (1979); on Heidegger and Wittgenstein see Bindeman, Geir, Mulhall and others. 
26 R. Goldthorpe, Sartre: Theory and Literature (1984) 
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familiar with Sartre the textual context is enough to satisfy the conviction that irony does not play 
a part in Sartre's quoted reply). Something else is also clear: that at this time Sartre has sympathy 
for many of the details of Pan-lin's' position - he is certainly not wholly dismissive: 'Let me say 
that I accept roughly the greater part of Para in's analysis. I challenge only their scope and their 
place' (LPE:DR 15S). In fact. Sartre's sympathy is directed towards certain specific ideas which 
he finds in Parain. 
Most notably, Sal1re is sympathetic to Parain's idea of a necessary relation between silence, 
nothingness and the self, and understanding. For Sartre, this relation is constituted in terms of a 
self (as nothing), linguistic inadequacy and a possibility of showing: the failure of language to 
signify this 'silent' human reality. Here is a \'ery useful passage: 
Parain sa\,s that languag.e interpolates between me and my self-knowledge. ... But when I 
am conscious or understanding a word, no word is interpolated between me and myself. 
... the word is before me, as thar which is lInderstood. Where else would you put it? In 
consciousness? You might as well ... cut it otr from itself. ... The effectiveness, the eternity, 
of the cogito lies in the fact it reveals a kind of existence defined as being present to oneself 
without intennediary. The word is interpolated between my love and myself, between my 
courage or cowardliness and mysel1~ not between my understanding and consciousness of 
understanding. For the consciousness of understanding is the law of being of 
understanding. I shall call this the silence of consciousness. (LPEDR 161). 
The word interpolates between our objects of experience and our experience of them - not 
necessarily. it was seen. completely successfully. The word does not ever interpolate between our 
consciousness of understanding and our being of understanding because it is the expression of 
that being which is the foundation of understanding. 
I grant what you [Parain] sa~' about consciousness, but as soon as you try and express what 
you are, you get bogged dow11 in language. I agree. However, I know what it is that I want 
to express because I am \\ithout intcnnediary. Language may resist and mislead me, but I 
shall nc\'cr be taken in by it unless I want to, for I can always come back to what I am, to 
the emptiness and silence that I am. (LPEDR 162). 
Here then are the two central points to be drawn from this essay on Parain. Firstly, that 
Sartre states his belief in 'The identity of man and his expression through language' (LPE:DR 
153). This is the failure of language to signify Man, the 'silcnt' human reality. As in the 
inten'icw with Vcrstrcaten. only herc at the time of Beil1g al1d "\'othingness, the notion of the 
ineffable is thus related to the human subject which is, in the Parain essay, connected to an -
ontological - silence (the totality of language as Being in the world: \\e are in language as we are 
in the world). Secondly. there is now an additional devcIopment that the foundation or silent 
precondition of langlIage, the self. is also the foundation of understanding. Thus, again, there is 
the possibility that the ineffable is the problem of communicating - disclosing - a new meaning 
(ethical), leading to a self-understanding. 
Conclusion. So far the inquiry has also revealed that Sartre's commitment to the ineffable 
revolves around the possible problem of defining and describing the relation that holds for the 
subject (pollr soi) between those objects (etre en soi) that form Illy world. Secondly, the subject 
itself as the source of these 'relations' is seen as ineffable, beyond propositional representation. 
(Also, less interestingly. it was noted that the ineffable pertains to emotions or 'desires'). Finally, 
with the essay on Parain, the human subject - and thus the problematic - has taken central stage 
in its ontological relation to the ineffable and the problem of disclosing Value (ethical): the very 
conditions of the ineffable constitute the possibility of showing. 
Thus. the subject - and the problematic - now begin to directly dominate inquiries. But the 
most authoritati"e - or representati\"e - Sartrian text and an early one at that is Being and 
Nothingnes: .... and much that has been argued for in the previous sections (aside from the crucial 
sens-signification distinction) will only stand if supported by the views of Being and Nothingness. 
• Being and Nothingness. 
Although this long section constitutes a continuous discussion, relief is supplied in the form 
of four parts. on 'Language: scIf. freedom, nothingness and being': on 'Language and Being': on 
'Being and .\'othingness on language': and finally a conclusion. 
Let it be supposed that the above conclusions, drawn from Nausea, What is Literature?, the 
interview. and the essay on Parain, are accepted as essentially \"alid. With the resulting 'threat' of 
an inclusi\'e ineffableness in Sal1re's philosophy, effabilists and ineffabilists alike may turn to 
Sartre's master work "'ith pU/.zlement and annoyance. Zeus himself \\as heard thundering: 
'Is not the external world of objects of experience Being and is not the self that constitutes 
85 
these objects as Illy ",orld a freedom or .\'othingness') And is not the whole merciless book, 
Being and Nothingness. a phenomenological description of Freedom. Nothingness and the 
Being of phenomenaT 
The question. a cooL insolent. nagging VOIce, responded: 'can language describe Being, 
Nothingness and Freedom? Can language ... ' 
It is necessary, first of aIL to re-acquaint ourselves, in a paragraph, with the central 
concepts of Being, Nothingness and Freedom. Sartre states that Being is all-embracing, universal 
and objective: it is contrasted with Existence which is the concrete present-at-hand, individual 
and subjective. Being-in-itself is non-conscious, it is the contingent empirical world of 
phenomena. Being-for-itself is consciousness - conceived of as a lack, a desire, and a relation to 
Bei ng27. It brings a nothingness into the human world which is human reality: freedom. What 
freedom and consciousness have in common is nothingness, in this they arc set against Being; 
there will be a constant struggle between the two as freedom seeks objectification (to become 
Being, while yet remaining itself). Occasionally Sartre uses the terms consciousness and freedom 
synonymously: the linchpin is the imaginative stmcture of consciousness, which - through 
negation - he sees as necessary if consciousness is to emancipate itself from the world of causal 
relations. Consciousness becomes - is permeated with - freedom. Freedom is seen as unlimited, 
absolute: universal. the 'foundation of all essences'; it is also identifiable with the self. In short, 
Being and Nothingness have this in common: first Being (pure and unmediated physical being) 
conditions - is essential to the occurrence of - Nothingness (a no-thing, immaterial, thought); 
second, Being and Nothingness are universal and foundational, the latter brings freedom into the 
world as a relation (lack) to the former: the individual or particular pertains as an existential 
reality - concrete and subjective. What then. of language and. firstly. freedom and nothingness? 
Language: Self, freedom, nothingness and heing. Being and Xothingness has relatively few 
27 The constant emphasis placed on 'relation' is to remind the reader that this notion is crucial, the self as a relatum 
is in fact the subject of inquiry in §4. 
pages de\'oted explicitly to language - but what there is. is significant. as will be seen. Equally 
significant are other passages. 
Thus we are always wholly present to ourselves; but precisely because we are wholly 
present, we can not hope to have an analytic and detailed consciousness of what we are .... 
the world by means of its very articulation rd'ers to us exactly the image of what we are. 
Not. as we have seen so many' times, that we can decipher this image. (BN 463). 
Here Sartre acknowledges the identification of the very possibility of articulation as dependent 
upon the image and in a relation to the world as a whole (~5). and, therefore, an intrinsic 
linguistic inadequacy. Earlier in Being and Nothingness, in one of the most important passages 
for the present study. the nature of the difficulty had been ascertained. 
At the start \\c encounter a great difficulty. Ordinarily, to describe something is a process 
of making e:-.:plicit by aiming at the stmcturcs of a particular essence. Now freedom has no 
essence. It is not subject to any logical necessity; we must say of it what Heidegger said of 
the Dasial/ in genera\: 'In it e:-.:istence preceoes and commands essence' ... The very use of 
the tcnn 'freedom' is dangerous if it is to imply that the word refers to a concept as words 
ordinarily do. /mit;/Inahle and IIIllwmeahle, is freedom also indescribable? (BN 438 - my 
emphasis). 
A similar difficulty \ras encountered earlier. continues Sartre, when 'we wanted to describe 
nothingness and the being of phenomenon'. However, this 'did not deter us', because 
There can be descriptions which 00 not aim at the essence but at the existent itself in all its 
particularity ... I could not describe a freedom which is both conunon to the Other and 
myselj~ I coulo not therefore contemplate an essence of freedom. On the contrary, it is 
freedom that is the foundation of all essences (BN 438 - my emphasis). 
Freedom is not an essence. it is the 'foundation of all essences'. A description - which aims at 
the stmcture of (\ particular essence - cannot then be given. Freedom is, on Sartre's word here, 
(and commensurate with Nausea). indefinable and unnameable, and possibly indescribable. But 
how do we - how docs Sal1re - give some kind of account (description?) of Being and Freedom? 
If he does not. or if such a 'description' is not unequivocal. then what is the status of what he 
does and does not say in. for example, Being and Xothingness? 
The suggestion in the above quoted passage from Being and Nothingness is that freedom, 
nothingness. and the being of phenomena arc in fact definable and describable - but on~v in their 
existenti;ll parliculari~v. Whereas. as again the above passage suggests, a description of the 
'essence' of freedom. nothingness. and the being of phenomena is not possible. Here, although 
speaking of essence, we are not to think of Plato: but rather of relations, of a common structure, 
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of the rcJation that holds between objects of experience. of something foundational. Sartre is 
clear in stating that what he is proposing when he does speak of essence is that which is universal 
to all freedoms. and this so because it is in turn the 'foundation of all essences'. (Though in fact 
Sartre will occasionally speak in terms of the self as essence: 'myself. cut off from the world and 
from my essence .... Consciousness possesses a pre-ontological comprehension of its essence' 
{BN 39}). 
Satire's claim. that essence is universal. indefinable and indescribable, while particularity is 
not, aligns him with the Scholastic tradition of nominal and real definition - cf. below, §2.4. The 
implication that follows from Sartre's alliance (tacit or otherwise) to the Scholastic tradition of 
seeing real definition as impossible is a point of great importance to both an understanding of 
Sartre and the claim of this chapter (and thesis) - though it is often overlooked and nearly always 
understated. Spieglcberg. charged only with understatement. is an otherwise unsurprising 
exception. in that he does identi fy Sartre' s problem and, in general terms. the character of his 
solution. Thus he notes that when attempting to describe freedom Sartre 'Always shows it as 
imbedded in a given situation.' (Spiegleberg. 1960. pp231). Indeed. even prima facie and without 
recourse to a theory of dual-definition. one would expect that this must be the case, for 
'Nothingness is not': 'We have to deal with human reality as a being which it is not and which is 
not what it is' (BN 58). Such that 'If we can speak of it. it is only because it possesses an 
appearance of being ... nothingness is made-to-be' (EN 22). 
It is clear. saYs Sal1re. 'That freedom is not a faculty of the human soul to be envisaged and 
. . 
described in isolation' (BN 25). Much more than this. 
[freeuom] Is not a quality auued on or a property of my nature. It is very exactly the stuff 
or 111\' being. .... For the ror-itselC to be is to nihilate the in-itself which it is. Under these 
cond'ilions freeuom can be nothing other than this llihilation. It is through this that the for-
itself escapes its being as its essence~ it is through this that the for-itself is always 
something other than what can be said of it. (BN 439). 
Sartre says that the For-itscJf is. 'in the final analysis'. that which escapes 'denomination'. it is 
'beyond the name which is gi\'en it. beyond the property which is recognised in it' (ibid.). Again, 
the point. one point. that is being pressed here by Sartre. is that original freedom. the negation of 
being. is foundational - 'the foundation of all essences': it is foundational and also universal and, 
therefore. beyond real definition. Only when freedom is manifested in the particular, in concrete 
situations. is it revealed to consciousness. and only then can it be defined, denominated and 
described. can something be said of it. The numerous (concrete and imaginative) examples and 
attempts at description of freedom in Being and Nothingness amply demonstrate this, as 
Spiegleberg notes. Here then there is a response to the question, albeit provisional: (the 
universal) Being and Nothingness, freedom - the self in fact - escape 'denomination' and that 
which 'can be said', but are nonetheless denotable and describable when particularised in 
concrete situations. 
The heart of this issue of self and the ineffable is thus, that freedom is ineffable because (a) 
it isfoundalional. and therefore an 'essence' or universal - beyond definition. (b) The activity of 
freedom. at its source. is to be seen as a complex of logical operations: it is these which constitute 
the activity of consciousness. and which constitute it the very precondition of language in its 
commitment to uniyersals. Here is Sm1re again, in his essay on Parain. Departure and Return: 
The ('xlema! identity of the word 'pellet' would be of no use to me, for however identical it 
might be phvsically, I would still have to recognise it, that is, extract it from the flux of 
phenomena and stabilise it. I would still have to refer it to its appearances of yesterday and 
the day before and establish between these ditTerent moments a synthetic place of 
identification. . .. Even if the word did exist in the bosom of God, I must produce it by an 
operation kno\\11 as 'synthesis of identification' the 'word has no privileged status ... I can 
name oIlly if I have constituted [objects] as independent wholes, that is, if I objectify the 
thing and the \\'ord that names it in one and the same synthetic act .... If I constitute my 
experience and m!' words within this experience, it is not on the level of language but on 
that of the synthesis of identification that the universal appears. (DR 16Of) 
The important issue is to explain how it is that in speech language is identified with the 
individual while committing itself to universals. 
The most authoritative - . Sartrian' - response IS found in a fine study of Sartre and 
Heidegger by J. Fcl128. He analyses the argument Sartre uses and agrees with Sartre that a word 
on its own cannot per xC' universalise. For a word to stand 'for a class of things or a succession of 
appearances of a single being' we must understand the 'words transferability in time and space'. 
28 J. Fell, Heidegger and Sartre (1979) 
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This involves. Fell argues, all of Kant's twelve categories (Sartre is invoking Kant) and commits 
Sartre to the transcendental unity of apperception. 29 This in turn commits Sartre to the view that 
the 'use of \\'ords as universals presupposes the laws of logic, for Kant's categories both directly 
restate and express the implications of the laws of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle'. 
Therefore. for Sartre, the understanding of universals is brought about through a complex of 
mental acts, of distinction and synthesis, which is the precondition of understanding universals, 
and which is regardless of what particular words are spoken. Understanding is an act of 
consciousness 'that both distinguishes and synthesises'. So that in using universals an individual 
subject is committing itself to a complex of logical operations. Hence, in a champagne passage, 
Against Parain, as against Hciucgger, conscience (de) soi is the tme beginning, the 
.lill/(/al1lelltlll1l iIlCOIICI/SSlIIII. the original negation of being whereby consciousness 
apperceives itself as nothing, emptiness, silence. There is consciousness of language, and 
consciousness is alway's therefore one step beyond language. But not beyond logic, for 
consciousness is, as perpetual 'other-than' and perpetual 'beyond' or 'surpassing', 
negation, mostly in the fonn of pre-reflective nihilation (Fell, 1979 pp286). 
It is correct to identify the ineffable ('silence') with logical operations that are the 
precondition of speech in its commitment to universals. This precondition, the logical 
operations. is itself to be identified with original freedom and negation (nothingness) - pre-
reflective consciousness. The original choice 'is the centre of reference for an infinity of 
polyvalent meanings' (BN 570). Such consciousness is the precondition of experience (it is also 
it shall and has been seen pre-conceptual). And indeed, when freedom is ours, particularised, 'As 
a pure factual necessity; that is. as a contingent existent', it is one that '1 am not able not to 
e,'\perience' (BN -1-38). Consciousness is then, an 'essence' or universal, the foundation of myself, 
my experiences. my language. It is the dialectical relationship between subject(ivity) and 
object(ivit)'). The pour soi, is, as a complex of logical operations which constitute the activity of 
consciousness. the very precondition of langl1age and its commitment to universals. 
Recall here that in the discussion of Sartre's sens/signification distinction, a truth of this 
29 On this Fell is undoubtedly correct - with interesting consequences, For if we accept a certain - most likely -
interpretation of Kant on these issues (such an interpretation is pervasively offered by Allison in his study of Kant's 
Transcendental Idealism. see pp290-3) we will find his position to be in accord with both Wittgenstein in the 
Tractatus and Sartre in Being and Nothingness, 
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doctrine was stated as follows. When words are limited to or are experienced as signs then their 
meaning will be derived from what they signify. Meaning is limited to what can be signified, 
which is, broadly speaking. particular objects or facts. With regard to freedom. when it is 
manifested in particular and concrete situations we can speak of it as the T. And when the 'I', 
the personal or the 'singular' is brought into the world it can be denominated, defined and spoken 
of in propositional langmlge. The source of the 'I', original freedom, is, so it would seem, 
perpetually beyond language. But when words are experienced as images or analogues they do so 
through Ie sens. Through this second meaning language suggests or conveys - or shows - the real 
description of an essence. the quo incommunicable, such as, for example, the relation between 
objects. This relation depends in fact upon the pOlfr soi, or Freedom as foundation. Thus Ie sens 
reveals, conveys Freedom. Whereas prose (signs as signifiers) can express the whole process of 
negating - present-at-hand - surpassing, the concrete; poetry (Ie sens) expresses the pre-reflective 
moment the self, - which we shall see is one of 'totality'. 
And so, to conclude this sub-section, four definitive propositions. (1) In Being and 
Nothingness. freedom is the universal foundation and precondition of language. (2) 'Freedom is 
the only possible foundation of the laws of language' (BN 517). (3) It is the universal that is pre-
reflectively grasped and which is beyond language. (~) It is only in language as la sens that the 
universal singular - 'man' - is shown. 
Language and Being. Not only freedom, but also it appears Being is agog with silence, the 
ineffable. and showing. If this is true. there is to be faced a conceptual surprise: the identification 
of Being per se with the ineffable would extend Sartre's ineffable realm beyond Wittgenstein's 
(for whom' facts' are at least sayable, cf. above ). 
On this issue of a putative ineffability of Being there has in fact been some very recent 
discussion. in which. unsurprising, Sartre has been taken to task for holding to such a position. In 
challenging the counter-claims of S. Mulhall 30 on this issue. the present discussion both links 
30 S. Mulhall, On Being in the World (1991), pp54ff. 
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back espccially to Yallsea and What Is Literature? (sens) as weIl as forward to a developed 
concept of showing. But morcovcr. this is achicved via an account of Being and language in 
terms of saying-showing. 
Basing his criticism on the interpretative model of perception, MulhaIl notes that 'when 
applied to thc relation betwcen basic conceptual frameworks and the world' (Mulhall, 1991, 
pp 152) such a model can avoid an infinitc regress only on pain of 'hypothesising a nameless, pre-
conceptualiscd world-stuff. But this is not. he claims, and contra Sartre (and Heidegger), because 
the essence of being is 'never fully exhausted by the resources of language', rather, it is because 
of a human rcsponse to a 'quite specific sort of experience [which] can best be described as one of 
aspect-dawning withollt a changc of aspect'. Any object of perception and the set of concepts that 
define it as what it is can be thc source of such an experience3l . The effect is of a separation 
bctwccn conccpt and objcct. 'a heightcncd awareness of the conceptual framework one can 
imposc upon that object' (ibid., 153). a fceling of having strippcd away 'even the most minimal 
and basic conceptual framcwork' and of having 'a perception of what lies beyond those 
conventions of human languagc and its stmctures of inteIligibility'. Mulhall refers to the 
description of such an cxpcricnce as pOl1raycd by Sartre in Nausea, where the narrator/author of 
this diary has 'a rc\'clation'. It is a wcIl known encounter (first quoted above), in the 'municipal 
park', \\'here 
thl:! root of a chestnut tree plunged into the ground just undemeath my bench. I no longer 
rememhered that it \\as a root. ... The root, the park gates, the bench, the sparse grass on 
the 1a\\11, all that had vanished~ the diversity of things, their individuality, was only an 
appearance. a veneer. (N 18011). 
In Roquentin's rcvelation. the 'venecr had melted. leaving soft, monstrous masses, in disorder -
naked. with a frightcni ng obsccnc nakedncss', Hcre the objects individual coherence, which is 
indubitably conccpt dcpcndcnt. is stripped m\'ay: 'suddenly, all at once, the veil is torn-away, I 
havc undcrstood, 1 ha\'c seen' (N I R 1). Eithcr this insight is as Sartre would claim a language 
31 Mulhall would appear to be working in the same tradition as Alston: in the 'philosophical tradition in which we ... 
can apply a concept to x whenever we predicate anything of x', and in which to do so is 'equivalent to saying x is 
conceptualizable' (cf. ~1). 
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transcendent experience of Being, or. it is as Mulhall claims, an example of a specific experience 
that can be understood as aspect-dawning without a change. 
The difficulty with the former position, claims Mulhall, is that if these experiences are of 
ineffable Being, then they must be conceptualizable and therefore accessible to language, because 
they h,l\'e been experienced and can - and have (as in the 'root' case) - been described and thus 
clarified by language. He thus concludes that although there is a type of experience where there is 
a sense of penetrating beyond language and encountering some Being external to language, this 
nevertheless is an experience of aspect-dawning where one becomes aware of a new set of 
concepts in terms that facilitate a description. Primary in, say, Roquentin's experience, is that set 
of concepts that determine what it is for something to be an object of the kind it is as experienced. 
When his awareness 'pertains most basically to the perceived object (e.g. the rootness of the 
root)" there is a sense of separateness effected between' that set of concepts and the object as a 
stripping away of all language from the thing itselr (pp154). Roquentin's experience suggests a 
language transcendent reality. but does so because his encounter, as with all encounters, is 
dependent upon conceptual structures that cannot be stripped away. in this case basic property 
concepts, and which determine things as having an existence that is not in fact dependent upon 
language. 'His experience, however. is not language transcendent'. 
Certainl\' there is in such 'revelation' experiences at least a sense of penetrating beyond the 
surface of things (as Mulhall acknowledges). Our directive question is threefold: does this 'sense' 
indicate an actuality') What is being experienced? Why is it ineffable yet communicable through 
art? To the first question all critical approaches into the veridicality of the experience will be 
found wanting - where in any inquil)' (even if it were purely reflexive) shall be attained data 
pertaining to an 'inner identity of one's own inner being with that of ... the kernel of the 
world'32. On this, perhaps no one has done better than Schopenhaucr and his lengthy historical 
catalogue of philosophers and poets who held such a vic,,, but were not 'madmen': the Kantian 
32 Schopenhauer, (1969) The World as Will and Representation. II, pp613 
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limits on inquiry must be accepted. and the possibility of such experiences granted. Reality for 
Sartre will be a conceptual background or ·totality' to atomistic predicate familiarity. 
(Hypothesising 'ultimate' is \'oidless. and would in any case only be true for Sartre in that Being 
is a condition of non-being). 
In deference to Sartre it could be denied that that which is being presupposed on his behalf: 
a commitment to the dominant tradition of definition that equates conceptualisation with 
predicate-concepts. But a more subtle point is at stake. Much of what Mulhall says can be 
granted: first of all that experience is dependent upon basic conceptual structures, and that 
shifting aspects and perceptual interpretations heighten an awareness of a non-isomorphic 
relation between the language we use and reality - that the relation is contingent. But neither 
experience nor the experience of concepts is as one-dimensional as Mulhall would have it. Take 
the latter. it is not difficult to state what would be basic property concepts, and on which any 
given experience will be dependent. But though experience depends upon property concepts it is 
not sufficiently explained by them. It is the \'ery fact that experience is necessarily against a 
conceptual background that makes the experience both describable and ineffable (limited): it is 
the whole background that is experienced in a revelation such as Roquentin's, it is this whole or 
totality that cannot be appropriated and given in language33 . 
Certainly. enough of the background is conceptualizable that a description is possible, for it 
is dependent upon basic propel1y concepts which are themselves describable and which in a new 
aspect disclose themselves and not the individual diversity of things (which are not ontologically 
dependent upon language) - 'chestnut tree'. 'root'. But the whole alludes description, what is 
given is signification to the particular and the conceptual: what is missing and fundamental to 
description is S(,IlS (sense). which is according to Sartre a subjectivity that is historically derived 
and therefore aI\Y<l\s lacking in any experience of the particular in its conceptually given 
individual objects (names). 
33 D.E. Cooper has an important discussion of this Background in his 'Ineffability', Aristotelian Society, Vol. LXV, 
1991. 
It is in What is Literatllre? it \\as seen. that Sartre speaks at length about this semantic 
distinction. It is. at least in linguistic practice. between language as prose and poetry, between the 
language of science and the language of art. The artist. will attempt to communicate with 
material rather than use words conceptually (though relying on that conceptual background). 
With music. for example. 'The significance of melody ... is nothing outside the melody itself, 
unlike ideas. which can be adequately rendered in several ways. It is always over and above 
anything you can say about it' (WL of). 
The municipal park passage presents a key theme of the novel. the effect of the perceived 
contingency of the external world upon an intending consciousness. The second key and 
fll11damcntally interrelated theme of the novel is an inquiry into the nature of the relation between 
art and lifc. Thc conclusion is that only through art. and the use of art as mediator. will an insight 
into Being be com'cyed: shown. But surely \"c \"ill respond. as Sartre recognised, by stating that 
if he has really shown us that the tree-root is beyond language then he has pragmatically refuted 
himself - similarly. if he has failed to express the revelation. then his thesis is safe, though 
presumably it remains uncommunicated. But no, pace Mulhall, what Roquentin experiences is a 
failure of language to embody sens: the background to the diversity of Being remains always 
beyond renective consciousness and. therefore, can only be apprehended pre-reflectively: 
signification (basic property concepts) is present and necessary. but sens is lacking. Such a failure 
as Roquentin's can of course be communicated (described, just as the Tractatus can describe the 
conditions for the unsavable without self-contradiction): though to be consistent the experience 
itself cannot be described in conceptual terms: the experience will have to be shown - hence the 
appropriation of the language of art as a means to such an end. Of course. whether it works in 
practice is another matter. and this will in any case have to be assessed empirically and 
individually. The principle. however. is logically safe. 
Being (Ind Nothinglle,\',\' on Language. The discussion of Sartre and his views on language in 
this chapter has. as promised. slowly yet assuredly. taken us from semantics to self: it has striven 
95 
to ascertain thc cxtent of the ineffable Frecdom and Nothingness - and now Being - and done so 
throughout key \yorks. And yct. there remains prcsently undiscussed the one section in Being and 
Nothingness which is dcvotcd cxplicitly to the discussion of language. It will be well, therefore, 
before drawing togcthcr conclusions or points of convergence, to see what Sartre has therein to 
sa\'. 
The section in Being and Nothingness devoted to language is entitled 'My Fellowman'. It 
falls in Part Four of that work, "here Sartre directly addresses the problematic of Freedom. The 
main question is whcthcr Having (including understanding and knowledge) and Doing (including 
acting) arc dcpcndent upon cither the fundamental existential choice or upon human nature. As 
would be expected, Sartre argues that Freedom is free choice. absolute, pure, original, 
spontancous. Howevcr, Frcedom always arises in a situation or contcxt (if it did not manifest 
itself hence it could not be thus rcprcsented in propositional language). Therefore, Freedom and 
Being are rcciprocally dependcnt upon each other: they each come to have meaning in the context 
of thc rclation bctwccn thcm. Thc ,"cry cxistence of things as obstacles presupposes Freedom (EN 
..J.86). A stony crag. for cxample, could bc a challenge to a climber or an object of beauty for an 
artist: 'Meaning [is] in tcrms of an initial projcct'. and 'For the simple traveller who passes over 
this road and "'hose free project is a pure aesthetic ordering of the landscape, the crag is not 
revealed either as scaleable or as not-scalcable: it is manifestcd only as beautiful or ugly' (EN 
..J.88). Sartrc thcn considers some 'specific examples' of the stmcture of this reciprocal relation: 
'My Placc'. 'My Past'. 'My Environment'. and 'My Fellowman'. My fellowman, or, it may be 
said, my fcllow frccdom. is the only possible /imitation on my freedom. Nonetheless, freedom is 
always in relation to Bcing. and Being is the context. the background out of which Freedom 
arises as a nothingness. Sartrc chooscs to illustrate this point with a discussion of nationality and 
language. 
Thc cxistential rcality of thc pOlfr soi is its being situated as a certain nationality, in a 
particular district etc. In like manner the reality of language for the pOllr soi is a particular use, a 
particular dialect etc. Words themselves. Sc1l1re tells us. and cchoing Wittgenstein (see above, 
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§2.3i). only have meaning (a) in their use (BN 5 l-\') and (b) within the context of a proposition: 
'the elementary stmcture of speech is the sentence [where] the word can receive a real function as 
a designation' (BN 51-\.). The meaning of the proposition itself ultimately depends upon the 
intentional act of the pOllr soi (see below. §-\..2i. on intentionality). But language (and Past and 
Environment. and Place). as the concrete and particular (dialect etc.), as facti city, is not a limit to 
Freedom: it is the being of the pailI' soi as nihilated. Indeed, while speaking of the factual 
existence of the for-itself. Sartre says that among the 'Factual characteristics of this 'facticity' -
i.e. among those which can neither be deduced nor proven but which simply 'let themselves be 
seen' - there is one of these which we call the existence-in-the-world-in-the-presence-of-others' 
(BN 512). It is the existence of others that presents the real limitation to freedom. It is also at 
this level - eire pOllr autre - that 'facticity is expressed'. 
How thcn shall I expericncc the ohjective limits of my being: Jew, Aryan, ugly, handsome, 
kimL a civil servant, untouchahle. etc., when will speech have inronned me as to which of 
these arc my limits? ... My hC<lut\· or my ugliness ... are apprehended by the Other in their 
rull concrctcness. and it is this concreteness which the Others speech will indicate to me. 
(13N 527). 
Here it will be seen that the above account of language and freedom from Part Four of Being 
and Nothingness fits easily into the context of the rest of the discussion. The following point most 
quickly illustrates this. Existential reality (which is not Being) is. as was seen, concrete and 
particular. The facticity of the pOllr soi includes nationality, a place. a district; it also includes 
language. a particular use. a dialect. But beneath and belo\\' the concrete and the particular is 
'the trllth of the dialect'. 'the truth of the language'. Sartre makes his point with the example of 
'techniques' : 
This means that the concrete techniques hy which \\c manifest our belonging to the family 
and to the locality rd~r us to morc abstract and more general structures which constitute its 
meaning and essence~ these refer to othcrs still more general until we arrive at the universal 
and perl'cct J\' simple essencc or an\' technique whatsoever by which any being whatsoever 
appropriates the world (BN 51 )). 
'Tmth' or essence is again to be understood as the relation or relations between the objects that 
constitute the concrete and Pi1l1icular. Without such a relation holding. spoken of in terms of 'the 
given'. absolute idealism would entail. Besides. unless there is. for example, a 'universal and 
simple essence of any technique'. we could not. claims Sartre. use any technique. for that would 
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require the use of a former technique and. nothing new here. an infinite regress ensues. The 
essential point remains: it is the concrete and particular. including Freedom when so manifest, 
that is signified by speech. The essence or the universal is beyond such designation. 
Conclusion. Freedom can only be spoken of when it has been revealed as mine in concrete, 
particular. situations. Original Freedom is a 'lack', it has no experiential nor - direct - linguistic 
reference: its reality is the pre-condition of the sentences that would be used to refer to it. 
Freedom, as pre-reflective IS beyond language as sign-signification ('prose' in What is 
Literature?). But Freedom is not beyond image/sens (,poetry' in What is Literature?: Art, next 
chapter). It is clear that . freedom is not a facuIty of the human soul to be envisaged and 
described in isolation' (BN 25). For 'we have to deal with a human reality as a being which is 
what it is not and which is not what it is' (BN 58). Thus, as far as our original, foundational 
project is concerned 'Let us understand clearly that there is no question of a reflective, voluntary 
decision. but of a spontaneous determination of our being' (BN 68). Indeed, in this final section 
on Being and Nothingness we have seen a conclusive development in Sartre's ineffable thesis: the 
universal part played by Freedom - the self. 
The ontological description of Being and Nothingness is limited to the categories of Being, 
not being itself. not self itself. The self. as far as propositional language is concerned, is 
'indefinable and unnameable' and. fUl1her. 'indescribable' (BN -\.38). Except as in particular and 
concrete sitllations. original Freedom. Nothingness. and the being of phenomena will not 
cannot. and are not defined or described in Being and Nothingness or .t-{ausea - or, for that matter 
in any other text. The existence of Freedom. Nothingness, Being and self will have to be shown: 
this by necessity excludes such a possibility from those writings and texts that would be 
characterisablc as 'scientific'. prose': only language as a double semantic, with Ie sens, language 
that takes words and texts as images or things in themselves. only language as art has the 
potential to show that which is beyond ordinary discourse. This in itself has further. far reaching 
implications. as will be seen in the following chapters. 
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§2.4 CONVERGENCE: SEMANTICS TO SELF 
In the preceding account of the ineffable and the linguistic possibility of showing. 
convergence. as will have been noticed. is not especially found in the details and stages of the 
respective positions. In fact. a few important details aside. the crucial points of convergence to be 
maintained are no more - but certainly no less - than a shared belief that certain specific matters 
are ineffable. and are so (in some cases) for similar reasons, but that - again for similar reasons -
they can be shown. and that. to look ahead. the ineffable and showing rest respectively on a 
conception of the self and aesthetic experience. In its extent. this \"ill be more than could ever 
have expected between the two archetypal representatives of The Divide. And indeed, it is this 
shared \'ision of the lingua-self, and its aesthetic determination, that motivates the present 
inquiry. However. while now considering the issue of convergence. it is worth noting that as far 
as The Divide does exist. as approach or method (cf. Introduction), this ensures differences in 
detail in certain areas of the respective accounts of the problematic. 
Wittgenstein's canon of ineffabilia and the linguistic possibility of showing result, for 
example. from the inherent logical constraints of language as he sees it. Obviously, his 
discoveries at least appear to be the result of a study of language, and its relation to the world. 
While for Sartre. on the other hand. the ineffable and the possibility of showing entails because 
words fail to signify - the necessary background, history. etc. can not be referred to. Similarly, 
Sartre's discoveries seem to be the result of a study of consciousness. and its relation to the world. 
Given these two approaches are from opposite directions it is perhaps no surprise that their 
accounts of the ineffable bear little similarity in the working out of their details. Clearly, lack of 
detail does not entail lack of depth: the details in construction of analogue and digital watches 
differ~ the profound similarity is found in the principles on \\'hich they are assembled and in their 
joint purpose. Nonetheless. I share the concern that such a vision (which is what, self-
confessedly. each philosopher - and this dissertation - takes to be most important) should be 
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supported by as much detail as possible. Indeed. in the following two chapters on self and on 
showing at the aesthetic level. the above lack of cOl1\'ergence in details will to an extent be 
compensatcd for by the stating of many points of convergence which are locked together in their 
details and which. when linked to the generic convergence of the whole, offer a particularly 
startling - and trans-divide - vision of the (aesthetic) self. Presently, this section elaborates 
specific kcy points of cOI1\'crgencc on saying-showing as thcy have emerged within the 
fl.lIldamental premises of gcneric convcrgence. 
This convcrgence section is in fact in three parts. First, some comments on the concept of -
'Scholastic' - definition which W<lS referred to in the discussion of Sartre, The main point of this 
discussion is to preface the key points of convergence with some comments on the philosophical 
background to the claim of linguistic inadcquacy in Sartre's (and possibly also Wittgenstein's) 
early philosophy. Thc sccond part of this section will summarise some of the results from the 
lengthy and detailed section on Sartre and the ineffable (it is not needful to summarise 
Wittgenstcin's position which is what was offcred abovc). Finally. in part three of this section, 
some of the kcy points "ill be expanded upon - as matters of convergence with Wittgenstein - and 
done so in the limiting context of the movc from the initial linguistic dimension to the self and 
the aesthetic dimcnsion . 
• Background to the ineffable: Problem of real definition 
Most philosophical theories with a commitment to linguistic inadequacy and its possible 
transcendcnce originate in an alliance with a branch of one or both of two key conceptions: the 
dual semantic stl1lcturc of language and the problem of definition (and therefore description). As 
to thc formcr. it is bccoming apparent that ncithcr Wittgenstein nor Sartre is an exception. For 
both. thc scmantic structure of language is seen as bipolar. This idea of a second non-literal 
meaning that is seen as capable of presenting the ineffable is accepted not only by Sartre and 
Wittgcnstcin but by many contemporary philosophers. including Max Black. Paul Ricoeur and, it 
should be cspecially notcd. Mikel Dufrcnne. who offers a systematic aesthctics founded on those 
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phenomenological and ontological principles which originate In Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. 
Moreover. there is a relation between the dual semantic concept and that of the second traditional 
source of the ineffable. that of definition. The highly complex relation between a dual semantic 
and the concept of dual-definition does not itself concern us. Nonetheless, reference to the 
concept of definition helps to explain what does concern us: Sartre's prima facie odd adherence 
to a dual semantic. 
It is an old tradition in philosophy that lives and states, in various formulations, that the 
definition of a word is a two-part process. The Scholastic formulation is for good reasons most 
notable in its innuence. A correct definition of a word or phrase is seen as logically equivalent to 
that word or phrase. The possibility of definition would then be characterised as either 'nominal' 
or . real' . The former explicated a meaning in accordance with established and pre-existing 
usage: while the real definition would be of the structure common to all the objects to which the 
word or phrase could be applied. Such a slnlcture has over the years had various formulations -
essence. logical form. necessary relation. Common throughout has been the tendency to see such 
a 'real' definition as impossible. usually because either (a) there is no essence, pluralism, or (b) 
the 'essence' is seen as 'underlying', noumenon. or thing in itself and hence being beyond human 
understanding: (often it is seen as the very precondition of such understanding). The tradition 
insists that the impossibility of giving a real definition logically entails the impossibility of giving 
a full or adequate description - as was seen with Sartre. 
For Wittgenstein and Sartre the essence as precondition will be. one supposes. either 'God 
or Nothing' (i.e. Freedom or thc subject). And if with Leibniz it is accepted that 'every idea is 
analysed perfectly only \\'hen it is demonstrated a priori that it is possible', then similarly it 
follows that 'if wc give some definition from which it does not appear [then] ... we cannot trust 
the demonstrations'. that. 'to have at the outset perfect definitions of these ideas is difficult'. 
Thus we are forced 'in the meantime Ito] employ nominal definitions of them; that is, we shall 
analyse the idea of a thing into other ideas through which it can be conceived, even though we 
cannot proceed as far as the primary ideas'. Similarly. remarks Leibniz. although Hobbes saw 
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that all truths could in principle be demonstrated from definitions. 'he belicved that all 
definitions arc arbitrary and nominaJ'·14. 
An important work in this ficld. falling between scholastic and recent work in logic and 
semantics. is The Port Royal Logic of 1662. In this work, Antoine Arnauld, his works as well 
known to Sartre as they were to Descartes, devotes a chapter to 'Nominal and Real Definitions'. 
Again. a sharp distinction is drawn between the poles: 'Real definitions are in marked contrast to 
nominal dcfinitions since in nominal definitions we arbitrarily assign to a given sound any idea 
we please by mcans of words we already understand'35. Real definitions are not arbitrary; they 
'necessarily fall into error': thcy must be proved and cannot be assumed. Real definitions would 
guarantee the tnlths of ultimate premises. but their certainty. much sought by philosophers, is 
claimed by Arnauld to be invalid: 
Philosophers Onl!r man~' real definitions, but claim for them the unassailibility of nominal 
definitions, eWll though the proposed ddinition be false, capturing neither our natural ideas 
or things nor the tnle nature or things. 36 
The Scholastic identity between nominal definition and particularity. and real definition 
and universality. and the idcntification of the latter with essence or 'the true nature of things', is 
the crux of Sartre's adherence to the concept (cf. above). In Sartrean terms, as was seen, when 
referring to Freedom the word signifies but lack sens - all the more so in that we are not here 
dealing with a concept: as to the word "'freedom" [it] is dangerous if it is to imply that the word 
refers to a concept'. MoreO\·cr. the word . Freedom' refers to a common structure, essence. A real 
definition would be of the structure common to all the objects to which the word or phrase could 
be applied. Such a structurc is often understood in terms of essence - any definition of an essence 
is necessarily \\'ithout meaning. No definition nor therefore description of Freedom is possible 
except at thc lc\'cl of concrete particularity. 
Typic:J1 of such csscnccs for Wittgenstein would be \\hat he calls 'the laws of 
34 Cf. Leibniz, Of Universal Synthesis and Analysis (1973). pp10-17. Parkinson (ed.) 
35 'Real Definitions', The Light of Reason (1973). Chapter 5, pp270. M.Hollis (ed.). 
36 Ibid., pp271 
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nature'(6.:nl D. Such laws may include that which is seen as responsible for the relation between 
objects of e'\periencc. This leads to the question: 'What of Wittgenstein and the problem of 
definition. is there any equivalencc with Sartre's historically explainable position?' 
As is well-known. Wittgenstein rejected the Mechanistic explanation of the universe, the 
belief that all evcnts occur according to Ne\\10nian mechanics (due for example to the 
displacement in space of material particles). The possibility that the laws of nature are ineffable 
pertains because these laws, according to Wittgenstein. are non-contingent, necessary for our 
experience and. therefore. as part of the form of reality, an essence, 'cannot be said: it makes 
itself manifest' (6.36). What is important to the present concerns, because of the entailed links to 
Sartre and definition. is that Wittgenstein sees the latter. scientific laws. as being some kind of 
essence (See M. Black I 96 .. J.. p2:16). Logical form. on the other hand. is clearly seen as an essence 
in at least the specific - Sal1rean - sense of it being a structure common to all of a particular kind, 
in this case. names and objects. And it is known from what Wittgenstein further says that both 
scientific );I\\S and logical form are beyond the sayable. Now. even given these circumstances, it 
may seem that it is stretching a point to say that Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning and the 
limits of saying (logical form and essence) entails the impossibility of giving a real definition -
though such a situation is certainly firmly suggested. But in any case. the limits of saying depend 
not only on logical form but ultimately upon the nature Wittgenstein assigns to names as 
primitive signs and their relation to reality (see above §2.2). And on Tractarian names 
Wittgenstein is explicit: 'A name cannot be dissected any further by means of definition: it is a 
primitive sign', moreover. 'Nor can any sign that has meaning independently and on its own', 
such that. 'Names connot be anatomised by means of definition' (3.26 & 3.261). 
Whether Wittgenstein's position is defined in terms of the impossibility of real definition or 
the impossibility of an elemcntary proposition representing the structure which it is in the first 
place depcndent upon for representation. the result is the same: (a) (given the picture theory of 
meaning) real definition is obviously impossible and. (b) the realm of the ineffable persists 
regardless. is maintained and strengthened by. the problem of real definition, as will further be 
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suggested below. Of course. it would take much "ork to argue convincingly for a Tractatarian 
commitment to definition along the Scholastic lines assigned to Sartre, such a scenario of 
comparative dctail would bc a bonus in the present circumstances but its lack will not weaken the 
main claims. Ncvcrthelcss. the possihili~v if not the likelihood remains convincing ... and 
hypnotic to both philosophcrs. 
• Summary of Sartre's position 
The claim that Sartre has something to say on language and that this includes a notion of 
the ineffable and the possibility of (acsthetic) showing, has required a lengthy discussion. Before 
proceeding to draw points of COl1YCrgcncc with Wittgenstcin it will bc wcll to summarise some of 
the key points. 
The Ineffahle. /\'ausea introduces the idea that a subjectivity expencnces the world as an 
assemblagc of mcanings (including espccially of course thc lack of meaning: meaning must have 
a priori priority ovcr lack if it is to bc expcrienced as lacking). The relation between these 
objects, that which holds them together as the world, as my world. is constituted by and is 
dependent upon a subject(ivity). This idca is elaborated upon in What is Literature?, where Sartre 
speaks of (lie relation that holds. necessarily. such that external reality is experienced as my 
world. The relation is thus the prc-condition of signification. Soon it was becoming clear that 
ultimately this relation. thc prc-condition of signification, is to be identified with the self. 
In thc cssay Departllre and Retllrn. writtcn in-betwccn Being and Nothingness and What is 
Literatllre? Sartre stresscs thc central role of the self as the foundation and source of 
signification and. therefore. as somcthing to be understood as the 'silent human reality'. This 
central idea had found its greatest elaboration in Being and Nothingness, where the subject is 
spoken of as 'original freedom'. the' foundation of essence'. 1. Fell helped us to understand this 
central notion of the 'silent human reality' ,,,ith his account of thc Sartrean subject, the original 
subject. in terms of the logical operations (of synthesis etc.) of consciousness which are the pre-
condition of the conceptual and significative language. Fells' discussion re-introduces the human 
subject and helps us to sec the connection between freedom as both a foundation and a 
precondition of universals. Freedom is ineffable because (a) it is foundational and therefore an 
'cssence' or universal and. (b). freedom, the pour soi, is, as a complex of logical operations which 
constitute the activity of consciousness. the \'ery precondition of language and its commitment to 
universals. SaI1re. it is clear. grounds his ontology in metaphysics. with epistemology, in a 
transcendental consciousness (negation) of logical operations. 
Both Being and Original Freedom were found to be pre-conceptuaL and could only be 
grasped. if at alL pre-reflectively. Where language is concerned, pre-reflective is pre-significative; 
a semantic equivalence with Being and Original Freedom would have to be at one with the 
'history' of the signifying signs: but ontology is temporal. the present-at-hand is, as in Heidegger, 
lacking. Being appears historically. its rcvelation is variable; such revelation will be further 
variable as Being cannot be determined on the basis of matter alone. it is also thought-
determined. the notion of Being (for-itself) as operative intentionality (see below. §4) entails that 
the meaning of the elements o[ Being (in-itself) is determined by Being (for-itself); moreover, a 
point expressed well by Fell. 
Anal~·tic thinking as an ontological method is to be used \\ith great circumspection 
(literillly). The nature of the thing as found in ordinary experience - as a fonnal whole - is to 
he respected and regarded as the essential meaning of the thing. Analysis cannot construct 
the thing out of its elementary factors. but must regard the elements as aspects o/the thing. 
The thing, that is. is to he regarded fundamentally as a whole rather than as simply an 
additional composite (Fcll, 1979, pp363). 
The failure of - temporally and epochally determined - significative language to place the 
Original Freedom of the self as Nothingness in the world is further explained, it was maintained 
in the discussion of Being and YOfhingness. by reintroducing Fell's discussion of the particular 
and the universal. also adding [miher substance to a claim of this chapter, that it is Sartre's 
adherence (tacit or otherwise) to a (Scholastic) dual theory of definition which contributes to his 
commitment to the ineffable. the problem of giving a real as opposed to a nominal definition. 
Showing. The possibility of showing. of transcending the ineffable through a second semantic 
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pole. was also introduced in VOl/sea. This early formulation of showing is portrayed in terms of 
a 'new insight' born out of the failure of significative language. The ineffable as the world, my 
world (i.e. essence as relation between objects that constitute the world of the subject's 
experience). is caused by a failure in significative language (saying) that is overcome by a second 
sense, la se/'lS, which shows what cannot be said. It is in What is Literature.? that Sartre speaks at 
length about this semantic distinction. The distinction is, at least generically and in practice, 
between language as prose. The former is identifiable as denotative, discursive, and instrumental, 
while denoting or referring its object it implies no fl1rther attributes; it is the ideal language of 
logic and science. Poetic discourse. on the other hand, is typified by metaphor. symbol, and 
myth, it is identifiable as connotative and non-instnunentaI. it suggests of its object of reference 
fmiher attributes: it is the ideal language of fiction and story-telling. Furthermore, Sartre refers to 
an art object as that which embodies its second - non-literal - meaning as something expressive. 
That language can present an actual reality or essence, the relation between objects, to an 
individual consciousness, but that this, quo-incommunicable, must be conveyed through the 
suggestive powers of language: showing (cf. above. §2.2iii). 
Besides articulation of this crucial semantic distinction, What is Li/erature? outlines what is 
a key link between the ineffable and the self. Sartre refers to a subject as freedom that is not to be 
understood in terms of the particular and the personal (realm of nominal definition), but in terms 
of the universal (requiring real definition). \\'here, importantly, prose is to be identified with the 
former. poetry with the latter. In the interview with Verstraeton, it was seen that Sartre develops 
this distinction by introducing, on top of langmlge as scientific (prose) and language as literature 
(poetry), that of language as philosophy: which always has concealed a literary dependence on the 
poetic (something to be elaborated upon in the final chapter). Here the ineffable is due to, at least 
partly. thc fact that words havc 'their own histol)", it is this 'history' which constitutes a 
background (Ie ,\'('/1.\) on top of \\'hich meaning is attained. The task of the \\Titer/philosopher is 
(or therefore should be) to 'attain equivalcnce' between ,yords and their background. But this it is 
suggested is dinicult. and Sartn.: further suggests that concepts cannot in fact be rendered by a 
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language that fails to attain equivalence. This limitation and the ensuing ineffableness opens up 
the need. desire. and possibility for a different use of language - aesthetic or aesthetically 
attained. with its own determining mode of expression (§5). Our discussion of the Key Points and 
more especially the views expressed in Being and Nothingness confirms with greater detail all of 
the abovc Iindings. 
• Key points: from semantics to self 
This section will state and expand on some of the key points - as matters of convergence 
with Wittgcnstcin - and do so in thc limiting and forward-moving context of the movc from the 
initial linguistic dimension to the self and the aesthetic dimension. In effect. and for relief only, 
these kcy points of convergencc are discussed under two headings, that of ontology, and that of 
logic and semantics. Thc latter division will break down into three further points of convergence: 
the distinction betwecn saying and showing: thc idea of a reflective and pre-conceptual mode of 
undcrstanding: and thc central role of the subject. 
Ontology. Rccall that both philosophers are committed to an ontological fact-value distinction. 
In each case the lattcr is ultimatcly idcntificd with the (metaphysical)-subject (pour soi) while the 
formcr is equated with cxtcrnal rcality as given (en soi). This reality is in tum to be identified 
with the factuaL and thc factual \,·ith the contingent. The world of facts is in both cases given, 
with both philosophcrs subscribing to a basic realism. The basic constituents of reality are, for 
Sartrc. just thosc cmpirical objects that we pcrceive: for Wittgenstein. they are also 'objects' (of 
course. as was secn 'the world' is not givcn). For the present purposes, it is a question only of the 
effability of thcsc objects which is of intcrest. 
Thcrc is a difficulty. howc,·cr. in that the nature and status of these Tractarian objects is 
completely opcn to diffcring intcrprctations. T\\o erstwhile possibilities ensue: either these 
cnigmatic objccts can be identified and a dcfinite description can be given: or a definite 
description cannot be given (\,·hethcr thcy are identifiable are not). Opinion is split. David Pears 
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(1987. pp 1 05-1 1-1-). for example. is in the former camp: while McGuinness and Ishiguro are in 
the latter. The point is that if Wittgenstein's objects are indeterminate. then on the question of 
the ineffable this pairs them with Sartre's perceptible objects, both being beyond real definition. 
If, on the other hand. the nature of the objects of the Tractatus is open to real definition and they 
are describable. then, surprisingly, Sartre's concept of linguistic inadequacy extends beyond 
Wittgensteins. 
For Sartre. the same empirical and contingent world that is constituted by objects is alien, 
bmte, and nameless, and is not as was seen. definable or describable. There is not the luxury of a 
logical correlation between names and objects (note that in the picture theory what is named is a 
thing, \"hat is described as belonging always 'to the category of facts' - cf. Stenius, 1960' ppI20). 
So. on this point. due to the illegitimacy and non-appropriateness of adopting one interpretation 
of the Tractarian objects o\,er another. all that can be said regarding the basic constituents of 
realit\' is that for Sartre their nature is ineffable, while for Wittgenstein their nature may be 
ineffable. Smire's ocean of the ineffable may well be deeper and more radical than Wittgensteins. 
There is in this maHer. hO\\e\'er. a central ontological/ineffable two-part point on which 
interpretation does not obtrude. and on which it can be said that both philosophers 
unambiguously agree. Firstly. the resulting combination of these objects is what constitutes 
external reality as the world. my world. as a scheme of relations or natural law. Secondly, a 
description of the relation is seen as impossible. As far as the Tractatus is concerned, the 
empirical and contingent world is one of relations that are pictured where the very possibility of 
picturing. 'the form of reality'. 'logical form' or the logical relation. common ground between 
world and language. is itself beyond picturing. As to Sartre, his position has been seen as 'An 
expression of re\'olt against ... linguistic idealism'. His world is that of 'the real rather than the 
ideal. because it is grollnded in an inat1iculable actuality. i.e .. a region beyond all denomination 
and c1assific,ltion' (Fell. 1979. pp270). For Satire, the scheme of relations that constitute external 
reality as a )t'orld are of course dependent upon the pour soi. upon a subjecti\'ity. Thus the self is 
in\'oked. as it is for similar reasons (below) in the Trac/allls. In short, for both philosophers the 
108 
ineffable is grounded in their ontology. it extends to ontological descriptions, and encompasses 
the self which is the relation between language and world. 
Logic and Semantics. The semantic status of a proposition IS, for Sartre, a matter of 
signification and .'lens: for Wittgenstein it is a matter of meaning (bedeutung) and sense (sinn). 
There is a clear parallel between the status of these two sets of terms (as I noted in the conclusion 
to the account of Wittgenstein, §2.2). To take signification and meaning first, they both have a 
given - referential - relation to the world. A proposition is said to have meaning or signify when 
its' names denote particular objects. Both Sartre's sens and Wittgenstein's sinn, on the other 
hand, are best distinguished from signification and meaning by the following three 
interconnected features: they arc not· given' - they do not say (signify or refer), and they make 
showing possible, making signs into symbols: they introduce a pre-conceptual - pre-reflective -
mode of understanding: they invoke. and depend upon, a subject. As the claim to convergence on 
this issue is significant some comment on each of the three points is required. 
Meaning (bedelltllng) and signification obtain in relation to the basic constituents of reality 
- objects, combinations of which are facts (above): it is to these which names refer. and it is due 
to this referring relation. the signifying pole of a language that propositions can be claimed to 
have meaning (bedelltllng) as is essential to 'saying' in the Tractatus. The ineffable is all that lies 
outside this remit: it includes Value, aesthetic and ethical. Also included is the world taken as a 
',,·hole' (Wittgenstein) or ·totality' (Sartre). for neither Sartre nor Wittgenstein is the world a 
fact. a referable object or set of objects. The world will have to be shown. This is achieved 
. . 
through seils and sinn. Thus. the saying-showing distinction in each philosopher finds the world 
as a "hole or totality to be amongst that which is not given and cannot be spoken about, but 
which. through seils and sinl1 is shown. The essential point to be taken forward to the final 
chapter. is that meaning. ethical (and in this case existential) meaning. is in both cases equated 
with the ,,,oriel as a "hole or totality. ,,·here this is achieved through the combination of the given 
meaning with that of seils or SI/III. 
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For Sartn~. s(!ns involves what he calls "comprehension". which is a pre-conceptual faculty 
for grasping objects and relationships between objects as synthetic wholes. This comprehension is 
a matter of (logical) acts of synthesis. Logical operations. in the form of mental acts that 
distinguish and synthesise, are the precondition of saying in Being and Xothingness (above). It is 
then, a pre-reflective and pre-conceptual mode of understanding: the necessary background to 
thought and language. Where Wittgenstein is concerned, logical form plays a similar role to that 
of Sartre's logical operations: it is the logical precondition of sinn, sense. It is the concept of the 
subject as intentional. as \\'e shall see. that underpins Wittgenstein's similar adherence to a link 
between the ineffable and the possibility of showing as an epistemological possibility: grasping 
the meaning of self and world as a totality or whole. Furthermore, in both logical form and 
logical operations we are again. as with ontology, referred to the subject. 
Indeed. as far as intentionality is concerned, the semantics of both philosophers depend 
ultimately lIpon it. As was indicated. the picture theory of meaning requires the intentionality of a 
self. If this is borne to mind ,,,hen tllrning to Sartre's account of language, then two generic 
points are immediately apparent. That on Sartre's view meaningful discourse does not, pace 
Wittgenstein. necessarily involve isomorphic representation and picturing: but that, nonetheless, 
there can in fact be no meaningful language without the intentionality of the pour soi. In Sartre's 
account the intentionality (of the pre-reflective cogito) is necessary to change 'dead' signs to 
symbols. to make meaningful discourse possible. In Wittgenstein's account the intentionality (of 
the metaphysical subject) is necessary to change signs to symbols. In both accounts then, the 
possibility of meaningful discourse is dependent upon the intentionality of self. 
The crucial point which this convergence section (and this chapter) is leading to is that both 
Sm1re's se/1,\ and Wittgenstein's sinn are dependent upon a self as signifier - a bi-polar self. For 
Sartre. it was noted. and a point to be elaborated below, the self is manifested in particular and 
concrete situations (the ego): we can speak of it as the T. And the T. the personal or the 
'singular' is in the ,,,oriel anel can be denominated, defined and spoken of in propositional 
language. Prose (signs as signifiers) can express the whole process of negating - present-at-hand -
tit) 
surpassing. the concrete. But the source of the T, original freedom. is. so it would seem, 
perpetually beyond language. It is (a) the foundation or background to language and (b) as 
background, (historical). universal. Original Freedom has no experiential nor linguistic reference; 
its reality is the pre-condition of the sentences that would be used to refer to it. Freedom -
originaL not as manifested in the concreteness of situations - is pre-reflective and is beyond 
language as sign/signification ('prose' in What is Literature?). But Freedom is not beyond 
image/sen,· ('poetry' in What is Literature?). Sign - signifier is equated with the natural or 
perceptual attitude: while materiality-sens is equated with imaginative attitude. Original 
freedom is not in the world and cannot be defined and described. But poetry (through la sens) is 
capable of expressing the pre-reflective moment - \\"hich is also one of 'totality' (below). It is only 
in language as la sens that the universal singular - 'man' - is expressed. As far as propositional 
language is concerned. the self is . indefinable'. 'unnameable' and' indescribable' (BN -\.38). And 
so too. as will be seen. in the Tractatlls. as one part of Wittgenstein's bi-polar self, the 
psychological self. is an object in the world \\hich may be referred to by language, while the other 
part of the self. the metaphysical subject. is. as with Sartre's original freedom, both the 
background to the possibility of language and also as such universal - though not, as will be seen, 
due to historical factors. But nonetheless. as was claimed at the conclusion of §2.2 and as will be 
elucidated at ~5. Wittgenstein's highly technical account of the saying-showing distinction 
similarly underpins a generic affirmation of poetic language as its operettas mundi. 
A Conclusion. Already then. a conclusion of the final chapter can be stated. Nausea is written 
by and is about a character who has a name and a title: Roquentin the Historian. and these, the 
pm1icular or the concrete. arc signified. have meaning. and are spoken of at length in the novel. 
But note the crucial point in the novel: Roquentin's realisation that his self cannot in fact be 
identified with the designation 'historian' results in the experience of nausea. Except as in 
particular and concrete situations - as an ego and psychological subject - original Freedom and 
metaphysical subject is not signified by language. it therefore will not. cannot. and is not 
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dcscribcd. not an)whcrc. including Being and .\'olhingness, Nausea, or Tmcfatus. 
Thc cxistence of the self. of Value. will ha\'e to be shown: potentially a nauseating 
revclation. To combine this with a philosophical picture of the world requires a \'cry particular 
conccption of philosophy as acsthctics. It is within this framework that the philosopher recreates 
his or hcr sclf whilc \'anquishing thc rcal problem of philosophy: the riddle of life, the absurdity 
of existence. Mcaning must bc crcatcd and can only be shown. The issue is a problematic of self, 
it is also a Romantic cthics of the ineffable. constituted in terms of the selfs aesthetic reinvention 
through a lingua-aesthetic deed, paradigmcd in Nausea and Tmctalus. Attention now befalls the 
self and acsthctic - poctic - rcim'cntion. 
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§3 
THE SELF: I, MOI - AUGE? 
The I or ego is the dark point in consciousness, just as on the 
retina the precise point of entry of the optic nerve is blind, the 
brain itself is wholly insensible, the body of the sun is dark, and 
the eye sees everything except itself. 
(Schopenhauer, The world as Will and Representation, 
VolI.lI, pp491). 
Where in the world is the metaphysical subject to be found? You 
will say this is exactly like the case of the eye and the visual field. 
But really you do not see the eye. And nothing in the visual field 
allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye. [sic] 
(Tractatus 5.633). 
The eye is the point to which all the objective lines converge. Thus 
the perceptive field refers to a centre objectively defined by that 
reference and located in the very field which is orientated around 
it. Only we do not see this centre as the structure of the 
perceptive field considered; we are the centre . ... That my eye 
should see itself is by nature impossible.[sic] 
(Being and Nothingness, pp317 & pp359) 
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~3 
After the preliminary remarks, §3.1 is in two parts, each expository, and each devoted to a 
philosopher, Sartre and Wittgenstein respectively. Such an exposition is of value in itself, as there 
is scant interpretative authority on either Wittgenstein's or Sartre's early accounts of the self. 
Equally, the exposition is necessary for both the problematic of the lingua-aesthetic self and the 
comparative study; each ultimately depends upon these exposed foundations: the present chapter 
will be drawn on in the remainder of the thesis. Indeed, the benefits of this exposition are 
immediately and heavily drawn on in the next section (§3.2) which details four key aspects of 
comparison between the two accounts of the self: that it is bi-polar, eliminated, a no-thing (non-
substantive) and non-encounterable. Aside from their value to the convergent theme of the thesis, 
these points of contact are central to the problematic of self. Furthermore (as with the saying-
showing distinction), they maintain the possibility of aesthetics, and do so by making accessible a 
fifth and final point of convergence: the (multi-dimensional account of the) self as modalities, as 
Value, the subject of the following chapter. 
~3: 1 Two SENSES OF SELF1 
Phenomenologically disposed philosophers have sought a self that is neither naturalistic and 
conti ngent nor pure and transcendent. 'The question', as Merleau-Ponty has it, 
is that of man's relationship to his natural or social surroundings. There are two classical 
views: one treats man as the result of the physical, physiological, and sociological 
intluences which shape him fr0111 the outside and make him one thing among many; the 
other consists in recognising an a-cosmic freedom in him, insofar as he is spirit and 
represents to himself the very causes which supposedly act upon him. On the one hand, man 
1 In what follows, the phrase '(metaphysical)-subject' will be used when simultaneously referring to Wittgenstein's 
'metaphysical subject' and Sartre's self as subject (i.e. as not ego). 
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is a part of the world; on the other, he is the constituting consciousness of the world. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1964, 71 f). 
'Neither vicw', he continues, 'is satisfactory'. 
Like Merleau-Ponty, Wittgenstein and Sartre sought and proposed a self between the two 
classical vicws. However, the tension that arises from positing a self that is both eliminated from 
the world existing at the limit or boundary of (linguistic) experience and one that is individual 
and embodied is not a tension that will directly occupy our problematic, apart from the 
preliminary section, Fact-Value. Equally, although some account of the embodied empirical 
pole of self must be offered, this only in so far as it crucially helps to 'place' the eliminated non-
substantive pole of self. It is the self as no-thing with which the inquiry is primarily concerned: 
though clearly the problematic, the limits of language and the possibility of an aesthetic relation 
all depend upon their embodied 'factual' situation. 
(i) Preliminary: I and 'I', contingent-transcendent, Fact-Value? 
For all the dominance of a 'self in Sartre's philosophy, the concept per se has received 
surprisingly scant attention by scholars. Most often, it has had to take back seat to itself as 
'freedom', as 'bad faith', as an ethically or politically engaged 'human reality'. Too little has 
been said about The Self, it lacks both expository and (in a strict sense) interpretative authority. 
Similarly, Wittgenstein's early account of the self has had scant attention - even when compared 
to the ethical as opposed to the logical and linguistic doctrines of the Tractatus. Its opacity and 
perceivcd subservience to logic and language making this less surprising. 
Proposing an account of the self presupposes in the first place such an entity. Existentialists 
like Sartre have good reason to want to avoid such a presupposition2 . To predicate from this 
subject is to allow language to imply, or even to posit, something definable and describable, an 
essence or substance of sorts. Thc vcry claim that a description reveals the nature of The Self is to 
2 D.E.Cooper (1991), Chapter 6. 
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be avoided. Although such terminology - 'self - can hardly be avoided, as in one sense Sartre 
more than amply demonstrates, nonetheless, it would be a mistake to think that Sartre when 
speaking of 'self is falling into the trap, as he sees it, of presupposing the existence of some 
underlying essence or substantive subject. According to Sartre, the mistake which leads to this 
trap is usually made. The roots of this particular philosophical presupposition is identified with 
the common philosophical use of that billowing little word "I" (§3.2iv). 
Of central importance for Sartre is that any such presupposition - to an underlying 
substance or essence that defines what humans are or do - is a clear example of bad faith; part of 
the more general attempt by agents to avoid responsibility for their actions, by dislocating those 
actions from a supposed 'true inner self. The 'true' self, if we wish to persist with such a 
designation, perhaps under the spell of its historic and subjective stage management, the true self 
is the being-for-itself as nothingness (Ie 11C~al1t). It is original consciousness, consciousness 
without object, a pure, active, intentionaL meaningful (operative), unreflected subjectivity; a 
nonsubstantial and therefore non-referent existence, definable only in terms of either its past or in 
terms of its absent-present-at-hand. that is, its existence as possibilities. If this concept is to be 
apprehended for what it is, then it will have to be kept clear of the philo-historical associations 
inherent in the language of 'self and T. 
It is not so clear in reading the Tractatus or the Notebooks that Wittgenstein is either as 
concerned about the dangers of presupposing the existence of an underlying and defining human 
substance, or (therefore) as eager to avoid a certain use of language when referring to the self. His 
attack, hO\\"evec on the use of "I" (very apparent in the mid and later works) is paralleled in its 
concern, I would suggest, to that of Sartre's noted above. That is. the reader must be on his or 
her guard against confusing the use of "1" with a predicative subject. Neither in the Tractatus nor 
the Notebooks does Wittgenstein speak simply of 'the self - for, as with the early works of Sartre 
no such philo-historical (substantive. essential) thing exists. 
As Wittgenstein is set against the idea of an underlying substantive entity, this, as will be 
seen, implicitly defines his approach. aligning it ,,,ith Sartre's. Wittgenstein splits the notion of 
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self into two, with the first part named as either 'psychological' or 'soul'. But moreover. the 
second part of the self, the 'true self (non substantive), is variously 'metaphysical'. 'ethical', 
'transcendcntal'. 'ego' or 'philosophical'. Partly. as with a similar diversity of terms in Sartre, 
this is to draw attention to its various modalities (§4)~ but moreover, the self will be seen to be 
just these modalities~ through which it brings Value, aesthetic and ethical, into the world. 
• (Fact-)Value 
The setting in the early philosophy of Sartre and Wittgenstein of Value against Fact, 
pervasive to the present thesis, is not to be determinate. 'There really is a sense in which 
philosophy can talk about the self (5.641). The 'sense' in which the self does exist is as Value, as 
selfhood, as modalities of selfllOod. This is found to lie ultimately in a concept of the self as a 
'relational attitude' (§4). This is the self that is involved in, but not designated by, an attitude to 
the world - whether natural or aesthetic: it is to be understood as coextensive with a 
'psychological', designating-signifying (§2) aspect, as having, in a fuller sense, an existence in 
the empirical or factual world (§4-§5 passim). 
Although it is clear that at the time of the Tractatus and the Notebooks Wittgenstein does 
not resolvc this point of tension between the empirical (Fact) and the metaphysical (Value), he 
insists that 'the will must have a foothold in the world' (cf. §3.1iii). Sartre is more successful -
the self does have a foothold in the world, it is situated - indeed, it is in a full sense situated. Thus 
although the self (Value) is set apart from Being (Fact), Being is experienced as the 'the present-
at -hand': the given is never free of human significance. The two realms, fact-value, are not pure 
and independent. There is a reciprocity between Being and self: 
Value is atTected with the double character, which moralists have very inadequately 
c:\plained, orboth being unconditionally and not being' (BN 92). 
Value cannot be equated. reduced to empirical desires, it also being outside the world (Tractatus 
6.41). It is the self. however, (as value: lack) that chooses or creates values. In so doing, the self 
chooses its world: as Wittgenstein said (quoted abo\,e): there are two Godheads, the world and my 
independent I. In choosing, the (historically) situated self projects itself toward a future, toward a 
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lack, the fundamental lack being the Being of God: absolute value. As Sartre says in Being and 
Nothingness, in the section 'The For-Itself and the Being of Value', 
Now we can ascertain more exactly what is the being of the self: it is value. 
'" Thus the being of value qua value is the being of what does not have being. 
Value then appears inapprehensible. To take it as being is to risk totally 
misunderstanding its unreality and to make of it, as sociologists do, a requirement 
of fact among other facts. (BN 93 - my emphasis). 
For Sartre, as for Wittgenstein, 'human reality is that by which value arrives in the world', where 
'value is given as a beyond of the acts confronted, as the limit, for example, of the infinite 
progression of noble acts. Value is beyond being' (EN 93). In short, 3 key points on the Fact-
Value relation can be noted. Firstly, body is situated consciousness, consciousness as a concrete 
reality (cf. sub-section under §3.1 ii). Secondly, experience is always within nature. Thirdly, the 
self is an activc mode of regarding the world, it is in a synthesis with Being, with objects, the 
Wittgensartrian position recalls clearly that of Kant's transcendental idcalism, as to some extent 
we shall sec. 
It is the transcendent pole of the bi-polar self which. though not in the realm of saying, 
nevertheless finds itself in the rcalm of showing. It is this very sense of self that emerged in the 
previous chapter and which shall dominate the inquiry. But, the crux of this preliminary, this is 
neither to forgct nor ignore those crucial aspects that situate the self as a relation, that reciprocate 
value with fact as they contribute to our problematic. Equally, and granting saying-showing, we 
must not forget what Wittgenstein's and Sartre's own lives show (cf. Introduction). In both cases 
we shall find a remarkable orientation toward self-transformation, this through a completely new 
approach to a way of living, to a constant preoccupation with renunciation and salvation (very 
much in accord with Pascal and Kierkcgaard3). We are dcaling with showing as a principle at 
once theoretical and practical, formal and existential, with renunciation uniting these poles4 . But 
3 The dept of both philosophers to Kierkegaard is unquestionable (Introduction and §4.2). As to Pascal, besides 
Wittgenstein's scattered remarks, there is, for a professed atheist, quite an extraordinary amount of references to 
him thought throughout Sartre's oeuvre. 
4 To take the most obvious example, of material possession: neither philosopher ever owned private property; both 
give away most of their money, keeping only what they needed to get by on. 
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the 'Existential' call to self-transformation announces itself as much in and through the work, in 
a concept of language and in a concept of self. 
(ii) Sartre: Self & structures of consciousness: subject and ego. 
If in the beginning there is the word, and if this word is to designate, define or describe, and 
if we are to attempt to designate, define or describe Sartre's self, then in the beginning there is a 
tripartite structure. The self of prereflective consciousness; the self as ego; the self as value. Also, 
relatedly, there is a self as embodied consciousness. Furthermore, one must, with Sartre, offer 
some comment on reflection. 
• The Self as Subject5 
(Or the Cogito; or prereflective consciousness; that is, non-thetic or nOn-l)ositional 
consciousness). Not the cogito of Descartes. Prereflective consciousness makes reflection - and 
thus knowledge - possible, and is to be understood, therefore, as the precondition for the 
Cartesian Cogito. Sartre's cogito can be defined as that which is aware that it is aware that it is 
not the object it is aware of. In broad terms, non-positional consciousness is self-consciousness. It 
is thus non-positional in the sense that it is not consciousness of an object, but rather it is the 
necessary implicit consciousness that accompanies other - positional - types of consciousness. 
This entails, as Sartre wishes, that every type of consciousness is a self-consciousness, 
consciousness is always aware of itself as consciousness of something and of not therefore being 
that something. Sartre characteristically offers homely existential examples to illustrate his ideas, 
such as someone counting cigarettes while conversing, or we might think of the process of 
5 The next few exegetical paragraphs owe a debt to Hazel Barnes' article Sartre's Concept of the Self in K. Hoeller 
(ed.) (1993). Although it has been a convenience to follow Hazel Barnes, in that her broad characterisation fits the 
purpose here, nevertheless matters are not as straight-forward as she too often has them. Importantly, the relation 
between the different modes of reflection and (non)-positional consciousness is more complex than acknowledged: 
reflection on the ego, for example, can also be non-positional. Also, it is disputable whether the prereflective 
consciousness can be identified with non-positional consciousness. Catalano (1977, pp98f) for one, states that 
prereflective consciousness is both immediately consciousness-of-an-object and an awareness, where every 
awareness is non-positional. 
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driving a car (of which we are always, ideally, prereflectively aware) while at the same time we 
reflectively think and do many other things. For Sartre, any act of consciousness includes both a 
consciousness of the object and a self - prereflective - non-positional consciousness. 
PrereDective consciousness is completely devoid of personal psychic qualities; it is the 
condition of consciousness, not its differentiating nature. It is non-personal in that there is no 
sense of 'I' or 'me' involved. Nonetheless, it is still individuated in the sense that it is pure 
intentionality directed towards an object and as such it is not devoid of individual psychic or 
emotional qualities. 
This individuated non-personal self-consciousness is radically separated from the ego and, 
thus, psychological determinism. It will be seen that it is on the plain of prereflectivity that both 
the intimation and the realisation of the ethical takes place, it is the prereflective consciousness 
that will make the original choice, the fundamental project. (It is at the level of prereflective 
consciousness that each and every choice is made). 
Prereflective consciousness is often referred to by Sartre as 'value'. For sure, it is the source 
of actions and the source of value, of ethical meaning (§4 and §5 ). The (prereflective) subject 
can never be regarded as an object (or as a 'fact' in the world), it is both a nothingness (a 
possibility) and the source or precondition of the ego. Sartre's cogito is the foundation of 
consciousness, of thought, of language and thus knowledge and understanding. Difficulties will 
be encountered if asked how we can conceptualise or have knowledge of or speak meaningfully of 
that which would appear to be the precondition of all understanding. As a nothing, as potential 
only (in relation to world), with no past (history), this structure of consciousness finds itself as 
the source of the mental act, as the signifier. not the signified; it cannot be spoken of, and will 
have to be shown . 
• The Self as Ego (impure and pure reflection; embodied) 
(Or ret1ecti,'c consciousness; that is, thetic or positional consciousness). The ego is not 
located in consciousness, it is external to consciousness, and is not materiallv immanent to 
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consciousness. There is, says Sartre, 'nothing under the words, behind the images. For 'finally 
everything is outside, everything, even including ourselves' (IN 125). 
When consciousness reflects back upon earlier acts of consciousness, i.e .. when the original 
prereflectiyc consciousness is 'objectified' by the reflective consciousness, it takes on qualities 
which are 'inseparable from the particular accumulation of particular interactions with the world' 
(Barnes, 1993 pp41fl), it begins to impose a unity upon those experiences, both past and future 
(future is as it must be, 'virtual '). This ego is coextensive with all of a selfs psyche, not a given 
part (as in Freud). It is not the original prereflective consciousness, it is all of the objects of the 
reflective consciousness. 
The ego is then, the bundle of psychological traits and characteristics, acts and reactions, 
which is identified with a personality. Unlike the prereflective consciousness it is personal, a 
distinctive enduring self. This 'I' with which a self associates its experiences is in fact no more 
than a construct of consciousness which is experienced at the level of impure reflection. This 
ego is not the cause of actions nor a fixed structure which can guide them. The ego is produced by 
consciousness, and is not part of the structure of consciousness. It is created - at the level of 
impure reflection - to give consciollsness an outside which is identical to itself The ego is thus 
an obstacle to authentic choice: freedom and responsibility are identified with consciousness, not 
'being' and not the ego. It is in bad faith that one identifies freedom with the ego. 
The existencc of the ego is thus purely 'ideal': it is seen by Sartre as a formal unity imposed 
upon past and future intentional acts by a present reflective consciousness. 6 It is the locus 
classicus of temptation, evasion, and bad faith. It is imposed by consciousness and in turn 
imposes restrictions - which can be modified. As Sartre says in The Transcendence of the Ego, 
the ego is at the horizon of our choices. this '1 which appears on the horizon of the I think is not 
given as the producer of conscious spontaneity. Consciousness produces itself facing the I and 
goes toward it. goes to rejoin it. That is all one can say' (TE 92). 
6 There is a difference depending upon whether it is the future or the past, see Barnes in Hoeller (ed.) (1993) 
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The ego, in the world, is of the same ontological status as other objects, as the world of en 
soi. As such, it is also a (potential) object of knowledge, for both the self and the other. This 
structure of consciousness can be regarded as what it is: an object (of impure reflection). It is, in a 
superb phrase by Barnes, the 'core of one's personal biography'. 
If Sartre were to write a novel (in the first person) called 'The world as I found it', and ifby 
analogy we say that the prereflective cogito (the original choice) is the author of this novel, then 
in this novel the first-person narrator would be the ego. But the ego is neither fiction nor 
substance. It is a bundle of socio-historical psychological states7. As an object in the world, it can 
be signified by language, it is in the realm of saying. 
Impure Reflection is a concept that is essential to Sartre's distinction between consciousness and 
ego. It is in impure reflection that consciousness is posited as an object, the ego, (and thus closely 
connected to its facti city). Impure reflection reduces consciousness to a series of psychic states 
and acts which constitute the self as ego. The self objectifies itself, sees itself as part of Being, as 
objects in the world, it becomes an object, (with its facticity). This involves overriding the free 
spontaneity of the prereflective consciousness in a guilty act of bad faith with the contingent 
world (en soi). 
Impure reflection can be thought of in terms of ordinary introspection; it is the process by 
which we recall past events, and with which we analyse and assess our psychic life - or that of 
others. It is what is involved in our trying to understand ourselves or others - perhaps typified in 
the therapist, the biographer, and the novelist (Sartre often cites Freud, his own biographies and 
Proust). Thus, unlike consciousness, which is orientated towards the future, impure reflection 
extrapolates and constructs from the past. It is also, besides that which apprehends, that which 
constitutes - and that which is constituted is the ego: the totality of states. In short, impure 
reflection organises reflected consciousness into a series of (psychic) states or acts; it objectifies 
7 In Buddhism the ego is the residue of past deeds: the liberation from the ego would free one from all forms of 
'selfness (i.e. one's Karma, the accretion of former thoughts and deeds). 
122 
reflected consciousness in an attempt to affirm identity (EN 163). Hence, impure reflection can 
be a welcome refuge from the anguished freedom which is at the heart of consciousness: it avoids 
the revelation of this freedom by deceiving us that we have a fixed identity. 'Impure reflection is 
an abortive effort on the part of the for-itself to be another while remaining itself (BN 161)'. 
The object of impure reflection, that which is grasped, the reflected, is not, however, the 
original consciousness; rather, where a subject is sought an object is found. The original 
consciousness is not a personalised self and impure reflection can not reflect upon its original 
source; in impure reflection what is reflected upon is the ego. If then, the cogito or original 
consciousness is to be apprehended. fixed by significative language, encountered. it will not be so 
by impure reflection. 
Finally, as far as Sartre is concerned. it is not a question of asking 'what sort of self am I?, 
for the self that is identified with 'I' is not the real self but a psychological construct - and thus 
the subject matter for psychology (exactly as in Wittgenstein - below). The proper question asked 
by Sartre's position begs a philosophical and not a psychological approach (again, a point made 
by Wittgenstein): 'what is the nature of '111y'8 real self, and what sort of an 'I' has consciousness 
created?' 
PUI'e Reflection. Pure reflection is the original structure of impure reflection, it is an internal 
modification of the prereflective consciousness (there is a corollary between pure reflection and 
the cogito, just as there is a similar corollary between impure reflection and the self as ego). This 
reflection is positionaL but the reflected (rejlechi) that is posited by the reflection (rejlexif) is no 
more than a quasi-object, for it is not posited as external: it remains always 'intra-subjective'. 
Pure reflection surpasses the psychic ego and objectified consciousness by dwelling on non-
positional consciousness. It seeks the subject, as does impure reflection. but whereas the latter 
8 The prereflective consciousness should not be referred to by personal pronouns - but their avoidance in a work 
such as this would result in a tedium which neither a reader nor an author could tolerate. Moreover, to assume that 
such indicators do in any case refer to a self is exactly the mistake that Sartre and Wittgenstein are at pains to 
countenance. (Cf. opening to this chapter and opening to §3.2iii) 
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finds a real (psychological) object the fonner finds a quasi, intra-subjective object in terms of a 
'sense of subject': this is the recognition of 'oneself as independent from one's ego. 
Pure reflection as prima-recognition, that is, of the first awareness of an outside world and 
of being-for-others. Pure reflection reveals to consciousness the apparent paradox that it is a self 
that is not, that consciousness is in fact a pursuit of selfl100d. Nonetheless, although it is possible 
to reflect on, say, the memory of a non-reflective experience (i.e. fear of ... ), it is not possible to 
reflect on the original prereflective conscious act in itself and at the time of making it. Pure 
reflection reveals the limited understanding of the freedom from ego that the prereflective 
consciousness has. (The ego may well remain present at the level of pure reflection, but it will 
only be 'on the horizon' - TE 92). 
If life appears meaningless due to a lack of an ethic (§5). the resulting feeling of absurdity 
will not be overcome in reflection as ordinarily understood. Determination will involve the 
difficult act of seeing ones projects in the world as that of a boundary or limit (§-l- and §5), and not 
as a thing or object. It is an aesthetic attitude that will make this a possibility. 
The Self as Embodied Consciousness. And again the specific issue of the self as fact(-Value). 
It has oft been said that Sartre's ontological position is incomprehensible; it is certainly complex 
and prima facie deserves greater attention that it has received (by Sartrean scholars). Sartre tells 
us that his ontology is a phenomenological description (cf. §2.3iii BN). between consciousness as 
a no-thing and the being that it is dependent upon. This is usually interpreted along the following 
leading lines. Being exists and is given to perception (realism), consciousness is the source of all 
determination (idealism), and thus, it is claimed, on this basis, an unfortunate Neo-Cartesianism. 
Sartre's ontological division is not. however. between consciousness and being; it is between two 
regions of being: for-itself and in-itself. The former is distinguished from the latter by its 
existence as a negating activity. as a relation (§-l-.2). 
Consciousness cannot exist. however. without being, and the body is the mediator between 
consciousness and being: it is both for-itself and in-itself. The body is the fact (facti city) of a 
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consciousness In the world. 'Being-for-itself must be wholly body. and it must be wholly 
consciousness: it cannot be united with a body' (BN .fO.f). Think here of emotional behaviour. 
Sartre says that all such behaviour is to be purposeful, so that the body is active and not passive in 
the selfs interaction with the world. By effecting changes in the body a person modifies their 
relation to the world. In The Transcendence of the Ego the body is seen as that which supports 
the illusion of '1'. It encourages a person, in the prereflective mode, to think of themselves in 
terms of a unified '1': "I say, 'I' am breaking up sticks, and I see and feel the object 'body' 
engaged in breaking sticks. The body thus serves as the visible and tangible symbol for the I" 
(TE 90). 
In Being and Nothingness Sartre identifies the body with three (ontological) dimensions: 
body for the other, body known by the other. and body as for-itself. The former is meant to 
indicate the fact, as Sartre sees it that a person (will usually) experience another's' body as a 
consciousness, as an expression of that consciousness and not as part of the inert matter of the 
world. Nonetheless, there will be times when another consciousness will treat or view my body as 
a pure object: this is the 'body as known by the other'. Of more concern to the present study is 
the third dimension of the body. as for-itself. The body is consciousness in the sense that the 
world is mediated to consciousness through the body, that without body there would be no 
facticity. This is not however. some kind of causal relationship. There is a prereflective, non-
thetic awareness of body that is part of the structure of consciousness: the two can not be 
differentiated: our consciousness of the body is prereflective. Neither can they be reduced to one 
or the other. Thus. unlike with the other two dimensions, consciousness is not of body. The heat 
from the fire that burns my arm is also a pain-consciousness, the two are only separated in 
reflection. 
The body is. then. to make an important point, a consciousness' point of reference on the 
world. My own (prerellective) experience of my body (as consciousness) does not - and cannot -
disclose it to me as an object in the world. In so far as my body provides me with a point of view 
on the world. it is impossible for me to take a point of view on it. Thus, a consciousness' point of 
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view on the world is. in a sense, within the world. But this does not, Sartre correctly notes, and 
echoing Wittgenstein's Tractarian position ('an extentionless point ... '). give a sufficient 
condition for identifying my body with my point of view. Within the structures of consciousness, 
Sartre has made it clear (above) that although the original conscious relation to the world is 
individuated it is not personal and does not involve the T. 'The point of view can approach the 
body to the point of almost being dissolved in it, as we see, for example, in the case of glasses, 
pince-nez, monocles, etc., which become, so to speak, a supplementary sense organ' (BN 320). 
Ultimately the self is 'nothing' but a self-relating self-awareness (§4.2). And 
when we say that the for-itself is-in-the-world, that consciousness is consciousness of the 
world, we must be careful to remember that the world exists confronting consciousness as 
an indefinite multiplicity of reciprocal relations which consciousness surveys without 
perspective and contemplates without a point of view. (BN 306). 
Conclusion. The 'true' self. foundational, is original freedom: it is a structure of consciousness; 
it is beyond the limits of those structures. it is beyond both modes of reflection. There is a sense in 
which it exists in the world, though this does not include it 'as the body'. 
That my eye should see itself is by nature impossible .... it would be possible to conceive of 
a system of visual organs such that it would allow one eye to see the other. But the seen eye 
would be seen as a thing [i.e. 'object' or 'ego'], not as a being of reference' (BN 358). 
The T is the limit or boundaI)T of experience. For the problematic of self, determination 
involves the difficult act of seeing ones projects in the world as that of a boundary or limit (§4 and 
~5), and not as a thing or object. This is a feat beyond the structures of consciousness - at least in 
its natural (relational) attitude to the world. Moreo\'er, original freedom is identified with value, 
with ethical meaning, and thus centrally \\"ith the problematic. For a solution to the problematic, 
or at ieast the possibility of a solution. the inquiry will have to focus elsewhere (beyond basic 
structures, reflection, body) to those modalities of the cogito which constitute it as value, and thus 
to the possibility of an aesthetic as opposed to a natural attitude to the world. 
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(iii) Wittgenstein: Self as Psychological, Metaphysical.9 
The focus of the present explication of self will be the direct references. the 5.6s. near the 
end of the Tractatus. Nonetheless, the entries from the Notebooks shall be used where they are 
helpful - this is not a sleight of hand. The genesis of the Tractatus is to be found documented in 
those wartime notebooks of Wittgenstein's which have survived, those, inconclusive, from the 
years 1914-1916. In what follows, there are points on which the Notebooks are fairly heavily 
relied upon. Now there is a danger here: by the time of the Tractatus, some of the remarks in the 
Notebooks are rejected, some of the views revised. But the Notebooks are never quoted from 
unless the remark is continuous with the Tractatus. Also, as regards the self, ethics and 
aesthetics, such comments fall into the later entries of the final notebook and are, in general, very 
consistent with their counterparts in the Tractatus. The advantage of the notebook entries over 
the Tractatus is that they offer argument and detail - and therefore, arguably, clarity - to a degree 
completely absent in the Trac/alus. There is of course a good (aesthetic) reason for the omission 
of ar!,rument and detail in the Tractalus ... on which see below, especially §5 . 
• The Self as Psychological. 
The first direct mention of the self in the Tractatus is at 5.542. 'There is no such thing as 
the soul - the subject etc.- as it is conceived in the superficial psychology of the present day. 
Indeed a composite soul would no longer be a soul'. That which is conceived of in psychology is 
a composition of psychical characteristics. It would appear that Wittgenstein is saying (with 
Hume) that no subject can be found and that no subject could be found, only a bundle of psychic 
characteristics and experiences. This is sometimes referred to as the 'human soul', but it is not a 
unitary self or subject. it is a collection of mental episodes. These \yill include 'thoughts', thus in 
9 It needs to be stressed that Wittgenstein's early concept of self and its related doctrines, including that of the seWs 
relation to aesthetic experience, owe a considerable debt to Schopenhauer. It may be a bonus that there is now a 
considerable body of secondary literature on Schopenhauer-Wittgenstein (see bibliography). Besides which, two 
texts have brief but excellent pointers, P .S.M. Hacker's Insight and Illusion (1986) and P .Gardeners Schopenhauer 
(1963). 
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response to a question from Russell: 'does a thought (Gedanke) consist of words?', Wittgenstein 
says 'No. But of psychical constituents that have the same sort of relation to reality as words'. As 
to the nature of these constituents Wittgenstein 'does not know'. However, 'the kind of relation of 
the constituents of the thought and of the pictured fact is irrelevant. It would be a matter of 
psychology to find out' (NB 130 and 131). As such it is the appropriate subject-matter for 
psychology - exactly as Sartre had said of the ego. But such a study is superficial, not least 
because it cannot deal with the real subject. Another term we could adopt for the psychological 
subject is 'empirical ego'. This is useful for both its allusion to Sartre's ego as well as it 
indicating the relation this self is to have to propositions and the Tractarian theory of meaning. 
Wittgenstein's direct references to the self are immediately preceded by an analysis of 
propositional attitudes, in particular psychological propositions (at 5.5-ll). There are three aspects 
of this much discussed proposition which are important to the present dissertation. Firstly, 
following directly on from Wittgenstein's analysis, there arises out of the ashes of propositional 
language the metaphysical subject. Secondly, the analysis ties in with this metaphysical subject 
the idea that it is complex, not a substance, and not referable to by names - and that therefore its 
existence can be shown. Thirdly, also tied in with Wittgenstein's analysis, his discussion of 
psychological propositions invokes the necessity of an intentionality - which, when considered 
with the later parts of the Tractatus, will itself be seen to be identified with the metaphysical 
subject. 
Wittgenstein begins his discussion of psychological propositions by argUIng that prior 
analysis of such propositions by Russell and Moore was, as with a psychological approach, 
'superficial' 10. 
Particularly with certain tonns of proposition in psychology, such that 'A believes that p is 
the case' and ' .. j has the thoughtp', etc. For if these are considered superficially, it looks as 
if the proposition p stood in some kind of relation to an object A. (And in modem theory of 
knowledge (Russell, Moore, etc.) these propositions have actually been construed in this 
wa}'.) (5.541). 
10 For an illuminating and more detailed account of Wittgenstein on this topic and its relation to the self see 
P.M.S.Hacker (1986). 
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Wittgenstein's main objection to this view 'paralysed' Russell. Russell had in fact argued that in 
such propositions as 'A believes p', A stood in some relation to the proposition p and further, that 
this relation was a mental attitude of A towards a p that exists - whether or not p is believed. 
That, in short, there was a correlation between object (mind, soul) and proposition. Wittgenstein 
sets out to tear this dual relation theory apart. He recognised that due to his commitment to the 
doctrine of extentionality he had to find a solution to the problem caused therein by intentional 
verbs: 
It is clear, however, that 'A believes that p', 'A has the thought p', and 'A says p' are of the 
fonn '''p' says p ": and this does not involve a correlation of a fact with an object, but rather 
the correlation of facts by means of the correlation of their objects. (5.542). 
His solution, he claims, in the Tractatarian proposition which directly comments on the last, will 
have significant consequences for the self and philosophy of mind: "This shows too that there is 
no such thing as the soul ... ' (5.5,,\,21). Wittgenstein's point is that there is no mental correlation 
between object and proposition (otherwise judgements could be nonsensical) and that no subject 
as Russell conceives it exists. It only seems that there is a correlation between object and 
proposition. In reality, a proposition is a correlation of facts brought about by 'means of the 
correlation of their objects' - for in the Trac/afus facts are always composites of objects. This is 
the clue to the very next entry, introducing the self: 'This shows [i.e. the above analysis] that 
there is no such thing as the soul'. Wittgenstein believes that his analysis has revealed the 
complexi~y of the soul. The possibility of say-ing depends upon the elements of the sayable - the 
thinkable (see below) correlating with what is being said by 'the method of projection'. Thus, 
while Russell had taken the object >1' to be a unitary subject related to a proposition, '.:/ believes 
p; Wittgenstein's analysis reveals ~~1 ' as a fact - i.e. as an assemblage of elements that pictures a 
(possible) fact p. In a similar Tractarian context, genuine proper names refer to simple indivisible 
objects, which constitute facts and make propositions perspicuous; while a non-genuine proper 
name in a proposition, that of a unitary subject. say, 'Tony Blair', hides the logical multiplicity 
involved. Once elucidated, it is clear. so the account goes, that the name 'Tony Blair' stands for 
a complc:\ of objects, a state of affairs, and does not refer to a unitary subject. In short, 
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experience does not encounter, because it does not exist, claims Wittgenstein, a unitary subject 
which will constitute the meaning in 'A believes p'. We are left with a Humian composite 
empirical self, a bundle of experiences and characteristics, a psyche that psychology can deal 
with. If there is a unitary subject beyond the experiences, then it is also, as adjudged by the 
ontological and logico-linguistic framework of the Tractatus, beyond the sayable pole of a 
proposition. 
Moreover, this composite empirical ego includes what we may want to call the 'thinking 
subject'. 'A logical picture of facts is a thought' (3.), and, in a clear passage from a letter to 
Russell, quoted in part above, and written in August 1919 when the Tractatus was complete. 
I don't know what the constituents of thought are but I know that it must have such 
constituents which correspond to the words of language. Again the kind of relation of the 
constituents of the thought and of the pictured fact is irrelevant. It would be a matter of 
psychology to find out. (NB 130). 
There is no thinking soul - there is no substance thinking thought. The mental configurations of 
for example thoughts and beliefs constitute the possibili~v of propositional depiction. That a 
proposition actually does depict depends upon the sense (sinn) giving to it by the meta-
psychological will which is to be identified, as will be seen, with the metaphysical subject, with 
its activity. 
Long before the Investigations Wittgenstein's starting point and target is the Cartesian self. 
As the psychological (thinking) subject is composite it falls within the empirical reality that is 
representable in language. We can thus speak meaningfully of the 'empirical subject'. It is in 
the world, among the facts, can be referred to by elementary propositions, is verifiable, and, what 
is more, has a necessary connection to the human body: a fact amongst other facts. 'A stone, the 
body of a beast, the body of a man, my body, all stand on the same level' (NB 12.10.16, p84). 
This latter point does not entail, however, that, a la Schopenhauer, the body is a 
phenomenal objectification of noumenal will. The thing-in-itself, the essence, is the 
metaphysical subject the existence of which can only be shown. Only in a philosophically trivial 
sense will we say that actions show the existence of the metaphysical subject. Acts of will are 
psychological phenomena: philosophy cannot use them to penetrate to the thing-in-itself. 
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Nonetheless. the metaphysical subject can be shown. and is the source of showing, in a deeply 
philosophical way. It is the condition of showing and indeed the condition of ethical, via 
aesthetic, responsibility. Although the ethical will (i.e. the metaphysical subject) is not and 
cannot be an efficient cause in the world. it is the transcendental ground of thought and action. It 
is, it will be seen, part of the forlll of the world as a whole. the limit of the world. In this way, to 
make clear the nature of language by drawing the limits to what can be said by language is to 
make clear the nature of ethics. This is the project of the Tractatus, whether it succeeds or not, 
and the metaphysical subject is central. 
• The Metaphysical Subject. 
When referring to the non-psychological self Wittgenstein vanes his term of reference 
between 'metaphysical subject'. 'ego', and T and 'the philosophical self. It may already be 
clear, at least prima facie, that Wittgenstein's psychological subject resembles Sartre's 'ego'. To 
avoid any confusion where Wittgenstein is concerned, when referring to the psychological and 
the metaphysical subject the term 'empirical ego' will be adopted for the former. 
Such a supposed enigmatic entity as a metaphysical subject begs three ruling questions 
What is it. where is it and why have it? Let us attempt such an approach. Forthwith it is clear 
'what it is not. By contrast to the empirical ego the metaphysical subject is, obviously, neither 
physical or psychological. Wittgenstein says that it is independent of the world of facts. It is not a 
part of the world. It is independent of the empirical ego. It is not the subject for psychology 
(above) - it is Wittgenstein informs us the subject-matter for philosophy. In actual fact, and this 
is crucial to the present thesis. it will be seen. that the metaphysical subject is not the subject-
matter [or any old philosophy. but only the particular philosophy that is recommended by the 
Tracfatlls. 
Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self il1 a 11011-
ps~'CllOlogical wa~'. [ 5.641; and sec 6.53]. The philosophical self is not the human being, 
not the human body, or the human soul, \\"ith which psychology deals, but rather the 
metaphysical subject, the limit of the world -- not a part of it. (5.641). 
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It is this identification of the metaphysical subject with limits (and a particular kind of 
philosophy) that will eventually lead us to aesthetics and an understanding of the Tractatus as an 
aesthetic deed. 
Still, this does not really answer the question 'what is it?' How should the undoubtedly 
enigmatic metaphysical subject be characterised? There is little doubt that Wittgenstein thought 
of it in terms of 'soul' - though not the superficial soul of psychology (5.641) and not the 
Cartesian - or Rationalist - 'thinking thing' (5.631), which for Wittgenstein is reducible to the 
former. A more fruitful procedure may be to ask 'where in the world can we expect to find the 
metaphysical subject?' But still we encounter difficulties: Wittgenstein argues for the non-
encounterability of the metaphysical subject. 
Whatever it is, and consistent with the doctrines of the Tractatus, the metaphysical subject 
is not placed in the world; it is not encountered as an object of experience In fact, along with 
logical form, the metaphysical subject is conceived to be a presupposition - in this case, of 
experience. Here Wittgenstein's account is strikingly similar to Schopenhauer's, even in the use 
of metaphor. 
Schopenhaucr speaks of the knowing subject (as does Wittgenstein in the Notebooks), the 
transcendental ego, as 'a presupposition of all experience' (WWR II, pp15). It lies outside space 
and time and is the source of experience. It is 'the eye (that) sees everything except itself (ibid., 
pp491). And Wittgenstein: 
The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world. Where in the 
world is a metaphysical subject to be found? You [Schopellhauer ?] will say that this is 
exactly the case of the eye and the visual field. But really you do not see the eye. And 
nothing ill the visual field allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye. (5.632; 5.633) 
The metaphysical subject is an inner limit to the world. It is that part of consciousness which is 
said to be identical with itself. That is. it is both the source of experience and the experience of 
the world. 'Only from the consciousness of the uniqueness of Illy life arises religion, science, and 
art. (NB l.8.16. pp79». 'The world and life are one' (5.621). 'I am my world (the microcosm)' 
(S.63). 'The world is Illy world' (S.6-l1). 
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The metaphysical subject is no kind of entity or thing at all. It is a no-thing. What it is. is a 
characteristic of experience as a whole. 'The [metaphysical] subject does not belong to the world; 
rather, it is a limit of the world', 'I am my world' (5.632, 5.63). This (non-psychological) 
characteristic of experience is not to be understood in terms of ownership; the metaphysical 
subject can not be an owner: it is the presupposition of the experience with which it is identified. 
In fact, the self as constituting the limits of one's world as a bounded whole is to be understood in 
terms of a sort of lIIineness, and involving self-understanding (in terms of ethical meaning). The 
mineness must be understood in a special way, as a programmatic notion, as 'will': will in 
relation to itself to the world. The metaphysical subject is a relatum. 
In fact, the best way to proceed with the inquiry into the nature of the metaphysical subject 
is to direct the leading questions - what, where. why - toward the concept of 'will'. Firstly, 
however. and while still addressing the nature of the metaphysical subject, the method is to 
harvest the above exegesis and interpretation for the first crop of comparative fruits specific to the 
self. 
~3.2 THE MISSING SUBJECT: FOUR COMPARATIVE ASPECTS 
The above has endeavoured to give some account of certain central aspects of Sartre's and 
Wittgenstein's early concept of self. It is hoped that exegetical interpretation is rewarded in what 
follows. In this the first of two comparative sections on the self (the second being constituted by 
the remainder of the dissertation), four key areas of contact shall be identified: the self as bi-
polar, the self as a no-thing, the self as eliminated, and the self as non-encounterable. 
(i) Self as hi-polar 
The first thing to state is that there is. for both philosophers, two senses in which the self is 
bi-polar: it is so in relation to itself and it is so in relation to world. The separation from the 
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world is of less interest and is in any case better discussed in the section on non-encounterability 
(below). 
That both philosophers conceive of the self as being somehow bi-polar in terms of a self-
relation should by now be clear. We saw that for Wittgenstein there is on the one hand the 
empirical ego and on the other hand the metaphysical subject. The empirical ego is characterised 
as psychological: a composition of psychical characteristics. Wittgenstein claims that only a 
bundle of psychic characteristics and mental attitudes and experiences are to be found when we 
look for a unitary self or subject. And indeed, when we do look for such an object it is there in 
the world, an object among objects. Such an entity is the empirical ego. By contrast to the 
empirical ego the metaphysical subject is neither physical or psychological: it is independent of 
the world of facts and 'independent' of the empirical ego - it appears, at this early stage, to be a 
characteristic of experience as a whole. 
Sartre's bi-polar self is between ego and subject. As with Wittgenstein's empirical ego, 
Sartre's ego is seen to be independent of the (metaphysical)-subject. Sartre's ego is seen to be an 
object of the same ontological status as other objects in the world. And as with Wittgenstein's, 
Sartre's ego is defined in terms of a bundle of psychic traits and characteristics, mental attitudes 
and experiences. In both accounts it is this psychological ego which a self identifies itself with as 
an 'I'. For Sartre, this ego is not part of the structures of consciousness, but is a product of those 
structures, it is an ideal in that it is a formal unity, but this unified 'I' is spurious, a construct of 
consciousness. For Wittgenstein too, the ego is not a unitary self or subject, it is a collection of 
mental episodes. Thus Wittgenstein's metaphysical subject and empirical ego are very close to 
Sartre's subject and ego - with both braces divided along similar lines. 
It must be conceded that it may be going too far to claim that Wittgenstein also saw this 
false unity as an ideal (i.e. unified '1') created by consciousness (the metaphysical subject), 
nonetheless, as we shall see when we come to discuss the metaphysical subject as 'will', any such 
counterclaim may also be going too far. Moreoyer, though this issue is forever destined to 
stagnate in indefinable pools of interpretation. the claim that the metaphysical subject creates an 
ideal unified 'I' will prove, I believe, as good as any counterclaim, as it fits like a jigsaw piece 
into the Tractatus and offers a workable and useful picture. 
In conclusion, what defines the metaphysical or foundational pole of self from the 
empirical, in both philosophers, is that the former is non-substantive, the presupposition of 
experience, individual (but not personal), identical with itself as the source of action/experience 
in consciousness and, finally, it exists as a willing relation to the world (§4). 
(ii) Subject as Eliminated. 
That the subject is eliminated entails in the first place that the self is bi-polar and, in the 
second and third place, that it is a no-thing and non-encounterable - but that the subject is a no-
thing and non-encounterable reciprocally entails that the subject is eliminated. Thus there is no 
real reason to place the account of eliminated self prior to self as a no-thing and its non-
encounterability ('thought' constantly forces such arbitrary decisions upon us and philosophical 
discussion). It is only hoped that there is some benefit in the chosen order of material. Whatever, 
a central conclusion of this section reciprocates one part of the two-part conclusion to the section 
on non-encounterability. That is, and this is the point that we must take with us, the elimination 
of the subjectfiAolIl the world entails that it is also 110n-encounterable in the worId. 
Via detailed analysis, and with the whole weight of a rigorous Tractarian system behind it, 
Wittgenstein argues that there is a self over and above the empirical ego which rather than being 
in the world is in some sense the presupposition of that world. The metaphysical subject has been 
eliminatedFolIl the world of experience: it is the presupposition of experience. The metaphysical 
subject is an inner limit to the world. It is that part of consciousness that is said to be identical 
with itself. That is, it is both the source of experience and the experience of the world. 'The 
world and life are one' (5.621). 'I am my \\orId (the microcosm)' (5.63). 'The world is my 
world' (5.6-ll). 
If I \\Tote a book called The World as I found it, I should have to include a report on my 
bod~', " dc" this being a mdhod of isolating the subject, or rather of showing that in an 
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important sense there is no subject; for it alone could not be mentioned in that book. 
(5.631 ) 
'The metaphysical subject, the limit of the world -- [is] not a part of it' (5.641). 
Sartre also eliminates the subject - subjectivity itself is reduced to empty consciousness; 'I' 
am not my interiority; 'consciousness is '" total emptiness (since the entire world is outside it)' 
(BN, ppxxxii). Whatever is true of a self is not - and cannot be - privately true, for the 'I' is a 
presence of consciousness to situation. 
In fact with Sartre there are two modes of self eliminated from the world. Fascinatingly, 
each corresponds to one of the two key aspects of Wittgenstein's single eliminated subject. For 
Sartre, these two modes are: the self as (pre reflective) subject and the self as value. Recall that 
the former is the original act of consciousness. it is, as with the metaphysical subject, the 
presupposition of experience. This so in the sense that (a) it is, as intentionality (see below), the 
source of experience. and (b) it accompanies all experience of the world. As with the 
metaphysical subject, it is an inner limit to the world. And like the metaphysical subject Sartre's 
subject is the source of experience as well as the experience itself: i.e. it is the condition of 
conSCIOusness. 
The world has not created the Me; the Me has not created the world. These are two objects 
for absolute impersonal consciousness, and it is by virtue of this consciousness that they are 
connected. This absolute consciousness, when it is purified of the T, no longer has 
anything of the subject. It is no longer a collection of representations. It is quite simply a 
first condition and an absolute source of existence. (TE 105/6) 
Recall also that pure reflection is an internal modification of the (pre reflective) subject. 
Pure reflection reveals to consciousness that it is, paradoxically, a self which it is not. That 
consciousness is not identifiable with the ego or the world. Consciousness is free and exists as a 
pursuit of self. This pursuit of self is termed, we saw, the self as value. The self as value bears 
resemblance to Wittgenstein's eliminated metaphysical subject in the following way: it is not in 
the world. it is a limit to the world. It is an on-going process. or striving, that pursues an 
unrealisable ideal: selfllOod. The goal of consciousness is selfllOod. this is the value, ideal. unreal, 
and unrealisable, that the self pursues. It is. by necessity. eliminated from the world of objects. 
Thus, the two senses in which Wittgenstein's metaphysical subject is eliminated from the world, 
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as a presupposition of experience and as not being part of the world because it is a limit to it, are 
mirrored in two of the structures of Sartre's self: as prereflective and as value. 
Because of its later importance, it should in fact be stressed now that the elimination of the 
self of value, as with its non-encounterability and its ontological status as a no-thing, is, for both 
philosophers, and as with their semantics (§2), connected to limits. Wittgenstein: 'The subject 
does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world (5.633)'. Sartre: 'by definition it 
[the selfJ is an ideal, a limit' (BN 103). 
(III) Subject as a No-Thing11 
As a preliminary point a comment on terminology. It may be thought that the Continental 
use of the terms 'nothing' and 'nothingness' can alone arouse passion in otherwise indifferent 
anglo-linguistic analytic philosophy. This would perhaps be a fortunate, but still an unnecessary 
state of affairs. In particular, it seems that the criticism of Sartre for deploying such terms has 
reached the status of eternal recurrence. Of near legendary status in such circles is the early 
attack made on Sartre by A.J.Ayer in 19-1-5. 12 Ayer accused Sartre's use of 'nothing' for 
consciousness as at best mysterious but actually subterfuge or meaningless nonsense. To be sure, 
any new designation hoping to grow into a rigid designator must begin life in anonymity, perhaps 
as apparent nonsense, as lacking, in Sartrian terms, the necessary - signifYing - background for 
sens, as well as struggling to assert its newly created referential status. But that is the point: 
consciousness as 'nothing' or a 'nothingness' has no old hackneyed tradition: the purpose behind 
its introduction (as with many terms in the Continental tradition) is to avoid a tradition of 
assumptions and presuppositions: ",hat is required we are being told is a new way of thinking, 
only then will old issues be clarified, solutions made possible. 
11 Kathleen Wider's' paper A Nothing About Which Something Can Be Said, (1991) was brought to my attention at 
the time of writing. The paper shares some of the insights of the present section - and allowed me to develop some 
points of detail. 
12 A.J. Ayer, 'Novelist-Philosophers: V. Jean-Paul Sartre', Horizon, 12, July 1945. 
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If the above point was not clear enough, the use of 'nothing' for consciousness is intended 
to assert what is perhaps a mysterious doctrine, though one common to both traditions, that 
consciousness is not a substance: that consciousness exists as intentionality and that this entails 
that consciousness, the very structure of consciousness, is always a lack (or 'incomplete', as Ayer 
would no doubt prefer) requiring an object. There is no way of speaking about consciousness 
except in relation to an object (internal or external); prior to this relation consciousness is indeed 
empty, or nothing: that is, passim this dissertation, until the activity we may term original 
consciousness is so characterised there is no way of referring to it, representing it, or speaking of 
it, directly. It seems to me that both of the above points are eminently not mysterious and both 
have complete sense (though the former can be taken too far). Sadly, as with other battles across 
the divide, the inception of the Anglophers attack is a prejudice, and not, unidealistically, the 
clash of free spirits for the liberty of wisdom and truth. Ayer is happy to target the nothingness of 
Sartre while lauding, for example, the 'emptiness' and 'nonentity' ofMoore13 . 
The nature of the 'no-thing' subject which Sartre and Wittgenstein required, and which is 
eliminated from world and introspection. is to be understood as not being a substance, thing, or 
entity of any kind: 'the selfon principle can not inhabit consciousness' (BN 103). What this shall 
eventually amount to is an account of self existing in the sense of operative intentionality, with, in 
Wittgenstein's case 'will' and in Sartre's case intentionality itself having precedence. But before 
proceeding along these lines some comments pertaining to the specific point of convergence on 
the non-substantial subject are in order. 
Drawing on the exegesis at ~3 .1, it is to be recalled that Sartre begins his account of 
consciousness by separating what exists, being, into two: consciousness (pour soi) and world (en 
soi). Consciousness itself is then bi-polar:, ego - the subject as value. To avoid dualism and 
maintain the translucidy of consciousness which he so desires, Sartre argues that what separates 
consciousness from itself is nothing, no-thing. More precisely, and with a nod to the next chapter 
13 G. Moore 'The Refutation of Idealism' for some startling comparisons to the Sartre of Being and Nothingness -
not the least of which is Moore's characterisation of consciousness as a 'nonentity', with direct acquaintance being 
impossible, we find 'mere emptiness'. 
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marked by my emphasis, 'the self ... indicates a relation between the subject and himself, ... the 
self does not designate being, either as subject or predicate' (BN 76). Of this self, or non-self, we 
are saying, non solipsistically, that it 
is not an ego and is without content, without a meaning to define it, there is surely no name 
that characterises a particular self, no word that will serve as the predicate noun or 
adjective indicating who the self is. Thus, Sartre does not introduce words for the self. It 
has no experiential meaning; likewise no linguistic meaning. The true self (that IS, 
unretlected consciousness) ... is empty and without words (Silvennan, 1987, ppI74). 
Sartre's view that consciousness itself is a nothingness, a no-thing, is central to our study. 
There are at least two important and related reasons why consciousness itself is characterised as a 
no-thing. Sartre conceives of consciousness as a lack of being, as non-being; it receives its 
determination from the outside world, from the presence of objects. He is keen of course to 
separate consciousness from material objects of experience. It is well established that Sartre 
accepted (with modifications) the Husserlian idea of intentionality. But a crucial point of 
departure is Sartre's claim that being does not belong to consciousness, that as Wider has it 
'consciousness is constitutive of the being of its objects' (Wider, 1992, pp325). Sartre argues that 
if this were the case we would have to distinguish objects by saying that they are non-being. 
Objects have being (substance) while consciousness is non-being. Hence, the fundamental 
ontological distinction between eIre pOllr soi and eIre en soi, with consciousness emerging as a 
negation of eIre. We have seen that in The Transcendence of the Ego Sartre argues against the 
existence of a Cartesian ego, this to the extent that in Being and Nothingness he says that 
consciousness is no substance at all, consciousness 'is total emptiness (since the entire world is 
outside it)' (BN xxxii)14. Consciousness and objects are distinct. Indeed, as early as 1939 Sartre 
states that 'consciousness has no "within", it is nothing but the outside of itself and it is this 
absolute flight, this refusal to be substance which constitutes it as consciousness. Consciousness is 
utterly empty, existing only in its awareness of itself and world, we are thus 
delivered from the "intcmal life", in vain would we seek the caresses and fondlings of our 
intimate selves ... since everything is finall~! outside, evef)thing, even ourselves. Outside, in 
the world, among others. It is not in some hiding place that we will discover ourselves; it is 
on the road, in the town, in the midst of the crowd. (I pp5) 
14 Sartre's externalism has, as with Wittgenstein's, been noted. See especially Oennetts' Mental Content. 
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Although the external world of objects exists whether persons are conscious of it or not, the 
en soi requires consciousness in order to exist as a world, as an organised and meaningful 
complex15 . As to consciousness and world (as opposed to consciousness and external objects), 
without the one there can be no other: 'Without the world there is no selfness, no person; without 
the person there is no world' (BN 157). Consciousness needs the world of objects for its 
existence. But this world of objects (including the ego) is always outside consciousness. The 
world as the world exists only through consciousness but, as we saw, this does not entail an inner 
substance. Rather, the world (as a meaningful complex) exists as an immediate spontaneous act 
or process. Consciousness itself remains empty, a no-thing. But what can this mean? 
What is the character of this 'process' that defines consciousness? Sartre argues that 
consciousness is a relation or 'presence' to the world. It is the presupposition and limit of its 
experience. Although it is dependent upon objects for its existence, it exists at a distance 16 from 
them. Therefore, crucially, 'What is present to me is what is not me' (BN 192). Consciousness 
is not and cannot be identical to its object - if it was it could not be consciousness of that object. 
Consciousness is nothing, has no content: a desire or an emotion, as with other mental events, is 
an object for consciousness. Consciousness is nothing other than what it is consciousness of, 
being or substance, but at the same time consciousness is not what it is consciousness of: for it 
must be a presence to being. Sartre's claim involves the idea that consciousness is not subject to 
the Law of Identity. To speak of consciousness as 'nothing' is a way of freeing it from the 
(mechanistic) world of causal relations. If consciousness coincided with itself it would not then be 
consciousness, it would be an object. 
The second principal factor in Sartre's characterisation of consciousness as a no-thing, and 
implicitly introduced in the first, consists in the claim that consciousness is intentional. Sartre 
sees intentionality as the most fundamental feature of consciousness. It was stated above, that 
15 To pursue this would take us to the heart of Sartre's unusual idealist-realist position. But this is not the place to 
enter the complex debate as to whether and when Sartre's philosophy was ever anti-realist or idealist - whether or not 
and when he ever was a transcendental idealist, though clearly, the present thesis supports the latter interpretation. 
16 The importance of 'distance' is to be elaborated upon in the final chapter. 
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Sartre disagreed with Husserl's claim that being does not belong to conSCIOusness, that 
consciousness is constitutive of the being of its objects. If this were the case, claims Sartre, then 
we would have to distinguish objects from the being of consciousness by saying that they are non-
being. But consciousness is always orientated towards a being other than itself. The great merit 
of Husserl's intentionality, says Sartre, was that it destroyed the idea of immanence (I 4). This so 
because 'consciousness-of' refers to something beyond. That this is the case frees consciousness 
by expelling it of things (chooses). (Actually this is not what Husserl says: the intended object is 
constituted by consciousness and is not independent of it). For Sartre, the preposition 'of' 
establishes an 'ontological proof': that 'the referent of intention is independent of consciousness' 
(Spiegleberg, 1961, IIpp488). Consciousness is not a substance of any kind, essentially it is 
empty, a nothing. 
Wittgenstein's account of the self in the Tractatus 5.6's is in its own way as startling as 
Sartre's. For Wittgenstein the metaphysical subject is a necessary condition for the existence of 
the world. However. as with Sartre, objects themselves exist regardless of the self: it is the world 
that depends upon the metaphysical subject. This necessary condition for the world is 
characterised as a limit or boundary. 'The metaphysical subject, the limit of the world - not a 
part of it' (5.641). Thus, as Wittgenstein says, '1 am my world'. the world is my world, and so 
therefore 1 am, in a sense, the world. 'The world is my world. The world and life are one. 1 am 
the world (the microcosm), (5.62, 5.621, 5.63). But still 'I' remains a formal precondition for 
the possibility of the world, a limit and so 1 am no-thing but the (limit to the) world. 'On the one 
side nothing is left over, and on the other side, as unique, the world (NB 85)'. 
The metaphysical subject would seem then to be a structure or mode of experience as a 
whole. This (non-psychological) characteristic of experience is not to be understood in terms of 
ownership: the metaphysical subject can not be an 'owner': it is the presupposition and limit of 
the experience with which it is identified. This characteristic of experience must be understood in 
a special way (above), and although I shall claim that it is best characterised as a kind of 
mineness or relation, it is still to be understood, as we shall see in the following section, in the 
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context of Tractarian 'will', as a programmatic notion. Thus understood, it will be seen that this 
sense of mineness has nothing to do with, nor does it entail, an inner substance or entity. For 
Wittgenstein, 'The world is all that is the case', and we can give a complete description of the 
world, entailing as it would all tme and meaningful propositions. Such a complete description of 
the world is what natural science aims at. But even if such an ideal were attained, and a book 
was written that described the world, there would be something left out of the description. 
Namely, there would be a no-thing left out of the description, 'for in an important sense there is 
no subject: that is to say, of it alone in this book mention could not be made .... The subject ... is a 
limit of the world' (5.631 and 5.632 - my emphasis). As with Sartre, Wittgenstein's self remains 
empty, a no-nothing set over and against the boundaries of the world. 
(iv) Subject as Non-encounterable. 
This aspect of the self, logically entailed from what has preceded, forces the issue of the 
problematic: if the lingua-self is to determine itself, and if, as is the case for both Sartre and 
Wittgenstein, this requires self-understanding in terms of an ethical insight (ethical meaning -
§5), then in achieving this. if it is to be achieved, then at some level it is the non-encounterability 
of the self that will eventually have to be overcome. In this section the discussion is limited to the 
clarification of the - convergent - reasons for this non-encounterability, leaving the actual 
possibility of encounterability and determination to the final chapter. 
It is already clear from some of the above material on the subject as bi-polar and 
eliminated, existing only as a limit that. and this is an important point of comparison, that the 
(metaphysical)-subject is the source of introspection, the precondition of all reflection. It is not, 
and cannot therefore be encountered, in the ll'orld: I objectively confront every object. But not the 
I' (NB 11.8.16). The I not being an object the I being that which points toward or intends 
objects, the auge being the signifier and not the signified, the I cannot be encountered in the 
world or in introspection. 
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Wittgcnstcin. Wittgenstein can be seen to be putting forward a portmanteau-argument supportive 
of non-encounterability, we shall call it 'the argument from contingency and experience'. The 
above discussion of Wittgenstein 's analysis of psychological propositions stated the foundational 
core of this argument. In his account of psychological propositions the conclusion is that the 'I' 
can only refer to a composite and empirical ego, similar to Hume's 'bundle'. Wittgenstein 
removed the 'I' that referred to a supposedly unified entity l7. The 'I' as some sort of unified 
substance, soul-like thing, is not it is concluded, experienced in introspection. The 'real' I, the 
metaphysical subject, is the presupposition of these experiences. All experience is contingent, the 
metaphysical subject is not part of that, not encountered in experience. Whatever is experienced 
could of course be otherwise (both Wittgenstein's metaphysical subject and Sartre's subject 
necessarily avoid any kind of psychological determinism). 
The subject does not belong to the world ... And nothing ill the visual field allows you to 
infer that it is seen by an eye ... This is cOlUlected with the fact that no part of our 
experience is at the same time a priori. Whatever we see could be other than it is. 
Whatever we could describe at all could be other than it is. There is no a priori order of 
things. (5.632,5.633,5.634). 
If there is a subject other than the empirical ego then (a) 'The I is not an object' (NB 7.8.16) and 
(b) it does not consist of simple objects and is not composite. 'A composite soul would no longer 
be a soul (5.5421)'. Thus, such a non-composite entity, if it existed, would necessarily be beyond 
the sayable. 
Here Wittgenstein is invoking a whole Tractarian ontology and theory of meaning. As was 
seen in the previous chapter, what is sayable is always that which is contingent - i.e. a fact. Such 
facts are derived from states of affairs which are concatenations of simple objects. Such 
concatenations are representable by elementary propositions. Basically. a state of affairs is 
something that is empirically verifiable. Such things are necessarily composite. The empirical 
ego is so conceived as composite - a fact in the world. A necessary requirement. that we may 
17 He maintained this position throughout the mid (Blue and Brown Books, pp67f) and later works, its essence is 
found in the Investigations. The 'I' is a word that acts as an instrument, no fact corresponds to it, it does not point to 
an inner thing, it is that thing. '''I'' is not the name of a person' (PI 410). 
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speak of the contingent empirical world (and the ego), is the existence of its fundamental 
constituents: simple objects. Now. nobody. except perhaps God and Wittgenstein. knows what 
these simple objects are. They are unanalysable and unsayable. What is known is that they are at 
the very least the precondition of meaningful language: this may well be because they are the 
precondition of the world. If there is to be any meaning at all in our language then a name must 
avoid an infinite regress and at some point refer to an absolutely simple object (see §2.2). It 
might help. or it may be that we are meant to think of them in terms of monads. It may also be 
consistent to think of the metaphysical subject as a monad of sorts: simple, necessary, 
unanalysable, unsayable and a precondition for experience. But no matter how we conceive of the 
metaphysical subject, it is clear that it is not thought of as being composite and is not, in an 
essential sense, in the world. That it is necessary and not contingent ensures that the 
unanalysable and unsayable metaphysical subject is the pre-condition of experience. and not 
therefore encounterable in the experience of the world. 
The metaphysical subject cannot be encountered in experience, introspection, or by the use 
of the first-person pronoun - or, it might seem to follow, by language at all. At least, this would 
certainly appear to be the case. Nonetheless, the question and hence the problematic persist until 
the final chapter: 'can this obstacle to self-understanding be transcended, can the eye experience 
itse1f18, would it thus determine itself? 
Salire. In his philosophic oeuvre Sartre does not spend a great deal of time discussing the uses 
of the first-person pronoun, such a method is counter-intuitive to a certain philosophical 
temperament. Nonetheless, by a different analysis, which is not negligent of the importance of the 
first-person pronoun. 19 he comes to similar conclusions to those of Wittgenstein - that the 
cardinal mistake is to confuse any use of "I" with its having to refer to a substantive subject in the 
18 'Can the eye see itself' erroneously suggests the primacy of an epistemological relation. See ~5.3i. 
19 See The Transcendence of the Ego part I. Also, see Phyllis Morris's 'Analytical approach' to Sartre's Concept of 
a Person (1975), Chapter4. 
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world (~3.1 i). Such a conclusion finds expressIOn throughout Sartre's oeuvre. In The 
Transcendence of the Ego for example: 
The "1" is the ego as the unity of actions. TIle me is the ego as the unity of states and 
qualities. TIle distinction that one makes between these two aspects of one and the same 
reality seems to us simply functional, not to say granunatical (TE 60). 
In Being and Nothingness it is 'the "I" which they wrongly take to be an inhabitant of 
consciousness' (BN 103). In Saint Genet, 'For nobody may say the simple words: I am 1. The best 
and freest of men may say: I exist. Which is already too much. For the others, I suggest they use 
such formulas: "'I am Himself' or "I am so and so in person'" (SG 83). 
Although for Sartre the body (as consciousness) is the point of view we have on the world, it 
is not we saw an additional object in the world that we experience. Our original point of view on 
the world is (the body as the) subject: prere1lective consciousness. This is non-personal and is 
radically separated from the ego: It is the locus of experience. Although it is individuated there is 
within this mode of re1lection no sense of 'I' (see the exegesis above at ~3 .liii). Thus, 'the 
transcendental field becomes impersonal; or, if you like, "pre-personal", without an l' (TE 36). 
The idea of a consciousness that can be grasped as unitary is redundant. It is not a case of 'I am 
conscious of this chair', rather, 'there is consciousness of this chair' (TE 53). Prereflective 
consciousness is directed upon objects of awareness; the 'I' is 'only consciousness of the object 
and non-positional consciousness of it-self. There is 'No 'J' in the unreflected [i.e. prereflective] 
consciousness' (TE .f 7). 
Convergence (fonvard to SelfllOod). The convergence between Sartre and Wittgenstein on the 
non-encountcrability of the self in introspection now opens up before us. In comparison to the 
account of Wittgcnstein, \\'e can now quote Sartre to the following effect. 
The cn! is the point to which all the objective lines converge. TIms the perceptive field 
refers to a centre objecti\'cl~' defined b~' that reference and located ill the very field which is 
orientatcd around it. On1\' \\c do not see this centre as the stmcture of the perceptive field 
considered; 'we are the cell Ire. (BN 317) 
T docs not refer to a soul-like substance or thing 'the being of human reality is originally 
not a substance ... the for-itsclfis nothing and is separated from the in-itsclfby nothing'. (BN 575 
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& 362). What the first-person pronoun does refer to is a bundle of psychic qualities or events, a 
unity of, and such a unity that is experienced in the world as a personality: not ever to be 
mistaken, however, for a person. 'What confers personal existence on a being is not the 
possession of an Ego - which is only the sign of the personality' (BN 103). It is the empirical 
ego that is encountered in the world and in introspection, and is the subject of psychology: 'the 
empirical psychologist, while defining man by his desires, remains the victim of the illusion of 
substance' (BN 557). The ego is for sure a 'sign' of a person, but this person remains no-thing. 
And whilc Sartre agrees with Wittgenstein that experience is contingent, it could always be 
otherwise, Sartre also concurs with Wittgenstein's Kantian point that the subject's relation to 
experience is a priori. Experience is always Illy experience, my visual field is my visual field: 
The perceptive field refers to a centre objectivity defined by that reference and located in 
the very field which is orientated around it. Only we do not see this centre as the structure 
of the perceptive field considered; 11'(' are the centre (BN 317). 
Moreover. as experience is mediated through impure reflection, and as the original structure of 
impure reflection is pure reflection. and as this seeks but fails to apprehend the subject (finding 
only a sense of the subject, quasi, intra-subjective), then neither can introspection encounter the 
subject: 'the self cannot be apprehended as a real existent the subject can not be self (BN 76). 
The subject or the prereflective cogito, is not, and cannot be, as with the metaphysical 
subject encountered in introspection or experience. The consciousness that does the reflecting, 
the (metaphysical)-subject can't itself be introspected. For both philosophers there is no 'I' as 
consciousness; the foundation of consciousness and the possibility of introspection would seem to 
be beyond language and beyond meaning. In the search for itself the self, by necessity, uses its 
own experience in the hope of being that experience. It appears at this stage, that the act or 
process of attaining self-understanding (ethical meaning), is a self-negating act or process. 
Surely. howc\·er. even if it were accepted that the self is bi-polar. eliminated, a no-thing, is 
non-encounterablc. evcn so, thcre lIIust remain a sense in which the self does exist; a sense in 
which the self is in thc world and in introspection. There may also therefore, be a means of 
encountering the self. 
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If I were to write a book 'the world as I found it', where in this book, in the experience of 
writing this book, in the experiences in between. would the I be encountered? Where in the world 
or introspection is the 'I'? If the 'I' is the pre-condition of language how can it determine itself 
at the linguistic level, how can it be apprehended through language? Certainly, neither name 
referral nor propositional representation have much to offer in such a problematic of self. 
The approach now, after identifYing both the foundations and the key - convergent - aspects 
of the self (and its linguistic dimension in §2), is to seek a solution to the problematic by 
proceeding with those modalities of self that constitute it as "alue, as an attitude, and as 
structurally related to ethics and showing as an aesthetic principle. 
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§4 
MODALITIES OF SELFHOOD: 
SELF AS VALUE 
To act is to modify the shape of the world 
(Being and Nothingness, pp433) 
If good or evil willing affects the world it can only effect the 
boundaries of the world 
(Witlgenstein, Notebooks, pp73) 
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This chapter deals with the self as sclfhood: the qualities of self in virtue of which, for 
Sartre and Wittgenstein, salvation is possible. That which is the synthesis of the modalities of 
identity (not of course, and as in Ricoeur, an unchanging core of personal identity). Such a 
concept ill\'olves a multi-dimensional account of the self as value, including such modalities as 
operational intentionality (§-l.l). rclatum and programmatic (§4.2), and attitude (§4.3). Such 
section divisions are potentially misleading and are for convenience of inquiry only, as it is a 
single (though complex) aspect of self. This notwithstanding, the modalities of self mark a 
significant development in the problematic: the self is value (ethical and aesthetic), it relates to 
the world in terms of a natural attitude: the solution (in §5) being a conversion to an aesthetic 
attitude. 
~4.1 OPERATIVE INTENTIONALITY 
The necessary introduction into the discussion of intentionality and will causes some 
difficulties. It is my contention that both concepts exist and playa fundamental role in the early 
works of Sartre and Wittgenstein. However. although Wittgenstein speaks much of will 
(especially in the Xotebooks) he does not directly address the topic of intentionalityl. Sartre, on 
the other hand, has much to say on intentionality, but relatively little on will. Nonetheless, the 
1 Although I have, in an analysis of both belief propositions (above) and will (below) supported my claim to 
intentionality in the Tractatus, and although for some time I thought myself solipsistic in holding such a view, I can 
now bring in further support by referring the reader to the article by Rosenberg, Intentionality and Self in the 
Tractatus (cf, below, §4.2) and, with interpretative reservations, to P .M.S. Hacker's recent volume, Wittgenstein, 
Mind and Will (1996) pp19-26. It is unfortunate that Hacker, unlike Rosenberg, misses the fundamental extent and 
significance of the structures surrounding propositional intentionality in the Tractatus. It is due to this over exclusive 
reading that Hacker misconstrues the notion, finally dismissing it with a very unfortunate turn of expression: 'the 
metaphysical subject merely enfolds an enigma consequent on our own misunderstanding within a mystery of our 
own making' (pp26). 
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picture thcory of meaning rcquircs the intentionality of a self, and that this intentionality is close 
in conccption to Sartre's (Husscrlian bascd) account. Similarly. I believe that Sartre's little 
discussed concept of will is close in conception to Wittgenstein's (at times Kantian) account of 
will. And further, that Sartrc's will must be understood within his concept of intentionality; as 
must Wittgenstein's account of intentionality be understood within the context of his concept of 
will. Due to the nature of this will and its structural relationship with intentionality, the resulting 
account of the self is, for both philosophers, and in its primary metaphysical sense a matter of 
operative intentionality. 2 
In speaking of the sclf as operativc intcntionality the following is intended. That of course 
there is, as there must be, a sense in which the self as a no-thing exists. The self exists as a 
relatum both to itself and to the world and does so as a method or means of engaging with the 
world so as to procure a ccrtain effect. as a means of altering the way the subject sees - and 
therefore experiences - the world. The basic structure of this relation is intentionality. 
(i) Intentionality - and Will (Sartre) 
For Sartre, wc turn to the discussion of will that is to be found in Being and Nothingness, 
PtA. in the first chapter 'Bcing and Doing: Freedom'. Also, for further enlightenment, the 
discussion of will that is found in the notes which in both date and content prefigure much of 
Being and Nothingness, and which are published in English as the War Diaries (1939). Between 
them, these two discussions offcr the most detailed account of Sartre's concept of the will. 
By now we are familiar with the idea that consciousness is empty. non-substantive. It is to 
be understood as a kind of mo\'ement. a transccnding towards world. Intentionality is the 
constitutivc state of consciousncss: an image or a perception is always of something. There is no 
2 This term recalls Merleau-Ponty (and Husserl) - I believe in fact that the similarity here may go beyond the mere 
terminological - hence my adoption of it. See Merleau-Ponty [1962J xviii 
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inner mental image, only 'consciousness of. .. ' - that is, a relation between consciousness and its 
object. 
For Sartre, consciousness is also pragmatic, that is purposeful; every act of consciousness is 
an attempt to do something. 
To act is to modify the shape of the world; it is to arrange means in view of an end; it is to 
produce an organised instmmcntal complex such that by a series of concatenations and 
connections the modification effected on one of the links causes modifications throughout 
the whole series and finally produces the anticipated result. ... We should observe first that 
an action is on principle intentional (BN 433). 
Consciousness is free; it therefore chooses. This brings consciousness into the world, into the 
realm of 'doing' and 'having' (cf. §2.3iii BN). Whatever the projects or fundamental project of 
the for-itself, doing and having are wrought in terms of conscious intentionality toward a future. 
Is this, or does it involve. an act of will? A provisional answer would be yes, but not in the 
Nietzschian sense: 'We must not confuse our necessity of choosing with the will to power. The 
choice can be effected in resignation or uneasiness; it can be a flight, in can be realised in bad 
faith' (BN -1-72). Nor, Sartre warns us, should we confuse his account of the will with the 
traditional Scholastic framed debate: no doubt he would be happy to call that The Sisyphus 
Approach: it is pointless, self-defeating to assume a causal relation between thought and action 
and then ask if one determines the other. Nonetheless, Sartre himself is, as with traditional 
approaches, at pains to (l\'oid any form of detcrminism in the realm of consciousness. He argues 
at length that the original source of our actions, 'original freedom', is not a prelude to action, but 
rather the foundation for action. He fmiher states that as far as action itself is concerned there are 
two determinants, motifand mobile. 
A/alifis usually translated as 'cause' (cf. Barnes' translation ofBN, especially pp435), this 
is not only very confusing for English readers, it is also misleading (a point often overlooked but 
notcd by Peter Caws 11979]). The English 'motive' is better, as by itself a motif cannot cause an 
action but is reason for action: action assumes or demands freedom. A/obile has similarly (and 
equally confusingly) been translated as 'motive'. The English 'motivation' is beUer, as Sartre 
refers to mobile as a 'subjective fact' (BN -1--1-6), while Barnes, in a footnote, perceptively refers to 
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its meaning as 'an inner subjecti\'c fact or attitude' (BN ..J.35 - my emphasis). Henceforth I thus 
alter Barnes' translation of thcse terms in Being and Nothingness to suit this clearer and less 
misleading formulation. 
In order for a motive (lIIoti}) to result in action requires, at the outset, that the motive is 
recognised for what it is. This to be sure is the minimal role of motivation (mobile), that of 
recognising or discovering a motive: 'The motivation is nothing other than the apprehension of 
the motive' (BN 449). Motive and motivation 'are correlative', and, with the final third of their 
structure, the act, form 'the three indissoluble terms of the thrust of a free and living 
consciousness which projects itself towards its possibilities and makes itself defined by these 
possibilities' (ibid.). 
There is, as there must be. an 'intentional structure'. an 'ensemble of my projects' (ibid.) 
which gives meaning to the drive-intention-act complex - otherwise we 'can only end up 
rendering the act absurd' (BN ..J.37). This is the actual process or drive of consciousness, what in 
common parlance is referrcd to by Sartre as 'original freedom'. It is to be understood as 
'spontaneity' or negation. 
By original freedom, of course, we should not understand a freedom which would be prior 
to the voluntary or passionate act but rather a foundation which is strictly contemporary 
with the will or passion and \\Ohich these mamfest each in its o\\'n way (BN 444) 
Freedom is consciousness. its state. whether in fact this be constituted as 'will or passion'. 
'Passion' is emotion. an 'emotional reaction'. For Sartre, this is clearly less desirable than 
a willed response. for although the goal may be the same in both cases, i.e. the positing of 'a 
supreme end the value of lifc'. the difference is that in the latter case this is only 'implicit' while 
as will it is both 'better undcrstood and explicitly posited' (BN 443). Passion and will are not 
opposed in Sartre's philosophy; and although neither are to be identified with original freedom, 
both are seen as 'contemporary' with that freedom, as modalities of the original drive. In fact, 
both arc seen as a matter of 'subjcctive attitude in relation to a transcendent end'. 
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As to these two modalities of the original freedom, will and passion, Sartre states clearly 
that 'The diITerence here depends on the choice of means and on the degree of reflection and of 
making explicit, not on the end' (ibid.). Moreover. 
The will in fact is posited as a reflective decision in relation to certain ends. But it does 
not create these ends. 11 is rather a mode of being in relation to them: it decrees that the 
pursuit of these ends will be reflective and deliberate. (BN 443 - my emphasis). 
The pursuit of ends - or value - by the will is preferable, such ends 'being more clearly conceived' 
than ifby the emotions. But when the will intervenes, as being-in-the-world, 'as the thrust of the 
engaged consciousness' (BN -1-50), such will is posited as a decision alrea(~v taken; at inception 
'the chips are dO\vn' (BN 451). What this means is that although 'the will is in essence 
reflective, its goal is not so mllch to decide what end is to be attained: ... the profound intention of 
the will bears rather on the lIIethod of attaining this end already posited (ibid.). Will, emotion, 
motive and motivation, and indeed reason, all arise and have meaning in the original choice of 
the for-itself. Wil1 is a manifestation, a projection of the for-itselfs original project. The end has 
been posited by original freedom. The for-itself must choose itself as passionate or calm, as 
desiring body or disinterested intel1ect. This free choice at once precedes all deliberation and 
gives the context to al1 deliberations. The wil1 is reflective: the original free choice is unreflective. 
In actual fact, as we know. the original choice is the pre-reflective cogito seen as that which is a 
project towards an end or goa\. Therefore, the original fundamental freedom of the for-itself is, 
ultimately, its very reality as a project in relation to the world (in-itself) and others. In short, the 
motive(s) for doing (and having) is discovered in the pre-reflective cogito (via an existential 
psychoanalysis); while the reasons for acting are what are revealed by reflecting on the world, or 
situation, as given, and in consequence of the motives behind one's motivations: the prior 
condition is thus. as we shall shortly see. self-consciousness. 
As consciousness. pOllr .mi, the self is always in a situation. out of which its motives are 
drawn. But its motives and motivations are not determined or even provided by the situation, the 
will is not given: 'If the will is to be autonomous, then it is impossible for us to consider it as a 
given psychic fact' (BN -1--1-2). And of course we cannot. claims Sartre, grant autonomy to the 
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will and not the passIons: . And docs not passion have its own ends which are recognised 
precisely at the same moment at which it posits them as non-existent' (BN 443). The situation 
will only have the meaning that the self chooses to give it. But then how are we to understand 
the activity of original choice? So far we know that it does not derive from deliberation but that it 
is intentional. In fact Sartre has said that the acti\'ity of choice is 'the original relation which the 
for-itself chooses with its facticity and with the world'. 
But this original relatioll is nothing other than the for-itselfs being-in-the-world in as much 
as this being-in-the-world is a choice - that is, we have reached the original type of 
nihilation by which the for-itself must be its own nothingness. [And, as we have come to 
expect] No interpretation of this can be attempted ... (BN 457). 
Choice, freedom, is the relation of the self to both itself (as facticity - i.e. ego) and the world. 
Although embedded in a situation (objcctivity), the meaning of the situation (subjectivity) will 
depend upon the fundamental choice. or project. that each self makes. 'The for-itself is the being 
by which "there is" a world. Bctter yct. it can be revealed only to a for-itself which chooses itself 
in this or that particular way' (BN 447). Thus, an act of will is neither the original 'will to 
power' nor does it change the situation, the facts (facticity); rather, it alters how the world 
appears. how the world is seen. and thus how the world has meaning for the self. It is, then, 
intimately connected to morality: to the \\<ly a person chooses to live their life. This can only be a 
matter of determination. the problematic of self. How the world is seen, what meaning it is given 
in relation to the self is crucial to the pursuit of ends, to value, to ultimate value, to the 
fundamental project. and thus to the problematic of self and the question of determination. 
Iris Murdoch, with a refined artists perception, has called Sartre's freedom 'the experience 
of accurate vision' (Murdoch. 1953. pp67). Freedom is not something to be proved, but is, as with 
Kant. and with intentionality and will. a postulate of action. Will is the disposition of freedom. 
Thus, as Sartre writes in the Irar Diaries. 'Will and perception are inseparable .... Of course, as 
Kant clearly saw [the] Will must be willed. Otherwise my will to go to Paris would be 
involuntary' (WD 34). What we havc is a 'Transcendent voluntary intentionality: the willed 
willing is a \\illing of x' (ibid.). For will can only exist as will 'by escaping from itself, by 
leaping out of itself towards thc future. It is [a la Hcidegger] a project' (entll'urf) (WD 38). 
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In summary. we can say that the will for Sartre is a means (a mode of consciousness, 
similar, only superior and therefore preferable to, the passions). by which the self confers 
meaning on the given. on the otherwise docile world. The will thus has the power within it, is 
condemned to have this power. of being responsible for altering the meaning of the world. The 
will 'Mustn't be understood as an empty psychological desire, but as the transcendental structure 
of human reality' (WD 110). So that in essence, 'I am what I will' (WO 41). And as such, the 
will is 'A total and existential modification of human reality' (WO 60). 
Will is either identifiable with, or a modality of, Value - a point of interpretation that need 
not concern us further: suffice that we are clear on the following points. Will is identifiable with 
the freedom that Sartre calls for good reasons Value (it is certainly not a fact, and it is certainly 
not in the world). Its ontological status is the same as its foundation, the prereflective cogito, it is 
a relation. Will is 'the relationship between consciousness and its own possibles' (WO 39). Will 
is in fact a relationship of the subject to it-self and the world. It is this (subjective) relation that 
constitutes meaning (in the sense most readily identified with 'existential meaning', - i.e. as that 
which is in opposition to the absurd). The search for meaning is constituted in terms of the self as 
a relatum, a willing relation. that is to be understood, within the final context of a programmatic 
notion and 'attitude'. as operative intentionality. The wilL by all accounts the ethical will, alters 
how the world appears, and thus has meaning for the self. 
(ii) Will - and Intentionality (Wittgenstein) 
Firstly. this section reqUires some (further) remarks on the claimed link of the picture 
theory to intentionali ty3. Secondly. Wittgenstcin's account of the self as non-substantive, non-
encountcrablc etc .. leads him. via similar considerations on intentionality and will, to the same 
conclusions found in S,1I1rc's account. Namely, that will is (a) not empirical. but value - ethical; 
3 Aside from the importance of this claim to our account of the lingua-aesthetic self, its discussion, here and 
previously at ~2.2 and ~3.2ii, maintains that important indirect claim of the thesis, that the Tractatus is (as was 
intended by its author) a unified whole. 
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(b) identified with the cogito or metaphysical subject; (c) a programmatic relationship between 
self and world: (d) the source of (ethical) meaning: (e) an attitude - wherein, building on the 
aesthetic stmcture of will (essentially . disinterestedness', §5). the direct possibility of converting 
from the natural to the aesthetic attitude. 
+Intentionality: from propositions to subject 
Sartre's position regarding the intentionality of consciousness is common to that found in 
the Anglo-American tradition. 4 Wittgenstein's later commitment to intentionality is fairly un-
controversial, though it has received less discussion5. However, this is not the case with the early 
Wittgenstein, where any relation between the Tractatus and intentionality remains predominantly 
unnoticed or generally neglected. 
That the picture theory of mean1l1g implies or is committed to, besides isomorphic 
representation, an intentional relation (and by implication a self), is not, due to the complexities 
involved, quickly or easily established. Indeed, it is impossible within the limits of the present 
dissertation to firmly establish such a thesis. But some such progress can, and must, be made. The 
present brief and direct attempt at such progress is supported by much of the material on 
Wittgenstein in this dissertation (including the bi-polar account of self in relation to the saying-
showing distinction. and the final claim of the dissertation that the Tractatus is intended as an 
aesthetic deed). Moreover. the above discussion of psychological propositions (§3.2ii) which will 
be drawn on offers direct support to the following thesis: that the picture theory requires the 
intentionality of a subject. 
It is a feature of the Trac/atlts, and perhaps it is a commonplace, that the conditions which 
make language a means of asking questions about the world also make possible answers to these 
4 See, for example, Sarire, by the respected Sartrian scholar Anthony Manser (1966, pp67). 
5 As in other specific areas there is plenty of evidence in support of continuity between early and late work - certainly, 
there is plenty of affinity between early and mid periods: 'If we say "from outside intention cannot be recognised as 
intention etc." We don't want to say that meaning is a special experience, but that it isn't anything that happens to us, 
but something that we do, otherwise it would be just dead. (The subject - we want to say - does not here drop out of 
the experience but is so much involved in it that the experience cannot be described)'. Philosophical Grammar, 
Blackwell, 1974, pp156. 
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questions. And once \\'c accept that language is eo ipso the bedfellow of objective reality, names-
objects, and that this objective sphere is distinct from the sphere of the human subject and value, 
objects given but the world as experienced, then if in our language we wish to avoid non-sense, 
we will cease to use a certain - propositional - kind of language to ask certain questions of the 
subject and value, these being the source of representation (above, §2.2). 
The picture theory model of language implies the universal and the particular, the 
impersonal and the personal. There is language (4.002). Language is universal and given 
(logical and pictorial form) and personal. creative and intentional (application and use). A 
propositional picture can represent an~1hing that has the same structure or pictorial form as itself 
(2.71). Pictorial form is the possibility of sinn (2.221). That is how a picture is attached to 
reality; it reaches right out to it ... like a measure [where] only the end points of the graduating 
lines actually touch the object that is measured (2.1511-2,2.15121). Again, 'The method of 
projection is to think of the sense of the proposition' (3.11). In order to signify, have sense and 
meaning (above, §2.2), a proposition is applied, used. A sign becomes a symbol by the wayan 
intelligent being uses it: 'A sign is what can be perceived of a symbol' (3.32). So that, 'In order 
to recognise a symbol by its sign we must observe how it is used with a sense' (3.326). 
Language is not only isomorphic representation, it is also intentional. Propositions are 
written or spoken by an individual. In pa11icular. we saw (cf. above, §2.2ii), that belief sentences 
entail and indeed require the intentionality of a subject. Recall that Tractatus 5.542 states that 'It 
is clear, however. that "A believes that p ", "A has the thought p ", and "A says p" are of the form 
'''p' says p" . The meaning in such 'picturing' mental acts as believing, thinking, saying, reduces 
to the fact that language is intentional. In order to speak of 'x' we require, first, an isomorphic 
representation of 'x', next. a picture of 'x'; it is the intentionality of a subject that makes the 
isomorphism into a picture. The pictorial relationship acts as the feelers of a picture's elements 
(2.1515). Language projects reality (2.1512) and a picture agrees with or fails to agree with 
reality (2.21). Hence. 'What signs fail to express, their application shows' (3.262 - my emphasis). 
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The central point being made here is not such that it contravenes a traditional reading of the 
Tractatus: the formal relationship between language and world remains fundamental. What is 
being suggested through the introduction of intentionality is an additional (and necessary) 
dimension to this relationship. Moreover, it is important to stress that in the Tractatus the 
intentionality of language resides, at least in one sense, within language itself. 'Only the end 
points of the graduating lines actually touch the object that is to be measured. So the picture, 
conceived in this way, also includes the pictorial relationship, which makes it into a picture' 
(2.1513 and 2. 13 I-I) What makes a picture depict is not something external to the picture, rather 
it is something internal. and this is the inherent intentionality of language - which, crucially 
Wittgenstein identifies with the metaphysical subject6. 
Here it is useful to us to state a possible difference between the Tractatus and the 
investigations. Both works lay great emphasis upon the role of use and application as far as the 
meaning of propositions is concerned. But with the investigations this is constituted in terms of 
language games - that is, a subject (situated in the world) playing a particular language game for 
a particular purpose or end. Tn the Tracfatlls, however, there is, seemingly, and this it has rightly 
been said is fairly amazing for a work concerned with language, there is no subject that thinks or 
entertains ideas: the psychological self is not the user of language, but is rather a set of signs. 
Signs are identified with the empirical self. with facts, they are composite, stateable - but, on their 
own, without sense. S'inn. which is in or behind the empirical self, is the use or application of 
signs, \\hich then become symbols. The use and application of signs, the intentionality of 
language, is the metaphysical subject. with which Wittgenstein also must identify SUbjectivity. 
Subjectivity is a pre-condition of experience: here Wittgenstein's position resembles that of Kant 
and Sartre, in that he is committed to transcendental idealism or, what with reference to Sartre 
has been termed 'existential idealism'. The structures of language are the limits of language (and 
at the same time thinking). Intentionality is responsible for the world being intelligible as the 
6 A case could be made for a further identification with logical form, with faSCinating though presently peripheral 
consequences. 
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world. In the following section we shall see that it is at these limits that we find the metaphysical 
subject. 'The limits of language (of the only language I understand) mean the limits of my world' 
(05.62 - my emphasis). 
A proposition is a picture of a state of affairs. Propositions constitute isomorphic 
representation in so far as thcy picture facts. Thus the world as the proposition is phenomenal, 
accidental and. as far as non-relative value is concerned, neutral: without sense. The relation 
between subjcct and proposition (i.e. fact) is always of the same kind: I discovcr truth or falsity of 
a proposition by relating it to a state of afTairs. Hence, it 'is impossible for there to be propositions 
of ethics' (6.-l2). For ethics is concerned with what is not the case (fact). If all the questions of 
natural science wcrc answered a complete description of the (phenomenal) world would ensue. 
But exactly what this world lIleans, is somcthing which depends upon the subject - and, for 
Wittgenstein. God 'What do I know about God and the meaning of life? ... The meaning of life, 
i.e. the meaning of the world. \\c can call God'(NB 72/3). Ethics, value, is in the sphere of 
subjectivity. and therefore it must be grounded in the human subject. This subject is, we must 
always remind ourselvcs. to be identified with limits 'the metaphysical subject, the limit of the 
world' (S.6-l1). 
Conclusion. Wittgenstcin's subjcct can lcave traditional readers behind. The account of language 
offered in the Tracfaflls rcquires thc intentionality of a metaphysical subject for the following five 
reasons. One. as that with which the dead signs can be associated, via use and application, 
becoming symbols and hence vchicles of meaning. Two, as that which compares pictures to 
reality. and dctermincs thcir truth or falsity - without verification, a proposition cannot of course 
be said to be either tnlc or falsc. Three. as a grounding for subjectivity and the realm of value -
for what is most important. which is not in the world, and which is called the mystiche. For all 
these an empirical subject will ncver do. Fourthly, we recall a central theme, and note that in the 
Tractatus Wittgenstein has conceivcd a fundamental difference between what can be experienced, 
dcfined or described and statcd without non-sense. and what is the precondition for the possibility 
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of experience, \\'hat cannot be defined but can only be shown. The metaphysical subject is 
required in order to make it possible that those things which cannot be said can nonetheless show 
themselves. The metaphysical subject is the precondition of meaningful language. Thus, as we 
shall shortly see (§5), there is the constitution of the world by the intentional subject. Fifthly, and 
finally, it is the formal existence of the metaphysical subject that guarantees the once disputed 
unity of the Tractatus. 
+From Subject to will 
We now proceed with the idea that the intentionality of the metaphysical subject is to be 
identified with will. Besides thc intrinsic interest of this further development, such an analysis 
will permit the comparison to Sartre that is required for the final moves to the aesthetics of the 
last chapter. In what follows much will be made of a concept of will that is characterised by 
Wittgenstein as being 'ethical'. This would be odd, as the present thesis is concerned with the 
self and acsthctic cxpcrience. if it \\'cre not for the final (ethical) purport of the problematic that 
directs the inquiry. Relatcdly, there is the view that ethics and aesthetics have fundamental 
similarities - or are evcn idcntical in ccrtain respects, Sartre held some such view, as did 
Wittgenstein at the time of the Tractallis. For the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, 'Ethics and 
aesthetics are one and the same' (6,-\'21). This does not have to be agreed with - but it must be 
recalled that when Wittgenstein is speaking of ethics he is at the same time referring to aesthetics 
(for the nature of this stmctural rclation see below. §5). 
There are only (or as many as?) fivc direct references to will in the Tractatus - though it is 
much discusscd and grcatly anguished o\'cr in the Notebooks. My claim shall be that the concept 
of 'will' is very important in the Tracfafus: it is identifiable with the metaphysical subject and 
thus the subject as valllc - and is thcrcfore part of the requirement for sense (sinn) in the picture 
theory. 
Whcn Wittgenstein speaks of will he invokes his concept of the bi-polar self. 'The 
philosophical self is not the human being. not the human body. or the human soul. with which 
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psychology deals. but rather the metaphysical subject' (5.641). Wittgenstein insists on making a 
clear distinction between will as ethical and \vill as phenomenon. ·It is impossible to speak about 
the will in so far as it is the subject of ethical attributes. And the will as a phenomenon is of 
interest only to psychology' (6,423). 
To say that there is a 'will as phenomenon' that is 'of interest only to psychology' is to 
place this will in the same situation as the empirical ego. Such a will would be something that 
could be described in a behavioural or experimental way. It would consist of psychical elements, 
such that it is revealed in the world through the voluntary movements and performed acts of the 
body. It would therefore, be that which can be represented, pictured. that which can be spoken of, 
and therefore described. As a fact in the world, a state of affairs, it has no value, at least not in 
the higher, non-relative mystical. sense with which Wittgenstein is concerned. (In the later 
Lecture 011 Ethics Wittgenstein used as an example of the distinction between relative and 
absolute value that of what we mean by referring to 'A good tennis player' and simply the 
'good'). 
J 
Conversely, Wittgcnstein speaks of 'the will in so far as it is the subject of ethical attributes. 
What is this 'ethical will '? The Notebooks will be of assistance here. In an early entry pertaining 
to the will. the ethical will. we are told that it is that which is the bearer of reward or punishment: 
'I will call 'will' first and foremost the bearer of good and evil': 
Let us imagine a man \\110 could use none of his limbs and hence could, in the ordinary 
sense, not ~xercise his \\ill. II-: could, however, thillk alld want [Wittgenstein's emphasis] 
and communicate his thoug.hts to someone else. Could therefore do good and evil through 
the other man. Then it is clear that ethics would have validity for him, too, and that he in 
the ethical sense is the bear~r o1'a will. [NB, 21.7.16. p76] 
In this passage, as elsewhere. Wittgenstein emphasises the word 'want'. At this time, July 1916, 
he equates 'willing' with 'wanting' (or 'wishing'). This results in a tension between an inner 
mental state, ,,,ith stoical ovcrtones. of the will accepting the world as its lot, and an activism, 
with the will 'penetrating' and affecting the world. Howcver. as time and contemplation proceed 
in their analoguc the Xotehooks, the two concepts are eventually distinguished. and the tension 
brought to easc. To will comes to be seen as an activity. while wanting now embraces the stoical 
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notion of not wanting. Thus. ideally. and this is important to what follows: ethical reward would 
be found in willing the good without \t'Ql1fing reward. 
Towards the end of 1916. Wittgenstein says: 'Now at last the connection between ethics and 
the world has to be made clear' (NS lO. 9.16); then, three weeks later: 
TIle will seems al\\'ays to have to relate to an idea. We cmmot imagine, e.g., having 
carried out an act of will \\ithout having detected that we have carried it out. Otherwise 
there might arise such a question as whether it had yet been completely carried out. It is 
clear, so to speak, that \\e need a foothold for the will in the world. TIle will is an attitude 
of the subject to the world. (NB 4.11.16; p86-7) 
When Wittgenstein speaks of the ethical will, he is not, we know, speaking of a psychological 
phenomenon. It is important that we \"ill the good and not the bad. This \\"illing the good is a 
matter of how one vic\\"s the world: the attitude one adopts. Willing is methodological - that is, 
programmatic. Thus. in the second dircct reference to will in the Tractatus 
If the good or bad e'l:ercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of 
the \\orld, not the facts -- not what can be e'l:pressed by means of language. In short the 
eiTcct must be that it becomes an altogether ditTerent world. It must, so to speak, wax and 
wane as a whole. (6.43) 
In the Notebooks. this entry is elaborated upon by the fl1rther comment: 'In short [good or evil 
willing] must make the world a wholly different one. As if by accession or loss of meaning 
(5.7.16)'. Wittgenstein is saying that the exercise of the ethical will has no effect on the world of 
facts. on the representational world. on the world which is 'the totality of facts' and which 
surrounds the willing subject as phenomena. What is effected by the ethical will is the meaning of 
the world as a lI'hole for an individual. (i.e. its ethical meaning). Whereas each willing subject is 
surrounded by the totality of facts. each individual as ethical subject exists differently among 
those facts. Thus. the ethical meaning of the world will increase ('wax') or decrease ('wane') 
according to the ethical subjects allilude towards the facts - and part of what is required. we shall 
see. is that the subject sees the world as a whole. 
This whole process is. cmcially. and as with Sartre and the wilL a matter of relation. Both 
in terms of indi\"idual inwardness and with the world. Ethical reward. \\hat Wittgenstein calls a 
good or happy life. resides in the subjects relation to (a) his self (i.e. a matter of inwardness) and 
(b) the world. A good or happy (non-anxious) life is strived for in the terms set by the self 
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existing as a relation. The project is that of striving for what Wittgenstein calls a 'hannonious 
life' . 
Many remarks in the j\'otebooks endorse the notion of ethical reward being equated with the 
good and this in turn being equated with being happy. For example, 
I am either happy or unhappy, that is all. It can be said: good or evil do not exist. 
For e:\ample: it makes me unhappy to think that I have otTended such and such a man. Is 
that my conscience? Conscience is the voice of God. (NE, 8.7.16). 
And so, the imperative is unavoidable: 'I keep on coming back to this! simply the happy life is 
good, the unhappy bad' (NB 30.7.16). Ethical reward is a particular type of happiness - which is 
equated with the good. which is in cffect. good willing. Hence, 'The world of the happy [i.e. 
'good'] man is a different one from that of the unhappy man' (6.-n). It is abundantly clear 
that Wittgenstcin was ncver a hedonist in lifc (even if we stretch a point and claim that he may 
have been in his work). in the philosophical sense of identifying pleasure with moral motivation. 
The state of mind that Wittgenstein is in fact thinking of when he speaks of 'happy', is one of 
contentment. A statc of wcll bcing dcpcndent upon a conscience willing the good. Winch, in his 
essay on Willgenstein 's Ear~v Treatment Of Will (1968), reminds us that the attitude of the happy 
person would be 'one bascd on thc rccognition that the appearance of power created by the will 
qua phenomenon is an illusion'. He compares it to the 'patience' of Kierkegaard in Purity of 
Heart. A state of mind in which one wills the good. This may well be a useful observation, to 
which R.J. Cavilier (1980) also has a claim. Cavilier further states, that 
this attitllde of the willing .SII1~iect towards the world is an attitude we can characterise as 
an ethicall'elatiollship and (<In be appro:\imatcd most closely by Kierkegaard's person \\'ho 
is 'pure ofhearf and wills only to do the good. Such 'purity of heart' is solely a matter of 
the individuals personal appropriation of the ethical principle 'to do good'. (pp84) 
The ethical will alters how the world appcars. and thus has meaning for the self. 
The reference to Kicrkcgaard and 'the ethical relationship' provides an appropriate 
opportunity to link thc present sections on thc operative self in a conclusion that will introduce 
the self as a rdatum - for this concept. as found in Wittgenstein and Sartrc. has a clear. and most 
likelv conscious precedcnt in a work of Kicrkcgaard's. 
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(iii) Convergence: Operative self 
We have seen that in both Wittgenstein and Sartre the self - as metaphysical subject and 
prereflective cogito - develops into a self that is to be understood as existing, ontologically, as 
intentionality. The (metaphysical)-subject exists as intentionality, but does so as a willing relation 
to the world. As such. it finds itself committed to existing as a means of engaging with the world 
so as to procure a certain effect. To say that the self is operative is to say it exists as a means of 
altering the ,vay the subject sees - and therefore experiences - the world. Whereas, for 
Wittgenstein. the will as phenomena must be identified with the existence of the empirical 
subject, the ethical will lllllSt be identified with the metaphysical subject. This makes the 
metaphysical subject that which is the source of value: ethical reward and punishment is a matter 
of will - just as it is with Sartre. The ontological status of Wittgenstein's will is the same as its 
foundation the metaphysical subject: a relation (just as the ontological status of Sartre's will was 
the same as its foundation the prereflective cogito: a relation). It is this (subjective) relation - a 
willing relation - that constitutes meaning, in the sense most readily identified with 'existential 
meaning'. i.c. as that \"hich is in opposition to the absurd, that which solves Wittgenstein's 
'riddle' of existence. 
In fact. Wittgenstein's concept of ethical will introduces a cluster of important points that 
again move the enquiry forward and that again bear similarity to Sartre's position. The first thing 
to state is a point of divergence: there is no bi-polar account of ,vill found in the writings of 
Sartre. However, consideration of Sartre's position has still led to important matters of 
convergence. Although prima facie there is no bi-polar account of will there is a clear distinction 
between the will and the ·passions'. Will is differentiated from the passions in that it is said to be 
both 'better understood and explicitly posited' (EN ~.:J.3). Will is a means (a mode of 
consciousness, similar, only superior and therefore preferable to, the passions), by which the self 
alters the meaning of the given. the world. Sartre states that 'The difference here [between will 
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and passion] depends on the choice of means and on the degree of reflection and of making 
explicit, not on the end' (ibid.). Moreover, 
The will in fact is posited as a retlective decision in relation to certain ends. But it does not 
create these ends. It is rather a mode of being in ,'elation to them: it decrees that the pursuit 
of these ends will be rcll.:ctive and deliberate. (ibid. - my emphasis). 
'The will is in essence reOccti\'c. its goal is not so much to decide what end is to be attained; ... 
the profound intention of the will bears rather on the method of attaining this end already posited' 
(ibid.). The end has been posited by original freedom. This free choice at once precedes all 
deliberation and gives the context to all deliberations. The will is reflective; the original free 
choice is unreOecti\'e. 
Thus we can see that Sartre's will. like Wittgenstein's ethical will, is, as an intentional 
stmcture of consciousness. structurally identifiable with the self. It is not. as Wittgenstein's will is 
not. to be directly identified with 'effecting the given world of facts'; it is not en soi (a thing) nor 
contingent. It is not. as is Satire's passions and Wittgenstein's phenomenal will, psychological: 
the will is metaphysicaL it 'Mustn't be understood as an empty psychological desire, but as the 
transcendental structure of human reality' (WD 110). Again, as with Wittgenstein's ethical will, 
Sartre's will is a relation. both between itself and the world and between ego and subject: 'the 
relationship between consciousness and its 0\\,11 possibles' (WD 39). It is to be understood as a 
method or means for placing acts in a context. that is, a way of altering how the world - as (we 
shall see) a totality - appears for the subject. It is what introduces. creates value. Finally, though 
this point has not yet been put forward (see below ~5), it can also be identified with the 
philosophical self - indeed. it must be so identified. OWe can best pursue this point of comparison 
- the sense in which thc self does exist. as a relatum - by pursuing the notion through the 
modalities of 'program' and, especially. 'attitude'. 
§4.2 RELATUM - PROGRAMMATIC SELF 
In both the last section and in the exegesis of the last chapter there has been persistent 
reference to the nature of the non-substanti\'e self as a relatum. It is in this sense of relation that 
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we can say the self exists in the mode of 'attitude'. Because of the central importance of this 
concept. the need for critical clarification calls upon us. 
Self as a Relation - an historical context. The notion of a relation or relations, as opposed to 
dualism's. proliferates in the present century, in both scientific and philosophical thought. In 
science, the great influence has been set by the work of Heysenberg. A point not lost on Sartre: 
The progress of science has led to rejecting this notion of absolute objectivity. What Broglie 
is led to call '\:::\pcrience" is a systcm of univocal relations from which the observer is not 
excluded. If microphysics can regenerate the observer into the heart of the scientitic system, 
this is not by virtue of pure subjectivity - this meaning would have no more meaning than 
that ofpurc objectivity - bill as WI original relation to the world, as a place, as that toward 
which all envisaged relations are oriel/tated. Thus, for example, Heysenbcrg ... (BN 307 -
111y cmphasis). 
Besides the modern dominance of such a Yiew of self as a relation there is in the history of 
philosophy many variations on the notion. 7 Indeed, the originality of the present reading of 
Sartre and Wittgenstein extends no [1lI1her than that. Thus it is to be noted (as found in P. Morris 
[1975]) that Aristotle includes perception. knowledge, and attitudes among relations, and adds 
"the significance of all these is explained by a reference to something else [self-world] and in no 
other way" [Categories, 7.Gb 2~r (ppI8). Also, that Sartre shares his view of the self as a 
relation with William James, G.E. Moore8 and, likely, Brentano. But the philosophers whose 
philo-historical roles are most important to both Sartre and Wittgenstein are, pace Morris, those 
in the Existential tradition: Kierkegaard. Hegel. Heidegger and Buber. Those views on self as a 
relation in Hegel and Hcidcgger - and the later Wittgenstein - are given extensive treatment in 
Tugendhat's fine work on self-consciousness and self-relation, Self-consciousness and Self 
Determination (198G). 
Martin Bubcr, in his mantra like I and Thou, has 'In the beginning is the relation' (1970, 
ppG9). 'The world of experience belongs to the basic word I-It. The basic word I-You establishes 
7 There is a brief but clear contemporary discussion of some weaknesses in the view in E.J. Lowe 'Substance and 
Selfhood', Philosophy 66, 1991 
8 Cf. respectively 'Does Consciousness Exist' in Essays in Radical Empiricism and a Pluralistic Universe and 'The 
refutation of Idealism' in selected essays. 
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the world of relation' (56) ... The relation to the You is unmediated' (62), and this, the relation, 
prior to knowledge and memory. is a plunge 'from particularity into wholeness' (ibid.). Prior also 
to language, the relation is the eternal origin of art, a form is encountered that wants to become 'a 
work through him'; the form cannot be experienced or described 'and yet. I see it, radiant in the 
splendour of the confrontation ... not as a thing ... but as what is present'. This presence is the 
actual relation, 'it acts on me as J act on it' (61). thus it is discovery, it is creation. 
Whereas Buber stresses the pm1 of art in the self as a relation, Kierkegaard stresses the part 
of ethics. The latter's philosophical position on the self as a relation will be consulted below, for 
elucidation. It is to that and Sartre and Wittgenstein that we now turn. certain that the concept of 
self as a relation which they offer is no en Singular anomaly, that in fact, the history of 
philosophy will revcal that any COI1\"Crgence between them on this matter is to be expected, as a 
view of self as a relation was in the air they both breathed, and has indeed dominated both sides 
of 'the divide' this century. 
Sclf as Relation: SaI1rc-Wittgenstcin. In the account (above) of Sartre's early self it emerged 
that '[Man and the world are relative beings], and the principle of their being is the relation', 
that. 'the first relation proceeds from human reality to the world' (BN 308). The self as operative 
intentionality (,vill) has made it clear that the reason for insisting that consciousness is a relation 
is that consciousness is intentional. Throughout Being and Nothingness it is made clear that all 
consciousness, intentional as it is. has the stmcture of lack, of incompleteness with respect to 
some particular object or state of affairs. There is of course a difference as to whether the object of 
consciousness is physical or mental. these being two distinguishable relations. Such a distinction 
also allO\\"s for the (Sartri~ln) fact that the intended object need not. if it is mental. actually exist, a 
unicorn is still the object the consciousness of which guarantees the difference between itself and 
the subject that 'thinks' it: internal conscious relations do not necessitate a physically existing 
object. And further. the fundamental relation is not between consciousness and world, but 
between consciousness and itself. the foundation of which is 'lack'. 'There is a type of negation 
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which establishes an internal rclation ... of all internal relations, the one which penetrates most 
deeply into being '" is lack' (BN 86). All consciousness is self-consciousness, where this internal 
relation is posited reciprocally to the object of consciousness which characterises the intending 
act of consciousness9 : 'The being which is released to the intuition of human reality is always 
that to which some thing is lacking-i.e., the existing' (BN 86). And so 'the being of human 
reality is originally not a substance but a lived relation' (BN 575). 
Similarly, as was seen, Wittgenstein's account is built around the following premise: 'The 
will seems always to have to relate to an idea .... The will is an altitude of the subject to the 
world. (NB.f. 11.16; pR6-7). In actual fact the concept of 'relation' plays a significant role in the 
Tractatus. Although what follows is concerned solely with the relational function regarding the 
self, it is appropriate that wc here note the deep interrelated source of such a view (not least, it 
lends supp0l1 to the passilll claim to Tractatarian continuity between logic, language, self and 
aesthetics). In this, due to the authors - linguistic - approach, I can do no better than quote from 
an instmctive article, intentionali(v and Se(f in the Tractatus. 10 The author (Rosenberg) throws 
into relief an underlying principle which holds together our main theme, the connection between 
the Tracfaflls' dipm1ite ontology, relations, showing and self. Thus, commenting on 
Wittgenstein's account of the relation between propositions and facts-objects, 
Genuine relations relatl.! objects and objects only .... Relation-expressions relate names. 
Namcs denote objects. Facts are not nameable. And, so, no genuine relation can relate 
objects and facts. Yet objccts and facts do stand in relations - objects, for example, ellter 
into facts - and so we are brought to the threshold of a second theme of ineffability in 
Wittgenstein. 
A rdation, so-caJlcd, betwccn object and fact or between fact and fact Calmot be a genuine 
rdation. For Wittgcnstcin it is \\'hat he caJls variously afonllal relation, a pseudo relation, a 
structural relation, or an il/lemal relation. And fonnal relations belong to the realm of what 
can be ShO\\ll. "What can be ShO\\ll, cannot be said" (4.1212) (Rosenberg, 1968, pp345). 
9The relation between these relations is of great importance to exposition/understanding of the self per se - but is 
not essential to the present inquiry. Without belittling the complexity or importance of the question we can note, and 
support for this will be offered indirectly, that the inner relation must be more fundamental than the outer, though not 
therefore primary: both are primary, drawing on CUltural/social factors of external relation. 
10 Jay F. Rosenberg, 'Intentionality and Self in the Tractatus', Nous, Vol.2, 1968. 
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Rosenberg then refers us to propositions 4.121 and the following 4.125: 'The existence of an 
internal relation between possible situations rfacts] expresses itself in language by means of an 
internal relation by means of the proposition representing them'. Now, on the face of it there is 
some similarity between Wittgenstein's concept of self and Hume's bundled self (cf. §3). Only 
Wittgenstein's account includes the answer to the central problem of what holds all impressions 
etc. together as a bundle. Broadly characterising for present purposes Hume's impressions, 
experiences, etc. as 'facts', Rosenberg's analysis revealed that for Wittgenstein 'there are 
relations between facts, and, thus. if the self is a bundle of facts, there can be a relation which 
holds it together as a bundle. But since the relations obtain among facts. they cannot be genuine 
relations but must be, one and all. formal. relations' (ibid., pp349). He then shows that, for 
Wittgenstein at least, a (propositional) point of view 'is marked off not by varying personal 
indices but rather by internal relations among a set of propositions (i.e. "facts")'. This being the 
case, 
Th~ binding of facts into a single bundle \\hich constitutes a person is accomplished by 
those facts all b~ing intemally rdated to one another in such a way that the set of fonnal 
relations marks otYand is jointl\' constitutive of a single point of view' (ibid., pp353). 
This has important consequences, ones that Wittgenstein is fully expectant of, including the 
single point of view of solipsism. 'J am my world' (5.63). Also, clearly, these formal relations can 
only be shown (no wonder Hume had to give up, the self can indeed only be shown). Similarly, 
returning the analysis to the self-world relation, this too can only be shown, by the formal 
relations which pertain between facts that constitute the self and facts that constitute others. Thus, 
in the most fundamental of senses, the self is, for Wittgenstein, a relatum: and it is just this fact, 
logically. ontologically. and semantically embedded, that ties the self to the ineffable and the 
possibility that it can be shown. 
In saying that the self becomes or is the self in its cognitive activities as a relation to itself 
and the world ,ye mcan no morc. hopefully, than Kierkegaard in the infamous opening pages to 
The Sickness IInto Death. from which. in the hope of elucidation, the opening t\\O paragraphs. 
The human being is a spirit. But \\"hat is a spirit"' Spirit is the self. But what is the self? 
Th~ self is a relation \\"hich relatt::s to itself, or that in th~ relation which is its relating to 
itself. The self is not the relation but the relation's relating to itself. A human being is the 
s~11thesis of the infinite and the finite. of the temporal and the demal, of freedom and 
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necessity. In short a s~'nthesis A s~'nthesis is a relation between two tenns. Looked at in 
this \\(tV a human heing is not ~'ct a self. 
In a relation between two things the relation is the third tenn in the fonn of a negative 
unity', and the two relate to the relation, and in the relation to that relation; this is what it is 
from the point of view of soul for soul and body to be in relation. If, on the other hand, the 
relation relates to itself, then this relation is the positive third, and this is the self. 
(Kierkegaard, 1989, pp43) 
It is clear from this, I think, that the self is a relation which relates to itself, by which first 
of all we mean, as with Wittgenstein and Sartre, that it is not a substance, an entity or thing. 
Kierkegaard calls it spirit - a term that is congenial to Wittgenstein but nauseous to Sartre. 
Terminology aside, this self is a relation, a synthesis between that which is infinite, eternal, 
necessary, and finite, temporal. free. The edifying factors in the first set of terms indicate the 
presence and omniscience of God (and do so for all three philosophers). Indeed, the former trinity 
of terms, it has been noted. 'represents a goal of human endeavour. a fundamental goal, on a par 
with Sartre's 'useless passion' 11. As Kierkegaard says in another work, 'consciousness exists 
only according to its possibility' 12. 
The self exists as a relation between its situationedness (history. place, etc.) and its ideal of 
selfllood. The self is not identified with consciousness, but with the activity of consciousness 
(intentionality and will): 'consciousness in its inmost nature is a relation to a transcendent being' 
(BN xxxvi). Hence. if the self is. as Kierkegaard says. a relation to itself, then the self is 
consciousness related to itself. i.e. its consciousness of itself: self-consciousness. Naturally, in 
such a synthesis, self-consciousness cannot. for Kierkegaard and Sartre at least, be divorced from 
consciousness of world (nor. 1 am sure, for Wittgenstein: 'The world and life are one' [5.621]), 
self-consciousness is always accompanying the world. self-consciousness requiring, pace Hegel, a 
relationship to concrete actuality: here then. the attempt noted (above) by Merleau-Ponty to place 
the self between the two classical views. 
11 A. Hannay, in his Introduction to Kierkegaard (1989), pp22 
12 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments (1985), pp170 - amongst a faSCinating inquiry into this concept of self as 
relation. 
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Here is Sartre, using the language of Hegel to paraphrase the view of Kierkegaard to put 
forward his own view. 
Being, as w\.! hav\.! saiu, is th\.! in-itself·for-itself, consciousness becomes substance, 
suhstance bccomcs the cause of itself, the Man-God. Thus the being of human reality is 
originally not a substance hut a liwu relation. The limiting tenns of the relation are first' the 
original In-itself, fixed in its contingency and facticity, its essential characteristic being that 
it is, that it \.!xists; and second, the In-itself-for-itself or value, which exists as the Ideal of 
the contingent In-itself and which is characterised as beyond all contingency and all 
existence. (13N 575) 
In order that the self, as (a self-consciousness) relation, can progress from the 'negative' to the 
'positive' set of terms, from contingency to necessity (the 'beyond' of Sartre), from its 'natural' 
situation to its 'Ideal', requires that the self is aware of the positive aspect. This will entail - for 
all three philosophers - self-knowledge: in terms of ethical meaning (passilll) 13. Self-knowledge 
is of one-self as a synthesis of the two possibilities. This is necessary in Kierkegaard that the self 
avoid the despair that is brought on by 'the biggest danger, that of losing oneself 14. To lose 
oneself is to be ignorant of the presence of God which is oneself as the synthesis one is. The 
search for self-knowledge - ethical meaning, central to choice in Kierkegaard, is integral to 
choice and the problematic of self in Wittgenstein and Sartre. 
While attempting to enlighten the account of the relational self through some comments by 
Kierkegaard, I have naturally enough introduced the Kiekegaardian (and Wittgensartrian) ethical 
dimension. This is appropriate as the emphasis will increasingly fall on the ethical (and aesthetic) 
as we proceed \"ith 'programmatic' and 'attitude' into the final chapter. 
• Programmatic self 
By programmatic I mean only that the operational self conforms itself. as a relation to both 
it-self and the world, to a systematic and pre-established pattern conforming to its foundation: the 
cogito or the metaphysical subject (see §3.2). It exists as a relation to both itself and the world, 
13 The nature of this Kierkegaardian synthesis which structures the self as a relation is by its very constitution 
ethical. The constant process of choice and striving and the demand on - ethical - self-knowledge all bear down on 
an ethical existence - again, no different to what we are finding in Wittgenstein and Sartre. 
14 Kierkegaard (1989), pp62 
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and, as wilL it is a method that aIters how the world - as a whole - appears for the subject. 
Sartre's wilL likc Wittgenstein's ethical will, is, as an intentional structure of consciousness, 
structurally identifiable with the self. constituting it as a methodological structure of 
conSCIOusness. 
The self so constituted as programmatic is, as stated, also creative: a way of bestowing 
sense (sinn) - and hence value - on an otherwise neutrally given world. The world is already 
given (to intentionality), and lacks in that primitive experience sense-and-meaning. For both 
philosophers, value is a matter of subjectivity, of choosing - willing - a particular project as is 
suggested by one's attitude to the world as a whole or totality. 
But then, is there a right or preferable way to see oneself and the world? such that, say, acts 
can be placed in a context that has meaning - and what does this mean? And if so, what would it 
involve that \\'C can see the self. our self, and the world in this way? And moreover, what would 
be the advantagc for the self - or for that mattee what reason is there to will any particular 
project? Finally, what. origina/(\'. must be the nature or natural state of the programmatic self -
i.e. prior to seeing the world in a particular or 'right' way. It is to these issues we now turn. 
~4.3 ATTITUDE (NATURAL) 
It has bccn strcsscd that the operational sclf is programmatic. The malO claim of this 
section is that thc way to undcrstand the formal principle of the self as programmatic IS as 
'attitude': central to the problcmatic is a PaI1icular attitude that each philosopher commends - the 
aesthetic attitude ('attitude' is of course familiar to aesthetics. and it is this traditional concept 
that will be drawn on). The usc of attitude in the Tractatus and the Notebooks is less complex and 
less divcrse than in Sartre's works. and can be stated fairly concisely - moreover, in essentials it 
- . 
agrees with the 'hybrid' concept that is bcing designated as Sartre's (early) position. Thus as a 
matter of mcthod the Tractarian vcrsion shall be used to summarise those points of convcrgence 
with Sartre that \\c shall takc forward to the final chapter. 
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Satire. 'Attitude' meant originally something like our 'disposition' or 'fitness'. By the mid 19th 
century it had acquired. in France. Germany and Britain, variants of meaning that were being 
technically employed: these included the following two. (a) A posture of the body proper to 
something or the implying of some action or mental state, and, (b). an (habitual) mode of 
regarding anything 15. 
It would be perverse to call Sartre an attitudinarian - but only for the singular reason that he 
does not study attitudes for themselves. However, the role of attitude in Sartre's philosophy is 
extremely complex and far reaching (as I shall attempt to indicate), especially in Being and 
Nothingness. Sartre believes. in fact. that both Philosophy's and his own perennial concern, that 
of the subject-object relation. is as all problems existential are. a matter of relations as attitudes16. 
And as one diligent scholar has noticed. 'Ontology is only possible in relation to the human 
being. Being and human thought and attitude are inextricably interrelated and covariant' (Fell, 
1979, pp362). 
The problem of Being and ;\'o/hil1gness is, in fact, 'the relation of man with the world'. The 
inquiI)' undertaken will lead to the 'heart of being' and will. therefore. require 'a single pattern 
which can serve us as a guiding thread in our inquiry'. And indeed, the author of Being and 
Nothingnes's himself. 'this man that 1 alll'. must. he tells us. be apprehended as standing 'before 
being in an attitude of interrogation'. The inquiry will be 'not simply the objective totality of the 
words printed on this page. rfor] it is indifferent to the symbols which express it. In a word, it is a 
human attitude filled with meaning' (BN -1-). Therefore. Sartre continues in this the first chapter, 
the first question to consider before we proceed with the inquiI)' will be 'What does this attitude 
15 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 
16 The notion of 'attitude' may indeed be familiar to existentialist philosophy since Husserl; but In Bergson we find 
the idea that in concentrating on internal experience only, in abandoning practical orientations, in adopting an attitude 
of disinterested contemplation, we perceive pure duree. Note that it is just this disinterested attitude that we will be 
ultimately concerned with, and note Bergson's 'superficial' and 'profound' self in comparison to the dual account 
offered above, and note also (§2, fn.15) how in Bergson symbols are used to convey indirectly states of mind or soul. 
Finally, note that Bergson, and not any or one of 'The Three H's' was the first philosopher that Sartre give serious 
study to; first loves never leave us, though we may run to all corners of id and ego. 
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reveal to us?' (BN ..t.). The answer. of course. is Nothingness. which is 'the original condition of 
the questioning attitude' and. 'more generally of all philosophical or scientific inquiry' (EN 11). 
At the outset of Being and Xothingness then, the reader is made aware that in the process of 
reading (s)he is engaged in a relationship with 'a human attitude filled with meaning': with the 
printed \\'ords. symbols, acting as a mere mediator. Similarly, the reader himself. as a relation to 
the text is an attitude in relation to the text (see also, §2.3iv). 
What then, to continue. is the connection between attitude and the self as a relation? Sartre, 
with an almost inexhaustible amount of terms and expressions that appear to beg the question but 
which actually belie the difficulty of signifying the signifier, refers to the attitudinal-self variously 
as, for example, the cogito. nothingness. original spontaneity. original negation, or as that which 
is 'to nihilate' (neantiser) or as a 'nihilation' (neantisation). This does not help, perhaps, but the 
problem is one that this whole dissertation is sympathetic to: whatever it is, the self is Not, and 
will not be pinned down by ordinary language - this much we know for certain to be Sartre's 
position (passin/). At this juncture. two further points of certainty regarding the self can be 
(re)stated. the second being our point of arrival. Firstly, that whatever the self as a not is, it is best 
understood as a relation. existing both to it-self and to the world: 'The for-itself is the foundation 
of all negativity and of all relation. The for-itseffis a relation'. (BN 362). Its existence consists in 
directing negations both outward toward the world and inward toward it-self. Secondly, that such 
'directing' is a matter of attitude: 'The human being is not only the being by whom l1l?gatites are 
disclosed in the world: he is also the one who can take negative attitudes with respect to himself 
(BN 47). Negatites are types of human activities-experiences that contain negativity as part of 
their structure (i.e. involving lack. absence. destruction). Naturally, for Sartre, such negatites 
permeate human experience. but note that humans can 'also ... take negative attitudes'. This 
suggests that the ensemble of desires. passions and will that freely and spontaneously constitutes 
itself as a motivation (lJIohile). and which (we recall - above §-I-.2i) is apprehended in the motif 
(lJIotij). and which together with the act forms 'the three indissoluble terms of ... consciousness'. 
17-' 
this suggests that they arc part of a synthesis. a modality of which is just those negative attitudes 
which appear to either determine or give existential meaning to being-in-the world. 
However, whatever the self as synthesis is. it cannot be, and is in fact neither determined 
nor given: we are still dealing with a freedom. What is given and determinate is the relation: 
between a negation or freedom (subjectivity) and a situation. The directing of negations is what 
we call an 'attitude', and this is, as we would expect, chosen. Naturally, this being the case, a 
description of all attitudes ('active' or directed relations) to both self and world would be an 
impossible or endless task - they being 'too diverse'. Therefore, as to the 'attitudes of negation 
toward the self. rather than study these 'internal negations' in general, Sartre prefers 'to 
examine one ... attitude which is essential to human reality and which' in fact, is such that it is 
that consciousness which 'instead of directing its negation outward turns it toward itself. This 
attitude. it seems to me. is had faith' (BN -l7f). Because of its reflexive importance bad faith is 
seen as a basic attitude. As far as the relation between self and world is concerned the basic 
relation would seem to be ·conflict'. Conflict is the original relation with Others, and for this 
reason it exists either in good faith or in bad faith, for the for-itself must constantly use its 
freedom to continue in any sub-relation with the Other. Two 'basic attitudes' to the world are 
possible - this much is in fact stated on the contents page of Being and Nothingness. For Part 
Three, Chapter 3 is. we are told. concerned with 'Concrete Relations with Others'. Sartre offers 
what turn out to be the two basic (and opposed) directed-relations with the other: 'I. First Attitude 
towards the Other'. 'II. Second Attitude toward the Other'. As to these two basic attitudes, it is, 
Sartre says at the opening of the actual section. 'arbitrary to begin with the one as with the other' 
(BN 36-l): for each attitude is the very being of the for-itself in its original upsurge as a nihilation 
and as a relation. Moreover. to account for some of the diversity in our 'concrete relations with 
the Other' each rc1ation is then further sub-divided (,Love, Language, Masochism'; 'Indifference, 
Desire, Hate. Sadism '). From these foundational (freely chosen) attitudes psychological states of 
consciousness follow. The foundational relations to self and world are, however. 
not simple specitications of the fundamental relation. Although each one of them includes 
within it the orig.in~d relation "ith the Other as its essential structure and its foundation, 
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thc\' are entirely nc\\ modes of bcing on the part of the for-itself. In fact the\' represent the 
various attitudes of the lor-itself in a world where there are Others. (BN 361) 
It was noted above that no matter whether the self, in a given situation, is said to be either 
reflective (will) or passionate (emotional), either position taken to the world remains a 'subjective 
attitude', and this 'in relation to a transcendent end' - i.e. the fundamental project. 
Here then, with the modality of self as attitude, the programmatic aspect of self becomes 
clearer. Operational intentionality is as a willing relation to the world. Certain relations are more 
fundamental than others - that of bad faith, that of conflict. They are foundational - by which we 
mean, partly, that they must be understood as metaphysical (psychological states of consciousness 
follow from these attitudes). This certainly suggests that they arc 'given' - and thus introduces the 
possibility that they are determinate. But. as stated, this last move docs not suit Sartre, so that the 
self becomes programmatic in a complete sense: the relation between subjectivity and situation 
constitutes a pre-established foundational relation which, however, must be appropriated by the 
self. The constituting or realising of such appropriation is what we call an attitude. It is the 
attitude of the subject that carries ethical meaning into the world. 
Wittgcnstcin. 'My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul', so says WiUgenstein in the 
Philosophical investigations. The role of attitude in the Tractatus and Notebooks is, as stated, 
less complex than it is in Sartre's philosophy. Indeed, Wittgenstein's position is so 
straightforward that when earlier we spoke of the metaphysical subject and its identification to 
ethical will we also encountered his notion that this, the metaphysical subject, the ethical will, is, 
with attitude. to be understood as a synthesis. 
In confronting the problem of the nature of the self as a relation, to it-self and between its 
(ethical) self and the \vorld. Wiltgenstcin says. on September 10th 1916, that 'Now at last the 
connection between ethics and the \vorld has to be made clear'. After further deliberation the 
solution appears three weeks later. 
The \\·ill seems al\\a\'s to have to rclate to an idea. We cannot imagine, e.g., having 
can-ied out an ael of \vill \\ithout having detected that we have canied it out. Otherwise 
there might arise slich a qllestion as whether it had yet been completely can-ied out. It is 
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clear, so to speak, that \\ c need a foothold for the will in the \\orId. TIle \\·ill is an attitude 
of the suhject to the world. (NB, 4. I I. 16; p86-7). 
The ethical will (i.e. the metaphysical subject) IS not, we know. a psychological 
phenomenon. Willing is a matter of how one \'iews the world: the attitude one adopts17. Willing 
is methodological - that is. programmatic. It is concerned. as the above statement dearl\' shows 
. , 
with the relation between the subject and the world. 'r am placed in [the world] like my eye in its 
visual field' (NB 73, 11.6.16). Such that. 'The situation is not simply that r eveI)'where notice 
where r see anything. but I always find myself at a particular point of my visual space, so my 
visual space has as it were a shape'18 (NB 86. 17.10.16). The willing or metaphysical subject 
shapes the world. and does so by adopting a certain attitude toward it. 'The subject is the willing 
subject' and 'The "ill is an altitude [,','/cllungnahahllle 1 of the subject to the world' (NB 87. 
4.11.16). 
Conclusion. The account of the self that can only be shown, the self as value, as operative, 
programmatic. this account of self has centered on a convergent concept of will. This will was 
found to be identified "ith the (mctaphysical)-subject. to be the source of (ethical) meaning and, 
as attitude, it offers the direct possibility of converting from the natural to the aesthetic attitude 
and thus providing the problematic ,,·ilh its solution. It is to these final - now aesthetic - issues 
that attention is now directed. 
17 Although much of Wittgenstein's treatment of will and self as noumenal/phenomena derives from Schopenhauer, 
including the 'eye' and 'ladder' analogies, this concept of attitude is not, as far as I know, found in Schopenhauer. 
But interestingly, as Brian McGuinness has shown in his The Mysticism of the Tractatus (1966), the idea is almost 
certainly borrowed - or was conceived with - Russell, who expresses it in his Mysticism and Logic. It is believed that 
Wittgenstein at least read this work in 1912-13 (cf. Introduction). 
18 And Schopenhauer: 'The I or the ego is the dark point in consciousness, just as on the retina the precise point of 
entry of the optic nerve is blind ... and the eye sees everything except itself (WWR, II, pp491). 
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§5 
Dis-Solving the Absurd Riddle?:- The Aesthetic: 
Determination and Deed 
It is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the world 
are eternally justified. 
(Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 5) 
As an aesthetic phenomenon existence is still bearable for us, Art 
furnishes us with the good conscience to be able to turn ourselves 
into such a phenomenon. 
(Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 107) 
Aesthetically the miracle is that the world exists. That there is 
what there is. There is certainly something in the conception that 
the end of art is the beautiful. And the beautiful is what makes 
happy .... The happy life is justified, of itself, it is the only right life. 
(Wittgenstein, Notebooks) 
The sole purpose of an absurd existence was indefinitely to 
produce works of art that escaped it. That was its sole 
justification ... It was really a morality of salvation through art. 
(Sartre, War Diaries) 
One thing is needful - to 'give style' to one's character - a great 
and rare art! It is practiced by those who survey all the strengths 
and weaknesses of their natures and then fit them into an artistic 
plan until everyone of them appears as art and reason and even 
weakness delights the eye. 
(Nietzsche, The Gay Science). 
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A special wrenching-free from ordinary reference is required to make reference itself the 
suhject of discourse. (Danto. Sarff'e) 
The present chapter moves the emphasis onto the aesthetic dimension of showing, and completes 
the problematic. The first two sections of this chapter are transitional. taking the inquiry to the 
aesthetic and opening the way for our conclusions. To facilitate this shift in emphasis the links 
between 'showing' and 'showing as aesthetic principle' are clarified (at §5.1) and by the 
following means. (a) Summary of the key points of the problematic framework. (b) Statement on 
'absurd riddle' (the ethical dimension of the problematic). Next (at §5.2), the pre-condition to the 
solution is given: the convergent thesis that ethics and aesthetics are one and the same. 
The solution itself is considered at §5.3, in two parts. Firstly, aesthetic determination: the 
self resolving the problematic of it-self by choosing itself (a relation) as an aesthetic attitude. Here 
the attitudinal self is discussed through the aesthetic concepts of disinterestedness and sub specie 
aeternitatis. Secondly. aesthetic deeds: self and the disclosure of the solution. Here the works 
Tractatus and Nausea are discussed as the paradigms of the early philosophy, and as the 
conclusion to the present thesis. 
The thesis ends with a PostScript. §5A. which comments upon (a) Sartre's potential 
ambivalence with. and Wittgenstein's embracement of. the aesthetic solution and, following on 
from this, (b), the most imp0l1ant critical consequence of the problematic of the lingua-aesthetic-
self and determination: that as a solution to the ethical meaninglessness of life, it actually fails, at 
least it fails theoretically. as it is found to rest. as Sartre saw clearly, on a logical flaw, in that it is 
based on an inherent self-deception. Still. it will be concluded, as a concrete and existential 
solution to the moral dilemma of self. the aesthetic approach can - or must on pain of absurdity -
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be seen to work. as is clear from the final positions of Wittgenstein and indeed Sartre himself. 
§5.1 PROBLEMATIC STATED: SELF, SHOWING, SHOWING AS AESTHETICS 
+Two Preliminary Remarks 
It is neither possible nor desirable to give an account of either Sartre's or Wittgenstein's 
(early) Aesthetics. Such an account would have to be inclusive, besides the artist, spectator and 
the art object. the ontological and semantic commitments of the system that supports the aesthetic 
would have to be considered. Clearly. by the time the present work is concluded it will in fact 
have involved some discussion of ontology, semantics. art object etc. - but not as a unified 
critique of an inclusive system that supports an Aesthetic.} Whereas in the present work we are 
concerned solely with the aesthetics of showing within the problematic of the self. An effect of 
this concern is that it takes liS. like a path. through any aesthetic that the early Sartre or 
Wittgenstein would have. Gi\'cn the context of our discussion this is not a bad thing, but 
moreover, our final destination. aesthetic determination and its presentation or communication, 
is, I am claiming. the culmination of their philosophical systems, the use to which any early 
aesthetic would aspire. It is as if. as in Kant the aesthetic is important exactly because, though it 
is situated \\'ithin the system. it surpasses that system. As if. to mention only Wittgenstein, Sartre 
and Kant these philosophers recognise the conformities of science, the schemata of logic, and the 
paradoxical contingency of existence. as that \\'hich imprisons human potential. But that, the 
aesthetic. and only the aesthetic. they claim. will open the door to Being and freedom and ethics, 
to the possibility of getting outside the system. that the self and not the situation may determine 
itself (or, as the case may be. position itself 'nowhere' for objectivity - though not pure and 
1 Sartre and Wittgenstein do have an aesthetic, though it would have to be drawn out of the philosophy. With 
Wittgenstein this might be difficult, for the characteristic reason that he has so little to say on traditional aesthetic 
topics. Where Sartre is concerned, many of his key works do discuss topics central to aesthetics (imagination, art 
works, artists, beauty, the world as a whole) Such discussions are found mainly in the early works, The Psychology 
of Imagination, What is Literature?, the Essays on Aesthetics, Nausea and the scattered passages on 'beauty' 
which occur throughout the writings, especially in Being and Nothingness. But also, there is Sartre's extensive 
writings on artists, on the poets Mallarme, Baudelaire, Genet, Flaubert, on painters such as Tintorreto and 
Lapoujade, and sculptor Giacometti. 
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transcendent. cf. comments cspecially at §3.li). With this, our first preliminary point can be 
stated: central to thc concept of aesthctic experience and the attempt for 'nowhere' III 
Wittgenstein and Sartrc is a Kantian aesthetic principle, distance or disinterestedness. 
The sccond prcliminary remark is introduced by 'disinterestedness'. The following aesthetic 
considerations do indecd compel thcmseh'cs upon a theory of art and the ineffable (as discussed 
above - cspccially § I). Thc idcntification of art with the aesthetic here giYcn is not taken lightly 
(see especially §2. I). The concept of disintcrestedncss, of disinterested attitude pertains, 
traditionally and in S,u1re and Wittgenstein, to the nature of aesthetic experience. Reciprocally, 
traditionally. and in Sartre and Wittgenstein, art is, amongst other things, something that must be 
experienced at a distancc, brackctcd. And, the further point. disinterestedness prevails in our 
proper - distanced - appreciation of art. Art and acsthetics can, and do in Sartre and Wittgenstein, 
entail each othcr. In the present case, this is apparent in that the aesthetic attitude reciprocates an 
art object an aesthetic dccd, both defined in terms of distance and disinterestedness. For 
Wittgenstein and Sartrc. art and acsthetics are reciprocal and do, in the present problematic, 
entail each other. 
A word of caution is herc called for: there is little in either Wittgenstein's or Sartre's 
aesthetics as covcred hcrc which is new2. What is unusuaL as compared to say Plato, Kant or 
Dewey, is that thcir ontology is an aesthetic and thcir acsthetic is an ontology. What is new and 
what justifics the following discllssion, is threc-fold: the identification of the aesthetic attitude 
with the linglla-sclf and thc preceding doctrincs, notably 'showing; the rcsulting overall vision of 
self; the claim to another and final area of com'crgence between Wittgenstein and Sartre. 
2 Certainly, aspects of Sartre's philosophy of art are not traditional. His out and out dislike of closure - as always a 
closure-on-freedom - leads him to reject representation and imitation. Similarly, the contemporary attempts by 
philosophers of art to justify art as ideology (Lucas, Adorno, Benjeman, Mackery) must be rejected: such art would 
enclose, fix, or solidify or define an ideology: it would say; it would not show, be open, suggestive or expressive of 
freedom (Nausea offers many examples of this, such as the portraits of the bourgeoisie in the Municipal Gallery). In 
this aesthetic there is discernible, perhaps, another problem for the proposed synthesis with Marxism, and the 
source of the inferiority of his later plays etc. compared to his earlier work - that is: in the later works aesthetic 
qualities are consumed by social and political exegesis/description; the balance between saying-showing is all but 
lost in favour of the former: closure has been re-introduced, in this case, by Marxist ideology. 
(I) FRAMEWORK - ETHICS (ABSURD-RIDDLE) 
In the previous chapters the account of both language and self lead to an underlying 
principle, that which was termed, after Witlgenstein. 'showing', This section \\ill clarify those 
aspects of the above thesis which characterise showing as an aesthetic principle, or at least, a 
logical principle which entails. besides an ontological, metaphysical and linguistic aspect, an 
aesthetic aspect. Whether this principle should be spoken of as unitary with qualities or aspects, 
or pluralistic. is a point of interpretation of little present significance. The evidence suggests that 
showing is. in fact. a pluralistic principle. to be understood. as is the metaphysical subject, in 
terms of modalities. For present purposes the salient point is that at an effective level the 
principle is necessarily and sufficiently aesthetic. as the remainder of this thesis will confirm. 
FI'amcwol'I{. Here is briefly assembled the key aspects of the lingua-self framework that 
constitute showing as aesthetic. Language is bipolar; one pole. 'ordinary': bedeutung, 
signification, (representation). limited to describing Facts (including the psychological) and 
world of phenomena. and which cannot say anything about the world as a whole or totality: the 
realm of 'saying'. The second pole. 'poetic': Ie sens, sinn, (expression), the presupposition to the 
former, identified with Value and the world as a whole. and which itself cannot be represented: 
the realm of 'showing'. Moreover. the self is co-structurally bipolar to language: empirical and 
metaphysical. the latter. the 'rca\' i.e. foundational self. is non-substantive, identified with the 
world as a whole (Willgenstein) or totality (Sartre) and is non-encounterable - both reflexively 
and outwardly. it docs not exist in the world of (ordinary) experience. Only the empirical self is 
in the world, the subject of experience, and represented by language. The metaphysical subject 
can only be ShOll'll to exist. FUl1hermore, for Sartre. the self itself is often spoken in terms of a 
work of art, as (a) an 'unreality', (a negatite), strongly identified with the imagination (cf. 
comments under §2.1ii). And also. (b), and so too for Witlgenstein. the self is. foundationally, 
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self-crcative). (Cr. §-L espccially §-l.l iii and the ontological status of the self as a relatum). 
'Crcativity'. it should bc rcmcmbered. is a prominent sub-theme in Being and Nothingness. In the 
Notebooks/or an Ethics it is less of a sub-theme: 'Evcry action is creation, creation of the world, 
of myself, and of man'. whcther thc action stems from an artist or a subordinate in a factory (NE 
129). Although the self-crcative non-substantive (mctaphysical)-subject is said not to exist in the 
world, there is of coursc 'a sense' in which the self exists, is in the world. The self is a relation, 
both to it-self and to the world. This wc saw is a matter of operative intentionality (involving 
will) that is programmatic - a systcmatic synthesis of consciousness constituting itself as a 
method of altcring how the world appears. This methodological structure of consciousness is 
understood, finally and fundamcntally. as an 'attitude' to the world: it is this that secures the 
ethical-aesthctic dimension. 
'Absurd riddle'. It appcars to somc. to many. that life is either absurd (Sartre) or it is a riddle 
(Wittgenstein). An ethically mcaningless life would be an absurd life. and it is just this which is 
identifiable \\'ith Wittgcnstcin's 'riddle'. Wittgenstein's philosophical concern with the meaning 
of life is. in fact. as cxistential as anything in Sartre or Hcidegger: though Wittgenstein's 
philosophical framework and solution cxplicitly exclude him for speaking at any length upon it. 
Nonetheless. somc commcnts arc madc: 
What do I know ahout God and the meaning oflilc') (NB 11.6.16) 
But is it possihk for onc so to livc that life stops being problematic? (NB 6.7.16) 
Ifthcre is u valuc \\hich is ofvuluc, it must lie outside all happening and being so. For 
all happening and hcing so is accidcntal (0, 6.41) 
(Our prohlems are not ahstract hut perhaps the most concrete that there are (0,5.5563). 
The solution of the riddk of litc in space and time lies outside space and time 
(0,6.4312). 
Such remarks indicatc \\hat the major doctrines of the Tractatus imply: a concern to preserve 
Value, those spccific values which are constitutive of the individual as. to borrow a term from 
Sartre. thc 'universal singular'. Thcse values. including for Wittgenstcin the will of God, are 
threatcncd by a scicntific or mcchanistic approach which is in fact according to Wittgenstein, 
3This echoes Nietzsche, which is no surprise. Cf. below, Conclusion I (and Introduction). 
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'founded on an illusion' (6.371). This. that 'the so-called la\\"s of nature are the explanations of 
natural phenomena' (6.372)4. In the present age the modern system 'makes it look as if 
everything were explained'. The lIIystiche, however, is not and cannot be explained (above, §2.2). 
Explanations are limited to facts and not values: 'the only necessity is logical necessity' (6.375) 
and 
Even if all that we wish for were to happen, still this would only be a favour granted by 
fate, so to speak: for there is no logical cOlUlcction between the will and the world, which 
would guarantee it, and the supposed physical connection is surely not something we could 
will. (6.374 - cf. also, §4.1 ii). 
So much for the modern system. Wittgenstein continues that although there were also 
problems with the ancient conception of the world. which treated 'God and Fate' as 'inviolable', 
the ancicnt conccption at least had the mcrit of recognising 'a clear and acknowledged terminus': 
'the world is indcpcndcnt of my will' (6.373)5 The terminus is drawn. it is God, and of the 'two 
godheads' it is the viable God of self 'my indepcndent ''1'' , ovcr against the world. From this 
standpoint only will the 'riddle' be sol\'ed and 'life stop being problematic' 
So much has been said on Sal1re's and the existentialist's clamour for ethical meaning in an 
othenvise absurd univcrse that it is suffice to conclude thus. That overall, life is either absurd or a 
riddle when. as is thc natural relation to the world, no non-relative meaning can be found, where 
by 'meaning' \\c intcnd cthical valuc. Such mcaning cannot according to the Tractatus and 
Nausea (and the other early works) bc found in the world. All that is in the world is contingent; 
ethical "alue. unless it wcrc to bc relative, and not then Value, would have to come from outside 
the world (cL abo\'e. §·t 1 i-ii) - but is that possible? 
The framework and thc absurd riddle proffer an aesthetic 'yes'. This because (a) the 
framework itself is foundationally acsthetic. (b) the absurd riddle is ethical and art and ethics are 
structurally idcntificd (by the \\"illing subject). And (c) The (ethical) willing subject is entailed in 
an aesthetic principle of disinterestedness that ultimately links the attitudinal self to aesthetic 
4 And Schopenhauer: 'a law of nature ... which remains as the absolutely inexplicable' (WWR II 176). 
5 And Schopenhauer: "natural sciences' ... in our time ... But however great the advances which phYSics 
(understood in the widest sense of the ancients) may make, not the smallest step towards metaphysics will be made 
this way (WWR II 177). 
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deeds, art objects. Attention now befalls points (b) and (c) and the solution, through first of all the 
important precondition to this solution. 
~5.2 PRECONDITION TO SOLUTION: ETHICS & AESTHETICS 'ONE & THE SAME' 
The critical position of this pre-condition (to the aesthetic solution) does not concern the 
present thesis. For both Wittgenstein and Sartre there is a structural identity between the aesthetic 
attitude and ethics: founded on the principle that both are transcendental. It is this point and - its 
convergent - relation to the problematic of self that is of interest. Also, in this discussion of a 
relation between ethics and aesthetics. elaboration is best attained less directly: with the 
continuing of the general thesis, and especially through the discussion of attitude. Finally, the 
case of establishing this pre-condition has to be made more for Sartre than Wittgenstein. The 
latter clearly states his position. especially in the Notebooks, and this will be outlined in a 
paragraph. Sal1re' s position. howcver. on the question of a structural identity between ethics and 
aesthetics, is more complex. and not without ambiguities. Nonetheless, the aim is to show that 
there is insufficient ambiguity to effcct the validity of the claim, to which we now turn. 
Salire. The reason [or the assurance that Sartre identifies ethics "ith aesthetics is the certainty of 
the Sm1rian starting point: that the self. the pailI' so;, that which we diagnosed as operative and 
programmatic ("illing). is by definition. an ethical self. Indeed Sartre prefers to speak of the 
moral and not the ethical self - this. the call to moral principles, which we also find in 
Wittgenstein. will identify the problematic, although metaphysical, as concrete and rooted in the 
world. 
In Being and .\'orhillglless Sartre concludes a lengthy account of the pour soi with the 
following: 'These considerations suffice to make us admit that human reality is that by which 
value arrives in the world' (BN (3). Sartre criticises philosophers who hypothesise value as 
dependent upon being as ,,,ell as those philosophers who see value as purely subjective. Value 
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enters the world through man - but it docs not depend on man. it is unconditioned in that it is the 
very nature of the prcrencctivc cogito: as that which it is in not bcing it. Human reality arises as a 
lack of idcntity of a 'self with a self. In its original (prereflective) upsurge, the for-itself tends 
toward identification - or coincidcnce - with a self (and a world) and consciousness of this self. 
Human reality itself. for consciollsness is always situated, consists in its perpetual attempting, and 
resulting perpetual failure. to bc its original project of identity. This human reality is value. 
Sartre thcrefore idcntifics value "ith 'lack' and 'possibility': all three are aspects of the for-itself. 
Lack is the lack of thc prereflccti\'c cogito, a fundamental internal negation. The self, as a lack, 
creates itself (perpetually) by choosing its possibilities. Lack, value and possibility constitute the 
selfs attempt to project itsclf toward its projects: modalities of the self as relatum and attitude. 
Such projects comc into thc world through 'being', that is, human reality or the original 
negation of thc in-itself. Thcy constitute thc foundation that Sartre equates with self (above, 
§3.1I). It is clcar thcn. and this throughout his works. that for Sartre 'Human reality is moral 
because it wishes to bc its 0\\'11 foundation' (Sartre, WD 110). Human reality is value, and it is 
moral value. It is also aesthetic value. It is so some of the reasons already given and that human 
reality exists at what Sm1re calls 'the limit'. The boundary whcre language stops saying and 
starts showing is the boundary where the world coincidcs with the subject at the limit of 
language. Language begins "ith the T as the intention behind signs and ends with the 'I' as a 
boundary or limit. Self is identifIed with whole or totality and it is this whole that can only be 
shown (not necessary solipsism, cf. fInal pages of Conclusion II). Showing is, at the most 
fundamental level. self-expression. This self is always, for Sartre. a moral self, and, 'as a moral 
agent, I considered myself unfettered by conditions'. It is this, continues Sartre, this 
'intransigence. as wel1 as l11y thcory of contingency. that lcd me to adopt a morality of salvation 
through art' (WD 86). As such. Sartrc 'did not consider it sufficient to \\Titc. I also had to be 
moral'. Morcover. ·this morality was a total transformation of my existence and an absolute' 
(WD 87). And so, 'little by little' Sm1re 'cquipped' himself with an 'aesthctic morality'. As to 
writing itself. 'although literaturc is onc thing and morality quite a difTerent one. at the heart of 
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the aesthetic imperative we discern the moral imperative' (WL ~5). 
Where in the aesthetic imperative. precisely, shall we discern this moral imperative? There 
is of course a traditional response. one which Sartre (and Wittgenstein) are drawing on. Sartre 
hints at this by his use of the term 'imperative'. It may be a common place to both ethics and 
aesthetics that the Fonner includes the most essential part of aesthetics: the meaning of life, the 
problem of how to live. In this way, both inquiries have been seen and used as responses to a 
particular problematic, a moral dilemma. 6 For sure, it can readily be accepted, a claim made by 
both Wittgenstein and Sartre, that an artistic presentation may be the best way of making 
criticisms of a certain way of life. or of rendering intelligible - showing - an answer. Indeed, as to 
moral dilemmas. perhaps there can only ever be an answer with recourse to a broad concept of 
showing, one that would include presenting or displaying a solution through action: and surely it 
is just this transcending of the limits of representation and denotation to which Wittgenstein and 
Sartre are referring us. 
What binds the ethical to the aesthetic imperative, at the limit with showing, is the self as 
operative intentionality and programmatic. the non-substantive self as ethical will. What the 
ethical will has in common with aesthetics is that both are to be understood as a whole or totality, 
as an attitude. an attitude that is aesthetically defined in terms of distance and its two principles: 
disinterestedness and slIh specie aefernitatis. It is the former that founds a conception of the 
ethical "'ill: 'disinterestedness' is the idea of a meaningful (moral) existence through, in broad 
terms, the elimination of many needs and desires. With ethical will, showing, 'The world and 
things become inessential. become a pretext for the act which becomes its own end'. And so 
'aesthetic enjoyment is a manner of apprehending the \\'orld' that is not 'directed' onto the real 
world, it is this that is 'the source of the celebrated disinterestedness of aesthetic experience' (WL 
213 & 222). 
With the self as value. as creative. as the foundation of possibilities (original choices); as 
6 It is just this view that Stuart Hampshire argues so forcibly against. See 'Logic and AppreCiation' in W. Elton (ed.) 
Essays in Aesthetics and Language, Basil Blackwell, 1967. 
the ineffable presupposition to discourse: as a willing relation to the world, entailing distance, the 
possibility of disinterestedness and suh ,'pecie aeternitatis. with this. aesthetics and ethics, as a 
response to a moral problematic. are structurally the same in the early philosophy of Sartre. 
Wittgcnstcin's position similarly relies on the same principle as Sartre's: the self as value, as 
operative and programmatic (ethical \\'ill). identifies itself with ethics and aesthetics. 'It would be 
possible to say (a fa Schopenhauer): it is not the world of Idea that is either good or evil; but the 
willing subject' (NB 79). Wittgenstein' position has the dual merit of being transparently 
confirmed in the Traclalus on the basis of an explanation in the Notebooks. Thus in the 
Tractatus: ·It is clear that cthics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and 
aesthetics are one and the same)'(6.-t.21). And thus, as the preceding Tractarian comment makes 
clear, 'It is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics. Propositions can express nothing that 
is higher' (6.-t.5). As aesthetics is identical with ethics and the latter is in a realm that transcends 
what can be said. then aesthetics is also of this 'mystical' realm. That is. 'to view the world sub 
specie aefernifalis is to vic\\' it as a whole - a limited whole. Feeling the world as a limited whole 
- it is this that is mystical' (6.-t.5). Both the aesthetic and the ethical are identified with the 
'lIlystiche. the transcendental. and "iewing the world as a whole. To be precise, as stated in the 
Notebooks: 'The work of ;111 is the object seen sub specie aeternitatis; and the good life is the 
world seen sub specie aefernitafis. This is the connection between art and ethics' (NB 83). Both 
involve (a) a self and showing at the limit. (b) This self as an attitudinal relationship to the world 
as a whole involving (c) Vicwing the world sub specie aeternitatis, distance, and 
disinterestedness. As \\'ith S'1I1re. \\'e will find (below) that this ethic and metaphysic support a 
self bound to moral principles. a self that although is in a sense eliminated from the world, 
nonethe\css is ill a sense situated in the world. 
For both philosophers. this is a reciprocal condition: the structural identity of ethics and 
aesthetics as a pre-condition of the aesthetic solution entails that the aesthetic offers itself as a 
solution. as we shall now sec, 
INN 
~5.3 SOLUTION TO PROBLEMATIC OF SELF 
It is all very \\cIl to claim an aesthetic solution to a perceived problematic (and we have 
seen a semantic and a metaphysic that rise always to the aesthetic): but how exactly is such an 
aesthetic supposed to work? Here then (after crucial transitional material to the ethico-aesthetic) 
we begin where the last chapter ended: on the modality of self that was fittingly termed 'attitude'. 
Only now, though still dealing with the willing or programmatic self. it is a question of the self as 
aesthetic attitude. and. given our lingua-sclffoundation, the dis-solving of the absurd riddle. 
(I) PART I: (CONCLUSION I): AESTHETIC ATTITUDE (THE WORLD AS A WHOLE) 
. According as he breaths in an atmosphere of sin. or in the peace of God, 
so the world changes its face'.7 
Philosophers such as Kant. Schopenhauer. Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Sartre and Dufrenne8 
have beheld the aesthetic attitude as a stance to the world or art object which reveals an otherwise 
impenetrable reality, essence. truth or Being. The aesthetic attitude is thus seen as a particular 
way of experiencing objects - independent of personal emotion, moral judgement, instrumental 
value or utility. It is sometimes conceivcd as heightened perceptiveness and sometimes, as in the 
philosophers quoted. as an e.'\ccptional cognitive relation to both works of art and the world. In so 
doing, it suggests a 'correct' attitude toward an object and thus relies on the presupposition that 
art is wholly aesthetic (not reducible to the socio-political or some other value) - a point of much 
dispute, though one accepted by Wittgenstein and Sartre (cf. §2.1 and opening of this §5). Post 
Kant. the principle most often identified with the aesthetic attitude is distance or 
disinterestedness. The inclusion of slfh specie aeternitatis is rarer. but is in any case used, with 
distance. by both Wittgenstein ;l\1d Sartre. After some remarks on these concepts per se the 
7 Jean Mouroux, The Meaning of Man; Garden City, Doubleday, 1961, pp37. 
8 One may see this as a continuous tradition, certainly Dufrenne's account has much in common with (besides 
Kant) Sartre. Although he is critical of Sartre's thesis of the unreal, he argues that aesthetic experience transcends 
the object to contemplate the truth of nature, a basis for mans relation to the real. Cf. Dufrenne (1973), pp456 and 
chapter 15 'Aesthetic Attitude'. 
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discussion \\ill movc onto first Wittgcnstein and then Sartre for confirmation of their allegiance. 
• Disinterestedness, Sub specie aeternitatis 
The natural attitudc or relation to the world that the self finds itself in is situated, in the 
midst of things. By this it is mcant that experience is structured within a spatio-temporal relation 
to other objects. This relation is constantly changing as it is correlated to the contingency of the 
world of facts: any value system based on this relation must then be relative. Experience is said to 
be identified with and is relativc to the now and here. Experience is determined by a reference 
taken from the location and identification of a subjects body9. When, as in Wittgenstein and 
Sartre, the body is identified with the will. a point of \'iew on the \\'orld (individual but non-
personal - cf.~3.1 i). then in this relation to objects there is, according to a Kantian tradition, 
'interest'. That is. the nature of the relation between our will and objects is utilitarian and 
purposeful: the natural attitude .. natural cognition' as Schopenhauer says. is governed by the will 
in relation to particular objects of experience (Wittgenstein: 'instead of "all objects" we might 
say: All particlI/ar oNects' - NB 11.7.16). We can say that this relation is one of psychic self-
interest: one of need. want and dcsire (cf. above, ~·t lilii). The selfs natural comportment to the 
given, the "cry condition of this situatedness. is said to be 'interest' governed. For Sartre at least, 
'biologically determined' would not be misleading, it is our attitude that is free, that is 
contemporary with original frccdom. 
Tn Wittgcnstein and Sal1rc the concept of 'interest', or lack of it pertains to the notion of a 
(willing) self as attitude to the world. The reciprocal idea of suspending such interest, of 
suspending or bracketing desires. needs. m:lllts. and the utilitarian direction of natural cognition 
is called ·disinterestedness'. Here the relation to the object or the world would be one stripped 
bare of practical utility. It is the elimination of the psychological mode of being, the minimisation 
of dcsires and needs. Thc climimtion of dcsircs thus involvcs replacing natural spatio-temporally 
9 See Strawson, Individuals, chapter 1 
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determined expenence. identified with the now and herc. with expenencc which is not 
determincd in rcfcrencc to the givcn. to the. that is. particular objects or facts of experience. The 
usual 'embodied' identification of the \rill with the world is transcended in what is an escape 
from a natural. usual or active stance to the world of particular objects. In other words, rather 
than experience being constituted in relation to the personal and the particular, it is so in relation 
to a whole or totality and at a distance from the personal (though it remains individual -
subjectivc and situated cf. §3.l i-ii). 
By placing the object \\ithin its own spatio-temporal framework, it is experienced as a 
whole or totality and thus: Expcricncc is undcr the aspect of eternity. To experience something 
sub specie aetemilatis is in fact to experience it as a lilllited whole or totality, as something 
which exists together with its own space and time. It is to lose sight of the particular, it is to 
condition experience by distancc. This distance ensures that the will is not in the world in the 
sense (the same sense as the (mctaphysical)-subject - above §3.1ii) that it is divorced from its 
spatio-temporal rclation. The world . ... ·lIh .\pecie aetemitatis, is a totality or bounded whole. 
The term and concept suh specie aeternitatis is most often associated with SpinozaIO. A 
summary of Spinoza's position hcre reads like a summary of the present account. There is no self, 
no 'I' beyond the authority of clcar and distinct ideas \\'here these represent the self from the 
point of view of God. suh specie ae{emila/is. The 'moral sclf is not then an individual 'I' but 
rather a disinterestcd rcasoncr. a modc of God. Spinoza arglles that the self must climb above the 
illusory perspective that secs things suh .\pecie dura/ionis to the objectivc and selfless perspective 
which is God's. suh .\pecie aetemilatis. Only then will the self be truly free and only then does 
the possibility of Sc1n100d exist. 
In the philosophy of Sm1rc and Wittgenstein. and most likely in Spinoza too, both sub 
specie ae/erni/a/is and dis-intcrestedncss rely upon a notion of 'distance'. A distance between self 
and world: betwccn dcsircs. W;Jnts. wishcs and a consciousness stillcd: bctwccn a natural. situated 
10 Wittgenstein was clearly impressed by Spinoza, and the similarity of titles Tracfafus Logico-Philosophicus and 
Tractatus Theologico-Polificus is unlikely, Moore's recommendation to Wittgenstein aside, to be coincidental. 
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outlook and a new outlook. The now famous essay on this topic. E. Bullough's Psychical 
Distance as a Factor in .lrt and .·!esthetic Principles. is worth mentioning for it draws attention 
to two points critical to the position adopted by Wittgenstein and Sartre ll . 
Firstly, the essay states that distance has two poles, negati\'e and positive. As to the former, 
distance involves an inhibitory aspect: the cutting-out of the practical, utilitarian side of things: 
the suspending of the natural. practical attitude. At the same time, in positive response. this opens 
up the possibility of an elaboration of the experience: a new, and revelatory, attitude. 
Secondly. Bullough argues that distance transforms to an aesthetic experience by putting the 
experience of phenomena out of gear (as stated above), and does so \\ith the personal self (of 
needs-ends - ends-needs). The claim is that in such experience the ohjective takes precedence. 
Even the essentially subjective affections of the experience are interpreted as characteristic of the 
phenomena of experience and not. therefore, as modes of our, personal. being. In short, whereas 
distance is the requirement for the vic\\' from nowhere, such a view is indeed a theoretical 
possibility when conceivcd in terms of a subject in an aesthetic relation to the world. 
It is a point worth making. that this notion of aesthetic experience as disinterested works as 
an explanatory tool - perhaps the best there is - for much that goes on in the artworld today. That 
is, in such a stance toward an object. m~v object could be the source of an aesthetic experience. As 
long as the object is distanced from its usual spatio-temporal framework, that which constitutes it 
as having utility of purpose and thus exists in its own spatio-time [sic] framework, as a limited 
whole or totality. Thus we might place a urinal in an art gallery, or a dead sheep in a glass case 
and, further distance. in an art gallery. The distance helps the willing subject to renounce any 
'interest' - utility etc. in the object. to avoid situating it in what Sartre will call the rounds of 
means-end - end-means. It is this disinterestedness that facilitates an aesthetic experience (of 
whatever character and import). That said, it is another matter whether we want to include 
ordinary (anc! natural) objects into the al1world. Similarly, although disinterestedness avoids any 
11 It is believed in fact that Bullough's essay had a direct influence on the Tractarian Wittgenstein; it was published 
the year Wittgenstein went to Cambridge (1912), Bullough was then a professor in residence, and the ideas of his 
essay were very much "'in the air"'. See Hodges (1990) pp14. 
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necessary claims to thc internal qualities of an artwork. it does not preclude an aesthetic having 
either a wcak or evcn strong commitmcnt to internalism (the vicw that aesthetic appreciation 
owes nothing to anything outsidc of the artwork itself). Disinterestedness claims to be necessary, 
but not sufficicnt for thc acsthctic attitudc. 
Wittgcnstcin is advocating as central to aesthetic attitude (and his early aesthetics) the 
traditional acsthctic concepts of disintcrcsted will and sub specie aeternitatis. This fact, as I 
claim it to bc. rcsts upon on two main factors. The avocation to worldly renunciation - resting 
upon a concept of sclr as a \I'i/ling sclr. dnming thus on the discussion of the willing self in 
relation to wishing and wanting (abovc ~-I-.l ii). Secondly, the actual identification of the willing 
self with the world sub specie aefernifafis. with the world as a whole, and thus ethical meaning, 
with the standpoint of God. (Thcre may be a third factor, that of 'contemplation' as the chief 
characteristic of a renunciatcd willing relation to self: this possibility is discussed in the 
conclusion). 
Wittgcnstcin's acsthctic is a lingua-aesthetic vision of the self. Thc mctaphysical subject, as 
programmatic. is a willing subject (§-I-.l ii), thc ethical \\ill is 'an attitude of the subject to the 
world' (NB -1-.11.16). The world itsclf 'is indepcndcnt of my wil\'(6.373), independent of the 
attitudinal self. Thus 
Even if all that we were to wish for \\ere to happen, still this would only be a favour 
granted h~' fate, so to speak: for there is no logical connection between the will and the 
world which would guarantee it' (6.37...)). 
But if, thcn. 'man could not exercise his wilL but had to suffer all the misery of the world' (death, 
destruction. loss: its apparcnt contingencies). what Wittgenstein asks. 'could make him happy?' 
(NB 13.8.16). That is. where is meaning to be found? (§-I-.lii and §5.1 i). 
The answcr is that man can exercise his will to such an effect that is. his ethical and not 
phenomcnal wilL and can thcrcrorc effcct the world. The ethical will is identified with the limits 
of the world. and so 'lr good or cvil willing' is to effect the world 'it can only change the limits of 
the world. not thc facts' (1016.-1-.')). Thc facts of course would bc effcctcd by the phenomenal will. 
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The world as a whole is effcctcd by the attitudinal self. So, in order to 'be happy'. one must will 
the world as a whole. it is in this that cthical mcaning is discovered. We must then, according to 
Wittgenstcin's position. bccome indepcndent of the world: 
I cannot bend th~ happenings of the world to my will: I am completely powerless. I can only 
make myse({ independent or the \\orId - and so in a certain sense master it - by renouncing 
[m~' inl1uence on happenings (NB 11.6.16 - my emphasis). 
Happiness, a good lifc, cthical meaning, is secn to lie in the will renouncing any influence 
on the world of happcnings. 'The will ... can only change the limits of the world, not the facts; 
not the things that can bc exprcssed in language' ([0]6.43). And so, again, 'The only life that is 
happy is thc life that can rcnounce thc amenities of the world' (NB 13.8.16). (Here of course we 
are in a whole tradition - many traditions in fact, including those of Buddhism and Christianity. 
As to the latter. the writings of S1. Augustine wcre greatly admired by Wittgenstein: 'when you 
become such a man that no carthly thing delights you, belicve me, at that \'cry moment, at that 
point of time. you will bchold \\'hat you desire'). A will that renounces influence on thc world, 
that 'makes itself' indepcndcnt is a dis-interested will. It has suspended the rounds of means-end 
- end-means. it is not intcrcsted in the world. It has distanced itself from the world of amenities. 
Willing is also. as with Sartre, a matter of inwardness. Ethical value is not found in the 
world, it is found - indccd. wc saw, it is created by the self. Thus, in the second direct reference 
to will in the Tractatlls wc find thc following. 
If the good or had e:\~n:ise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of 
the world, not the Ii.lcts -- not what can be expressed by means of language. In short the 
erred must be that it becom~s an altogether ditlerent world. It must, so to speak, wax and 
wanc as a whole. (6.·B). 
The vel)' condition of the cthical \\'ill as limit and having a standpoint sub specie 
aeternitafis is confirmation of a willing relation to the world that is an attitude that has converted 
itself from its natural disposition to an aesthetic disposition (,disinterestcd' will is supported by 
both the opcning discllssion of disintcrcst and the willing self - §-\..l ii). Wittgenstein c1carly states 
that this acsthetic relation to thc world is to bc contrastcd with our usual or natural relation: 
'There are two godhcads: the world and my indcpendent r (NB 8.7.16). As to the latter, we 
identify it \\'ith the natural attitude. 
Thc usual \\'a~' of looking at things s~~s obj~cts as it \\'cre from the midst of them, the vic\\' 
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sub specie aelemilalis from the outside. In such a \\'a:- that the\' have the whole world as a 
background. In this vic\\' the ohject is seen together with space and time instead of ill space 
and time. (NB 7.10.16). 
There is a difference when thc sclf convel1s from its natural relation to the world (spatio-temporal 
framework) to a relation slib specie aeternitatis. 
That Wittgenstein identifies a stance to the world as sub specie aeternitatis is a point which 
we have already lent support to (it is, to begin with, 'the connection between art and ethics' - NB 
7.10.16, and above, ~5.2). The main point concerns temporal suffering and eternal salvation; it is 
the problematic, thus: 'The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and 
time' (6.4312)12. And so. 'If good or cvil willing' is to effcct the world 'it can alter only the 
limits of the world' (G.·B). Thc will is 'an attitude of the subject to the world' (NB 4.11.16). The 
world itself 'is indcpendent of my \\ilr(6.373). Now. we have. 'to view the world sub specie 
aefernitalis is to view it as a whole - a limited whole (6.45). The identification of the stance sub 
specie aelernilalis with the \\illing subject (and therefore ethical meaning) is thus 
straightfonvard enough. and so: 'Willing 'must make the \,orld a wholly different one. As if by 
accession or loss of meaning' (NB 5.7.IG). The effect is that the world 'must wax and wane as a 
whole' (6.·B). 
Relating to the world suh specie aeternitatis is. and logically is. to take the standpoint of 
God. 'Ethics is transcendcntal. How things stand is God. The meaning of the world we can call 
God' (NB pp79 and 73). In ordcr to li\'c happily I must be in agreement with the world .... That 
is to say: "I am doing the will of God" '. And so 'To believe in God is to see that the facts of the 
world are not the end of the matter. ... we are dependent on what we call God .... In this sense 
God would simply be fate. or. \vhat is the same thing: The world - which is independent of my 
will' (NBS.7.16). The seIrs aesthetic relation to the world is founded on two (aesthetic) 
principles: of disinterest and suh specie aeternitalis. Combined. they constitute the attitudinal self 
as aesthetic. 
12 And Schopenhauer, ordinary, as opposed to aesthetic consciousness, always relates to the world from particular 
objects, principle of which is the human body, such that considerations 'always lead back by a shorter or longer 
length to [one's) ... body' (WWR I, 76f). 
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The only clearly explicit explanato/T exalJlple of the aesthetic attitude in the early work is 
that of a 'stove'. The choice of such an ultra-mundane example as a 'stove' is used by 
Wittgenstein to enforce the main point: that we are dealing with a change of attitude to the 
objects or facts of the world. whatever they are (avoiding any claim to intrinsic or objective 
aesthetic qualities putative to art objects themselves). 
As a thing among things each thing is equally insignificant; as a world each one equally 
significant. 1fT have been contemplating the stove, and then am told: but now all vou know 
is the stove, my result does indeed seem trivial. For this represents the matter as if I had 
studied the stove as one among the many things [i.e. objects or facts] in the world. But if! 
was contemplating the stove if was my world, and everything else colourless by contrast 
with it. (NB 8.10.16) 
Wittgenstein then says: '(Something good about the whole, but bad in details),. The idea here, as 
Wittgenstein continues to say. is that the bare present image can be taken as either - and equally 
as - 'the \\'011hless momentary picture in the \\'hole temporal world', or. as 'the true world among 
shadows' (NB 8.10.16). Bearing in mind that 'things acquire "significance" only through their 
relation to my will' (NS 15.10.16), and that the subject is the willing subject', how the bare 
present moment of something. anything. is taken, in this case the stove. this will depend upon 
'attitude': 'The will is an attitude to the subject to the world' (NS -\,,11.16). The right attitude to 
the world and objects is to sec them as a whole. Through this will we experience 'The true world 
among shadows'. 
S"1I1rc is also advocating. as central to aesthetic altitude (and his early aesthetics) the Kantian 
aesthetic concepts of disinterestedness and sub .specie aeternitatis (also, the non-convergent 
stmcture of the aesthetic altitude as a negation with the posited as the unreal). As we are 
concerned with lingua-aesthetics. the best place from which to make our points quickly and 
comprehensively is his early work on language (and aesthetics), What is Literature??, as well as 
his early work on the imagination (and art). The P.\ychologv of ilJlagination. 13 
13 Although Sartre's Essays on Aesthetics were consulted, it has not been necessary to use them. These essays, 
spanning many years, consider art through a discussion of the work of certain artists (Tintoretto, Giacometti, Calder 
and Lapoujade), and do so open-mindedly though with specific regard to Sartre's philosophic system. These artists 
are thus discussed in relation to class contradictions, emptiness, control and movement, and beauty (EA 8). None 
of these topiCS has direct significance on our project here. Much more important are the extended works that 
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In What is Literalure i thcrc is S<llire's distinction between prose and poetry. There is its 
relation to the psychological sclf and prose and the self and poetry (§2.3iii and §2.4). Of the 
latter, we can unequivocally identi(y it with the self as attitude, although of course the former will 
also be an attitude to the world, 'prose is first of all an attitude of mind' (WLll), - psychological 
and not metaphysical (§-t..l i). Hence it will be 'the poetic attitude \vhich considers words as things 
and not signs' (WL 5). Whcrcas in the natural attitude the 'speaker is in a situation in language'. 
for the poet. 'language is a stl1lcture of the external world' (WL 6). Indeed, 'the poet is outside 
language ... he sees words as if he did not share the human condition'. The poetic - or aesthetic -
attitude is 'on the outside'; the poet 
Considers words as a trap to catch a fleeing reality rather than as indicators which throw 
him out ofhimseJfinto the midst of things. In short, all language is for him the mirror of the 
world' (WL fi). 
The 'poet docs not utilise the word'. thus. for example, 'in each word he realises, solely by the 
effect of the poetic allitlltie lsicl (WL 7). 
This aesthetic or poetic attitude. which Sartre has identified with lang1\(lge Ie sens (§2.3iii, 
WL) and the universal and therefore ineffable but showable. is also the attitudinal self as the 
precondition of meaning. (This self is programmatic. its relation to the world is a willing 
relation). This is consciousness in its natural relation to the world (§.:J..2-3). What characterises 
consciousness in its modification or cOI1\'crsion from the natural to the aesthetic attitude (and the 
claims on Ie sens) is. as with Wittgcnstcin. that it is dis-interested, non-utilitarian. and involves 
sub specie aeternitatis - and. an il11poliant but in itself non-convergent point, it is unreal. 
If wc wish to kno\\' 'the origin of this attitude towards language', Sartre tells us, 'the 
following arc a few brief indic<ltions.' What follows is an extensivc footnote, much of which I 
discussed in some detail earlier (§2.3iii. WL). the key detail now is thus: 'Poetry reverses the 
relationship I<ls compared to prosej: the world and things become inessentiaL become a pretext 
for the act \yhich becomes its own end' (WL 23). Tn fact. the feeling 'that is customarily called 
contribute directly to aesthetics (What is Literature? and The Psychology of Imagination), his major work Being and 
Nothingness, and of course that aesthetic deed itself, Nausea. It is in these major works that we witness the 
centrality of the doctrines which contribute to the (lingua-)aesthetic( -self). 
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aesthetic pleasure'. but which Sanre would' much rather call aesthetic joy'. and 'which becomes 
one with the aesthetic consciousness'. this is 'identicaL at first, with the recognition of a 
transcendent and absolute end. which. for a moment suspends the utilitarian round of ends-
means and means-cnds' (WL -t.1I2). 
This freedom. the self. 'is manifested to itself by a transcendent exigency'. This 
'recognition of freedom by itselr the adopting of the aesthetic attitude (and the creating of an 
aesthetic object - next section). not only renders the absurdity of human existence as meaningful, 
but also asjo~cfuI14. And 'thus'. continues Sartre. 
aesthetic joy proceeds to this level of the consciousness \\'hich I take as recovering and 
intemalising that which is non-ego par excellellce, since I transfonn the given into an 
imperative and the fact into a value .... In aesthetic joy the positional consciousness is an 
image-makillg cOlISciollSlless of the world in its totality. (WL 4213). 
Sartre will call this 'the aesthetic modification of the human project'. for. 'the world appears as 
the horizon of our situation. as the infinite distance which separates us from ourselves, as the 
synthetic totality of the given' (WL -t.2). (We shall Sh0111y return to this idea of 'totality, the world 
as a whole). 
The aesthetic attitude. that which 'transforms the given', is directed away from ego, it is 
concerned with value. Recall that the ego is not value. that it is a psychological fact/object - and 
can be spoken of. The concept of disinterestedness is thus invoked in the passage above when 
speaking of consciousness ',yhich is non-ego'. With this. the surest and speediest way to affirm 
Sartre's early adherence to an aesthetics of disinterestedness is to consider what he says in the 
final pages of his most important work in aesthetics, The P.~vchologv of Imagination. Thus, 'To 
posit an image is to construct an object on the fringe of the whole of reality, which means 
therefore to hold the real at a distance. (TPI 213 - my emphasis). Sartre makes this point, not 
unnaturally. in relation to works of cui. of which we do not as yet want to discuss. Still, the 
'disinterested relation' docs concern us no\\': 'aesthetic enjoyment ... is but a manner of 
14 At the time of What is Literature? 'Joy' may well have been translated as 'gay' - without loss of direction. Equally, 
Nietzsche's The Gay Science. The point here is the undoubted Similarity in doctrines and the loss of a most fertile 
adjective. 
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apprehending the unreal object and. far from being directed onto the real painting. it serves to 
constitute and present the imaginary object through the real canvass' (my emphasis). This, 
continues Satire. 
is the source of the celebrated disinterestedness of aesthetic experience. This is why Kant 
was able to say that it does not mutter whether the object of beauty, when experienced as 
beautiful, is or is not objectively real; why Schopenhauer was able to speak of a sort of 
suspension of the will. (TrI 222) 
Not that 'this comes from some mysterious way of apprehending the real'. No, as was first seen 
above, 'the aesthetic object is constituted and apprehended by an imaginative consciousness 
which posits it as unreal' (TPI 222). Aesthetic attitude and aesthetic object are in some way 
reciprocal (see next section). whatever the ontological status of the real object, and whether it be 
'a bouquet of flowers or a glade'. when I "contemplate" it. I am nevertheless not in a realistic 
attitude' (TPI 221). That is. I am at a distance. my will. as phenomena (§-l.lii), has been 
suspended. 
This concept of distance naturally leads the inquiry into 'the world as a whole'. In The 
Psychologv o/llllaginafioll. thc first part of the two-part conclusion addresses directly its 
flll1damental question. 'what the essential requisite is in order that a consciousness may be able to 
imagine'15 (TPI 212). Satire "Tites that 'it must possess the possibility of positing an hypothesis 
of unreality'. That is. the objccts of an intentional consciousness possess 'a certain trait of 
nothingness in relation to the "'hole or reality'. Unreal objects, aesthetic objects, such as 'the 
successivc toncs of a melody' arc pcrccived 'on the foundation of a total reality as a whole (TPI 
209). And evcn though. or because of that fact. ·the imaginary object can be posited as non-
existent or as absent or as existing elsewhere or as not posited as existing'. Of these four 
possibilities, the cOl11mon propctiy includes the 'entire category of negation', with the negative 
act as the 'most intimate structure' of an image'. Thus. in order that we produce an image, 
consciousness must den~ rcality. Hence. ·to posit an image is to constnlct an object on the fringe 
of the whole of reality' (TPI 213). The whole of reality here is the synthetic totality of the given, 
15 The importance to our thesis of central aspects of image and imaging as presented in The Psychology of 
Imagination were first noted above, ~2.3ii 
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it "is nothingness in relation to the whole of reality' (TPI 212). "Thus', continues Sartre, 'the 
thesis of unreali!)' has yielded us the possibility of negation as its possibility'" where this is 
possible 'only by the negation of the world as a whole' (TP1214). 
To posit the world as a world, or to negate it is one and the same thing. In this sense 
Heidegger can say that nothingness is the constitutive structure of existence. To be able to 
imagine, it is enough that consciousness be able to surpass the real in constituting it as a 
world .. " But this surpassing cannot be brought about by just any means, and the freedom of 
consciousness must not be confused with the arbitrary. For an image is not purely and 
simply the world-negated. it is always the world negated from a certain point of view, 
namely, the one that }X--rmits the positing of an absence or the non~xistcnce of the object 
presented 'as an image'. (TPI214). 
The self, the constitutive structure of existence. which is defined if at all as the very structures of 
consciousness (~3.1ii). and which is thus always situated to a point of view, but which goes 
beyond these structures in being a freedom and a nothingness, and which includes the crucial 
negating structure of the image in the imaginative act (~2.3ii), the self exists as a freedom and a 
surpassing in relation to the world as a whole: "merely to be able to posit reality as a synthetic 
whole is enough to enable one to posit oneself as free from it' (TPI 21-t). As has been see~ this 
'means therefore to hold the real at a distance'. that is, 'to free oneself from it. in a word, to deny 
it' (TP1213). 
This holding the real at a distance is a matter of will and attitude and is to be distinguished 
from a logical distance that fixes Sartre's ontology. There is between self and world, between 
consciousness and its object. in the relation itself, a structure of distance. This is necessary if the 
signifier is to signify a signified. It has been pointed out (by Danto) that the structure of nihilation 
is found in that of denotation: "a sign stands for, and so is not. the object it points out'; 
consciousness. 'an arrow points toward a target', its object. Danto goes further than this, 'I 
believe the whole high-flown apparatus of Nothingness in Sartre's thought is merely a device for 
speaking of the distance between sign and object' .16 The foundation of self is the structures of 
consciousness (~3.lii), these structures include, besides a logical distance between subject and 
object, a willing relation that is the self (self-consciousness). Without this, Sartre's self would fall 
16 Danto. Sarlre (1975). pp93. 
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into a classical VIC\\'. Cm1csianism. ilnd moreover, \\'ithout the relation being constituted as 
willing (or opcrativc). the conccpt of interest-disinterest would similarly collapse. Quite 
specifically. 'The failurc of communication bccomes a suggestion of the incommunicable, and 
the thwartcd projcct of utilising words is succecdcd by thc pure disinterested intuition of the word 
(WL 24). 
As with Wittgenstcin, the distancc involved in the disinterested attitude is equated with the 
possibility of the world as a wholc or totali ty l7. This is the condition of a stance to the world sub 
specie aeternitatis, This is the aesthetic stance required by, for example, an author-narrator, so 
that 'he tells his story with dctachmcnt. ... He looks back upon it and considers it as it really was, 
that is, sub .\pecie aelemilalis,' (WL 1(5). Similarly, there \\'ill arise the question of relations 
with the othcr, and similar is thc situation. In Sartre's philosophy the Other is the incarnate 
cognitive certainty of one-sclf (§3.1 i). And in this sense of the Other, the importance of the other 
in encountcring onesclf. thc stance of thc Other to one-self will be seen to be sub specie 
aeternifalis. 'In fact thc problcm for me is to make myself be by acquiring the possibility of 
taking thc Other's point of vic\\' on myself (BN 365). But if in spcaking of sub specie 
aeternitatis we are lead to think of eternal values. then \\'c should, a slipping Sartre will remind 
us. be wary. Evcn so. it must and is conceded: 'It is dangerously easy to speak of eternal values; 
eternal values are vcry. vcry Ileshless, Even freedom, if one considers it sub specie aeternitatis, 
seems to be a withered branch: for. like the sea. therc is no end to it' (WL 49). Indeed, for 
freedom, the sclf. is a modality of our being. a potential of the self as an attitudinal relation to the 
world. Thc self is 'a mO\'cl11cnt by which one pcrpctually uproots and liberates oneself (WL 49). 
The aesthetic rclation is as a 'nothingncss in relation to the whole of reality' (TPI 212). 
The standpoint of slib specie aelernitatis is the standpoint of God. This principle was 
naturally acccptcd by Wiltgcnstcin. and so too Sartre. Again. as with Wiltgenstein, the 'villing 
self is to be idcntificd with thc \\'orld slIb .~pecie aeternitatis. \\ith the world as a totality or limit 
17 This point of comparison has been noted before: 'We are the boundaries of the revealed world [Wittgenstein 
writes, "The subject does not belong to the world but it is a limit of the world"], and the condition of its revelation'. 
Danto, Sartre (1975), pp95. 
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(and cthical mcaning). and again this is equated with the standpoint of God. Thus, for example, 
in order to considcr some 'admirable lines' from Rimbaud. in order that is that we adopt the 
aesthetic (poetic) attitude. '\\C place ourselvcs on the other side of thc human condition, on the 
sidc of God' (WL 9). Such is the mode of art, of poetry. take any person in the aesthetic attitude 
and 'it will withdraw him from the human condition and invite him to consider with the eyes of 
God a language that has been turned inside out' (WL 10). As Sartre says many times over in 
Being and Nothingness. 'Man is the bcing whose project is to becomc God.' This 'divine 
ineptness' is not socio-religiously or psychologically determined. No, it is rather a metaphysical 
principle. And 'if man possesscs a prc-ontological comprehcnsion (i.c. self-encounter) of the 
being of God. thcn 
It is not the great wonders or nature nor the power of society which have conferred it upon 
him. God, value and supreme end of transcendence, represent the penllanent limit in tenns 
of "hich man makes kno\\'n to himself \\'hat he is. To be man means to reach toward being 
God.' (BN 566 - m~' emplwsis). 
But this impulse toward God. thc uni,'crsaL thc totality. IS. as ever. situated or founded in the 
concrete and particular: 'The impulse toward God is 110 less concrete than the impulse toward a 
particular woman' (BN 5(3), Still. concrete woman. desire, or not. 'man f1111damentally is the 
desire to be God', persists Sartre. (BN passim)18. 
Sartre has been taken to be a religious prophet by some19. A thinker or a mystic that is 
looking forward to a God or a Value that is coming to be, to a time distant from 'the darkness of 
our own times' as Wittgenstein has it. Simone dc Beauvoir has said that Sartre studied the 
mystics during the early thit1ies. Mysticism is replete with the idea of opposition and synthesis, 
especially the radical opposites of 'fullness and emptiness'. All and Nothing. Wittgenstein's 'God 
and the independent .. ,,, " opposites which must be resolved. As in Master Eckhart, where God 
and I arc one. where the "'''. self-relating. is thc unmoved mover that moves all things. In 
Christianity. 'fullncss and cmptincss·. thc fullness of God. the divine kenosis or self-emptying -
18 Attention has been drawn throughout to this important point: that the universal standpoint does not preclude a 
situated self - an unacceptable position, This issue is tangential to the problematic from the metaphysical standpoint, 
still, it is considered to the extent that is necessary - cf. §3,1 i and §3,1 ii, this chapter passim. 
19 See for example, King (1974) Sartre and the Sacred. 
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10 a sense III the world' - Christ. It thus may well prove fmitful to see Sartre from this 
perspective. as. like Wittgenstein. a Romantic humanist attempting to blend Eastern and Western 
divinity. Such a perspective withstanding. the indubitable, on Sartre and God. is that God is the 
value and supreme end of consciousness. God is the limit in terms of which each and all 
particular projects of being-God arc reflected in the many attitudes of self towards, for example, 
ideas, other subjects, property. Objects only present themselves as having value in relation to the 
fundamental value I have chosen. Before this choice there is no value, and this choice is to be 
carried out. when considered. as oneself as aesthetic attitude. 
Unlike Wittgenstein. who offered a 'stove' as an example 111 his account of aesthetic 
attitude, Sartre gives as examples of the aesthetic attitude pal1icular objects of art: Beethoven's 
7th symphony. certain paintings etc. This may appear as significant for the wrong reason. It is 
not that Wittgenstein wants to stress that the aesthetic attitude is in relation to any object, while 
Sartre wants to limit it to art objects. Rather. the choice of examples is to do with Sartre's more 
pure interest in the sl/~ject of aesthetics and Wittgenstein's belief that there should not be a 
subject of aesthetics: it cannot be spokcn meaningfully of2o. With Sartre (for support see §4, 
above on aesthetic attitude, the remarks below on aesthetic deeds) and Wittgenstein alike the 
aesthetic attitude is a challge of attitude to the objects or facts of the world, whate\'er they are. 
The approach, general and as here specific, may be different (Introduction) but the content is 
similar: a metaphysic of aesthetic existencc . 
• Determination and the Aesthetic Attitude 
To God. is where the account of aesthetic attitude has led in both Sartrc and Wittgenstein. 
Given the problematic this is no surprise. though where Sartre is concerned, it may be 
disappointing. Nonetheless, the n:ltural attitude. situated in the world. docs not render to the self 
the ethical meaning of the world. Is the natural attitude wrong - what \\'ould make it so? Simply 
20 In this, Wittgenstein was truer to his philosophy than Sartre to his; but then Sartre was always struggling with an 
ambivalence to the aesthetic whereas Wittgenstein embraced it wholly - ct. especially §2.3iii What is Literature? II 
and 5.4 PostScript. 
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that it constituted consciousness as inert. fixed. not engaged: in bad faith. A right attitude on the 
other hand would constitute consciollsness as mobile. engaged: in good faith. The former can be 
said to result in unhappiness. that is. anxiety: the latter in happiness, contentment of sorts. And of 
course to see the world wrongly. to have a wrong attitude, to will ill. is a moral and not a 
cognitive or theoretical error. Thus, as Catalano has said. 'The moment a person is awakened to 
the real possibility of new conditions for his life. he adopts a different attitude toward his being' 
(Catalano, 1977, pp197). Attitude. is the way a person sees the world, their attitude. It is a matter 
of will. 
The actuality of willing does not effect the world, facts remain as they are (above); what 
alters is the subjects evaluation. his critical response. the meaning he gives to the world. The 
metaphysical sense of being in the world is as an intentional relation (will) that is programmatic, 
consciousness constituting itself as a method of altering how the world. the given, is experienced. 
The (willing) self is at the limit (is a moral self) "hen it relates to the world as a whole. It does 
this by choosing itself as an aesthetic relation to the world (through the principles of 
disinterestedness and the stance on the world sub ~pecie aeternitatis). It is from this stance, 
independent of contingency, that the self encounters itself as the source of ethical meaning, and 
thus resolves the problematic: ethical value is to come from outside the world, from either God or 
the subject as God. Self determination is achieved through the aesthetic attitude And all, all 
depends upon the relation between ·t\\,o godheads: the world and my independent l' (NB 8.7.16); 
it is 'a matter of envisaging the self as a little God which inhabits me and which possesses my 
freedom as a metaphysical virtue' (BN -1-2).21. 
21 Besides the undoubted influence of Schopenhauer on Wittgenstein there is the formers influence on Nietzsche -
and the latter's on Sartre. A work of Nietzsche's that seems to preside over these doctrines of Wittgenstein and 
Sartre is The Gay Science (and its precursor, Schopenhauer's On Man's Need for Metaphysics). Nietzsche says 
that life has become 'problematic' (preface, 3). Schopenhauer uses the same expression, but more often 'riddle': 'a 
riddle, whose solution then occupies mankind without intermission ... [an] ever disquieting riddle' (WWR II, 170f). A 
riddle founded on the philosophical astonishment that there is something and not nothing, that this something is the 
world, and that the contingency of this world is assumed in all our reasoning. Man needs another world, man needs 
metaphysiCS. The Gay Science offers a solution, one which is especially revealed to 'we philosophers': the artist and 
art. We must transform our outlook and thereby ourselves, becoming 'poets of our lives' (299). Crucial in this is 
'aesthetic distance' (107) which (a) entails, as a condition of the self, the creative freedom to redefine self, and (b) 
as a factor involved in our willing relation to the world, the possibility of standing back from our lives that things can 
be seen differently (299), that the spell of the given is broken. The self that is to be created is the self that solves the 
riddle (here Nietzsche is no doubt relying on the doctrines of amor fati and eternal recurrence). 
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Wittgcnstcin. The above comments suggest what is tme to both Sartre and Wittgenstein, that 
the solution to the problematic is a dis-solving and not a solving. Thus, to begin with 
Wittgenstein: 
Doubt can exist only where a question exists, a question only where an answer, and an 
answer only where something COIl be said . ... When all possible scientific questions have 
been answereu. the problems of life remain comp\etdy untouched .... The solution of the 
problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem' (6.51 and 6.521 ). 
That is, and as we are seeing in some detail. the problematic. the self and the meaning of life, has 
little to do with science or psychology. it is metaphysical. Thus the solution too is metaphysical, 
as the (metaphysical)-self cannot be spoken of. it is in the realm of showing and not saying 
(passim). When saying has answered all questions the real 'problems of life will remain 
completely untouched' (6.52). 
The problematic, the problem and the solution, vouchsafes itself to showing. It is a matter of 
willing the world as a whole - that is the right and not a wrong way to relate to the world. The 
self must experience itself as independent of the world if it is to encounter itself and this is 
achieved at the limit. Such encollntering is not a matter of knowledge, at least not propositional 
or conceptual knowledge22 . To begin with, the solution does not involve 'doubt' or an answer. 
Rather, the solution is a problem being dis-solved when one relates to it the right way. When one, 
to rely for the moment on a visual analogy, looks at it the right way. J can see a rabbit. Look 
again. Yes, I see a duck. Now you have it. But although such an example catches the spirit of this 
conversion of aspect. from natural to aesthetic relation, it remains inadequate to the task. There is 
a more descriptive example in a passage (from the year 1930) in Culture and f'alue (pp4): 
Let us imagine a theatre: the curtain goes up and we see a man alone in a room, walking 
up amI UO\\l1, lighting a cigarette, sitting dO\\11 etc. so that suddenly we are observing a 
human being from outsiue in a way that ordinarily \\e can never observe ourselves; it would 
be like \\utching a chapter or biography with our 0\\11 eyes, surdy this would be uncanny 
and wonderful at the same time. We should be observing something more \\"ondcrful than 
any thing a play'\\Tight coulu an-ange to bc acted or spoken on the stage: lik itself. -But 
then we do see this c\'eryuay \\"ithout it making thc slightest impression on us! Tme 
enough, but m: do not sec it from that point of viGw. Well, when Engelmann looks at what 
he Iws \\Titten and linds it marvellous he is seeing. his lifG as a \york of art created hy God. 
22 Both philosophers insist that the problem of ethics - how to live - is not solved by science (passim). 
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The right perspective on ourselves. and thus the world. suggests Wittgenstein is an aesthetic one. 
Of course the ineffable will makc itsc1f 'manifest' (6.522), will show itself. But it is not we have 
seen a mattcr of facts. of qucstions and answers. It is a matter of elucidation, of seeing the world 
and thus onc's relation to it 'aright'. 
My propositions arc elucidation in this way: he who understands me finally recognises 
them as senseless, when he has climhed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so 
to speak throw a\\w; the ladder, alter he has climhed up on it). [6.54 - my emphasis] 
We must understand Wittgcnstein: 'mc', and we must do this through the propositions of the 
Tractatus (cf. next section) and in so doing wc will 'sec the world rightly' (6.5-1-). 
Thc solution to the problem of life will be the disappearance of that problem which IS 
'ethical rcward'. This itsclf Wittgcnstcin characterises as a particular kind of happincss - which 
is equatcd with thc good. \\'ith \\'illing thc good (cf. §.:J.). so that 'The ,,'orld of the happy [i.e. 
good] man is a diffcrent onc from that of thc unhappy [i.e. cvil]' (6-1-3). Only in this sense do 
good or cvil exist. And for thesc reasons. 'the happy life seems to bc justified, of itself. it seems 
that it is the only right life' (NB 30.7.16). We could say that 'the happy life is more harmonious 
than the unhappy'. that is, that' I must be in agreement with the world' as a limit and thus 'in 
agrcemcnt ... with thc will of God'. A good life. the happy life, is attaincd whcn the self stations 
itself. suh specie aeternitatis. at thc limit. For we notc that 'aesthctically. thc miracle is that the 
world exists' and that it is 'thc cssencc of the artistic way of looking at things, that it looks at the 
world with a happy eye'. And so. muddicd by contingency. 'Life is grave [while, the swallow of 
salvation] art is gay' (NB 20.10.16). 
All this is. we feel. 'in some scnse decply mysterious!' Surcly the answcr. even if aesthetic, 
will lend itself to formulac? Wittgcnstein asks thc same question: 'What is thc objective mark of 
the happy, harmonious lifc'!, 
It is c1car by no\\'. to both this thcsis and the Wittgcnstein of thc Tractalus and Notebooks, 
'that there cannot be any such mark that can be described'. The rcason. 'This mark cannot be a 
physical onc but only a mctaphysical onc. a transccndental one' (NS 30.7.16). And 'It is 
impossible to speak about the will in so far as it is the subject of ethical attributes' (6A23). There 
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IS no doubt that 'It is clear that ethics canl10t be expressed!' (ibid. and 6.-nl). And alas, 
'Whereof we cannot speak. thereof\\"e must rcmain silent' (0, 7). 
Satire is also possessed by an ethic. of ethical knowledge and of good conscience - which, if it 
were possible, he would appear to cquate with a happy, or at least a good or anxiety free life. Here 
it is appropriate to notc that for Schopcnhauer a central characteristic of the natural - willing -
attitude to the world is that it is a suffering, anxious consciousness23. The fundamental feature of 
the ordinary relation is its practical utilitarian demands and the resulting disjunction between 
how the world is and how the individual desires or wants it to be. For Schopenhauer, 
Wittgcnstein and for Sm1rc. it is 'A qucstion of willing the good in order to be ethical', so that we 
'modify this [natmall point of view' (NE 5)24. And again, [or all three philosophers, on the issue 
of a change of attitude and a solution, it is a dis-solving and not a solving of the problematic. 
Sartre: 
as long as m: ohscrvc thc canvass and the frame for themsdvcs the aesthetic object ... will 
not appear .... It \\ill appear at the moment when consciousness, undergoing a radical 
change in which the world is ncgated, itsdf becomes imaginative (IPI 219 - my emphasis). 
The self 'assumcs the imaginati\c attitude'. But this does not produce an 'answer' to the problem. 
In What is Literatllre? for example. Sal1re takes two lines [rom Rimbaud2s, and follows them 
thus. 
Nobody is questioned: nohody is qucstioning, the poet is absent. And the question 
involvcs no answcr, or rathcr it is its o\\n <1ns\\cr .... Hc asked an absolute question. He 
confclTcd upon the hcautiful word 'ame' an interrogative c\:istence. 111e interrogation has 
becomc a thing .... t2GI It is secn from the outside, and Rimbaud invites us to see it from 
23 As we are seeing, there is more than the concept of disinterestedness between Schopenhauer (Kant) and 
Sartre. 
24 A point to note, and one that is borne out by the analysis, is that the dominant visual metaphors of both 
Wittgenstein and Sartre in these matters are powerful but limited . Better than 'point of view' or 'seeing the world 
aright' etc. would be 'orientation', which while suggesting a self in relation, does not implicate a pure or primary 
epistemological relation. 
25 0 saisons! 0 chateaux' / Quel/e arne est sans detaut? 
26 I omitted from this quotation the following 'The interrogation has become a thing as the anguish of Tinteretto 
became a yellow sky. It is no longer a meaning but a substance.' In both the context of the present and the general 
context of what Sartre has to say in What is Literature? this is misleading. I believe the happy insight of the first 
sentence has lead to the unhappy analogy of the second sentence. The yellow of the yellOW-Sky is a substance and 
without meaning; but the anguish as yellow sky is a thing with meaning, and the one cannot stand by analogy for the 
other. Clearly the yellow-sky does not signify a meaning; it does, however, embody a meaning, Ie sens (cf. What is 
Literature? pp2-4). This point is born out by my analysis of What is Literature? (~2.3iii). It is in that section where I 
also warned the reader of the dangers inherent in this text. 
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the outside \\ ith him. Its strang.eness arises from the fact that, in order to consider it, we 
place oursc\ves on the other side of the human condition, on the side of God (WL 9). 
The 'strangeness' of this sort of interrogation results from the certainty that it is as it must be 
. , , 
placed on the side of the ineffable and showing - with the problematic. 
There is an exchange in ;Val/sea which pronounces on the problematic, on the self and the 
search for meaning out of contingency (and affirms while so doing the link between art and 
cthics). 
'In each privileged situation, there arc certain acts which have to be perfonned, certain 
attitudes which have to be assumed, certain words which have to be said - and other 
attitudes, other words arc strictI!, prohibited. Is that it? 
'rfyou like ... ' 
'In other words, the situation is the ra\\' material: it has to be treated.' 
'That's it,' she says. 'First !'Oll had to be plunged into something exceptional and feel 
that you were putting it in order. If all these conditions had been fulfilled, the moment 
would have been perfect. . 
'In fact, it was a sort of work of art. ' 
'You've already said that,' she said in irritation. 'No: it was ... a duty. You had to 
translann privileg.ed situations into perfect moments. It was a moral question.' (N 212). 
Perfect moments. constituted by certain attitudes, and out of \\'hich we have works of art, are put 
forward as the moral - deontological - solution to the problem of existence that waylays 
Roquentin. 
And thus. and prior to the final considerations of Nal/sea itself. the four conclusions of this 
section as previously applied to Wittgenstein. can now be stated with regard to Sartre. 
Firstly. for Sartre too. the dis-so!\'ing has little to do with science or psychology, it is not a 
matter of facts. of questions and answers. it is mctaphysical problem. A central theme of Nausea 
is the main characters reOcxiYe preoccupation with the actual purpose of writing 'the diary'. The 
answer of course is that it is an attempt to confront and overcome the onslaught of nausea. But 
how should this work'? "To keep a diary is to sec clearly' (N 11). By the end of the diary, he sees 
that neither it nor a historical work (for example) will achicve this end: he must writc, say, a 
novcl. This point will be pursued belo\\' in the section on Nausea. For the present, the aesthetic 
attitude is the relation to world that will help one to sce things aright, it will 'unveil' the meaning 
of existence (N 2-1-R). The degree to which one sees the world aright is the dcgree of 
consciousness one possesses of one's real goal. The aesthetic attitude \\ill show, and this is 
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necessary. for when saying has answcrcd all (factual) questions the problems of life (value) will 
remain completcly untouched. 
Secondly, the solution to thc problem of life will be the disappearance of that problem; this 
solution. this salvation. is an 'cthical reward'. Thc metaphysical subject is an ethical subject - an 
(ethical) will in rclation to the world. The self seeing the world aright is by definition an ethical 
principle. Elucidation declares itself as ethical meaning - not as propositional knowledge. It 
declares itself to showing and not saying. 
Thirdly. the ethical' good life'. anxious free life, that which is attained when the self 'sees 
the world aright'. this is possible from a perspective that is stntcturally the same as the aesthetic: 
disinterested and suh ,'pecie aefernilalis. at the limit. Pure reflection is inadequate to the task, as 
it remains positional. the cogito is prcreOectivc and prior to this intentional, only when the 
operati\'(~ intentionality becomcs dis-intcrested. in an aesthetic cOl1Ycrsion can the subject be 
revealed to itself - as the limit. 
Fourthly. all this is. we fecI. perhaps even more so than with Wittgenstein, 'in some sense 
deeply mysterious!' The solution. evcn if acsthetic. will surely give itself to formulae? It is clear 
by now, as it was \"ith Wittgcnstcin. that for Sartre. 'there cannot be any such mark that can be 
described'. The reason. as Wittgenstein expressed it. is that 'This mark cannot be a physical one 
but only a metaphysical onc. a trallsccndental one' (NB 30.7.16). This much has been clear since 
the self emerged from our discussion (in §2.3iii - especially on BN) of the saying-showing 
distinction. For with the sclf 'wc have to deal with a human reality as a being which is what it is 
not and which is not what it is' (BN 58). As far as saying is concerned. the self, that original 
freedom. is 'indcfinable. unnameable and indescribable' (BN -\.38. and above §2.3 - -\.). 
There is no doubt tl1<lt 'It is clear that ethics cannot be expressed!' (ibid. and 6.421). The 
problematic may well be bcyond \"hat can be said, beyond propositional language, it vouchsafes 
itself to shO\\ing. 11 is a mattcr or thc self \\i1ling the world as a whole - that is the right and not a 
wrong way to relatc to the world. In so relating to the world thc self encounters itself - at thc limit 
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of I and showing. In the subject choosing itself as aesthetic, in distancing itself from itself, it 
determines itself. the problematic is resolved. meaning is shown. But how. then. as would be 
required, is a solution to be presented or communicated if it cannot be said. By aesthetic deeds. 
• Addendum to Aesthetic Attitude: Epistemological, Philosophical? 
The next section. Conclusion II. will claim that Tractatus and Nausea are aesthetic deeds 
on the basis. in broad terms. that they are limited wholes. with a transcendental message that is 
shown. A further claim could be made. in terms of both attitude and deed. The claim that (here 
we are speaking of the 'attitude' dimension) the Tracfalus and Nausea are philo-aesthetic 
deeds27. This claim could be made in a 'strong' or 'weak' sense - and in fact, the weaker sense 
follows in the next section: that both philosophers use the aesthetic attitude to disclose, through 
its embodiment. aesthetic deeds. a solution to a metaphysical (philosophical) problematic. The 
stronger sense of philo-aesthetic deed would rest on proving that the philosophical attitude was 
structurally and formally identified with the aesthetic attitude - or \'ice versa. Such a claim is not 
necessary to the present thesis. though I shall now suggest how this is the case with Wittgenstein 
and how it may be so with Sartre. Besides the intrinsic interest of this claim, such a possibility is 
worth pursuing (brieOy) for another reason. It places the inquiry in the following realm: does the 
aesthetic attitude. like the natural attitude. constitute a distinct epistemological relation? We shall 
say that the aesthetic attitude should be distinguished from the natural. scientific or other basic 
attitudes: in that it is not of an epistemological structure that is conceptual or propositional: it is 
more fundamental than this. primitive. The aesthetic attitude. supposing it exists, does not 
confront the problematic in terms of a question to be answered. As was seen above. it will be a 
matter of dis-solving. not soh'ing. It excludes situation. the particular. the specific (but not the 
individual): it is not in the realm of question and answer. 
27 Not only Wittgenstein (and Sartre), but Heidegger too sought recourse between art and philosophy. Interestingly, 
Heidegger also seeks the disclosure of Being as a whole. To achieve this he places art, essentially poetry, on an 
equal status with philosophy. Moreover, this is by no means a precedent: there is a history of philosophy as an 
attempt to deal with philosophical questions first of all through art (Cf. Bowie 1993 and 1990). 
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Both Wittgcnstcin and Sartrc occasionally spcak of thc acsthctic attitude as contemplative, 
or as involving kl1()lI'/e(~f!.e. and thcrc is further evidence idcntif-ying the aesthetic attitude with the 
philosophical attitude. And in fact the claim to an epistemological aspect is of concern in a 
primarily negative sense. That is. some commcnts on its real possibility are needed so that it is 
not confuscd with a lIIetaph.vsics of aesthctics which includcs 'ethical knowledge' and the 
philosophical attitudc hut 110t scicntific or self-knowledge (of a non-propositional nature). 
A complete intcrpretation of thc role of 'contemplation' and knowledge in the early 
aesthetics would in fact require a contcxtual reading of the doctrines of key works (Notebooks-
Tractatus, What is Literature) -The P,~:vchologv of IlIIaginatian) in relation to the 
KantianiSchopenhaurian tradition. 'Contemplation' is indeed a traditional 
(Kantian/Schopenhaurian) response to the question of the nature of the aesthetic attitude. 
Moreover, it is consonant ,,,ith thc doctrines of disinterestedness and sub ,specie aeternitatis, and 
it does, furthcrmore, appcar in the contcxts of both Sartre's and Wittgenstein's (convergent) 
aesthetic position. Thus. if we sought the apparent solidity of historic determination. with Sartre 
we would look to Kant. whcreas Wittgenstein's comments on the 'contemplative' nature of the 
aesthetic attitudc may bc sccn as originating in yet another aspect of Schopenhauer's metaphysics 
that Wittgenstein has asscntcd to. 
Wittgcnstcin says that the attitudc that cxpcriences the world as a whole (and is thus 'good') is 
'contemplativc·. 'If I was contell/plating the stove il was my world, and everything else colourless 
by contrast with it ... ' (ibid.). Within the contcxt of what we have already said about the aesthetic 
relation to the world. wc can sce that 'contemplation' is linked in Wittgenstcin's thinking here 
with knowledge (and cthics). Such that. in confronting the 'miscry of the world' (NB 13.8.16). 
the only way that the self. as an attitude to the world. can be happy, is 'Through the life of 
knowledge'. Clearly. 'the Iifc of knowledge is the life that is happy in spite of the misery of the 
world', and this so bccause - as contemplation - it prcsen'cs ·the good conscience'. 
Thc idca of 'good conscicncc' bcing prescrvcd by a life of knowledge is connected to self-
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knowledge. to the possibility of self-e\'aluation and. certainly for Wittgenstein, guilt and salvation 
(NB 13.8.16). Good conscience is similarly connected to the relation to the 'world as a whole' 
and therefore God. Thus. 'When my conscience upsets my equilibrium. then I am not in 
agreement with something. But what is this? Is it the lI'orhn Certainly it is correct to say 
conscience is the \'oice of God' (NB 8.7.16). We know that 'There are two godheads: the world 
and my independent "I" , (NB ibid.). and that conscience as the voice of God is thus the ethical 
subject in its (aesthetic) relation to the world as a whole (sub specie aelernitatis). Good 
conscience is a willing self that is in agreement with itself at the limit. Thus the life of 
knowledge. as when I contemplate the sto\'e. is a life based on experiencing the world as a whole: 
it is an ethical insight into one's freedom of wi II. one's projects and goal, and it is shown. It is not 
constituted by information or facts for these cannot be determined or controlled. as they are 
'independent of my will'. Self determination is only possible if we accept the contingency of the 
world, the independence of self. and the possibility of a good conscience through the changing of 
the ethicalllleoning of the world - as a whole or totality. 
In aesthetic determination. the willing self escapes the contingencies of the world, its 
happiness then becomes solely the function of its identity relation to the as a whole or limit. 
Knowledge. then. is ethical knowledge. it is a matter of 'seeing things aright', of elucidation and 
clarification. It is this that thus links the aesthetic attitude with the philosophical attitude. An 
identification explicitly made in the Tractotl/s: 'The philosophical self is not the human being, 
not the hum,lI1 body. or the human soul. with which psychology deals. but rather the metaphysical 
subject (T 5.6-1-1). The metaphysical subject. as will, as attitude. indistinguishable as it is from the 
potential of itself as aesthetic. is also the philosophical self: 
The philosophical sciI' is not the human heing, not the human body, or the human soul, with 
which pSH:holog~' deals. hut rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world - not a 
part (leit (5.641). 
In a remark dated I \)3 I Wittgenstein says that a teacher of philosophy such as himself 
'ought to be no more than a mirror. in \\'hich my reader can see his own thinking with all its 
deformities so that. helped this way. he can put it right' (CY 18). There arc some useful 
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comments on the philosophical attitude in a mid-work of Wittgenstein's which I ha\'e no 
hesitation in now referring to due to (a) the importance of attitude to the present work and (b) its 
obvious continuity to the Tracfaflls, and (c) its succinct explanatory power. The work in question 
was only recently published2!<, and this under the title 'Philosophy'. The lengthy and descriptive 
sub-title reads thus: 'Difficulty of philosophy not the InteIIectual difficulty of the sciences, but the 
difficulty ofa change of attitude. Resistance's of the wiII must be overcome.' (PO [P], p161). In 
this work Wittgenstein states that on his return to philosophy he had considered making explicit 
part of what he'd earlier tried to show in the Tractaflls: that the special difficulty of philosophy -
philosophy proper, metaphysical - philosophy. was a matter of attitude (ulIlstel/ung). 
It is of more than passing intcrest that' 1I111stellung , has been translated as 'attitude' and 
not, as it might 'col1\'crsioll' (apparently the English translator was aware of this important 
subtlety in Wittgenstein's technical meaning). Using a concept of 'conversion' may prove to be a 
very beneficial way of approaching thcse isslles. A change of attitude is a change of will to the 
world as a whole, a cOI1\'crsion from onc \yay of experiencing the world to another - (cf. below, 
section II 'Aesthetic Deeds'). What is needed to sol\'e the problems of philosophy is not more 
information. It is. rather. a clearer way of seeing things, brought about by a conversion of 
attitude. The philosophical self is the metaphysical self and thus the problem of philosophy is 'not 
a difficulty of the intellect but of the will'. (Recall that difficulties of intellect would be a matter 
for the 'thinking subject' or the 'psychological self - §3.1 ii). Solving the problematic becomes a 
dis-solving of the problcmatic. 29 Wittgenstein thus states that 'work on philosophy is ... actually 
more of a work on oneself (PO !PI. p 161). 
Salire and Conclusion. In The Psychologv of Imagination, Sartre says. for example, that the 
28 In 1929, on in his return to philosophy, one of the first works Wittgenstein worked on was what has come to be 
known as The Big Typescript, constructed in 1933. Most of this 800 page manuscript was posthumously published 
as the Philosophical Grammar. However, for reasons that remain moot, 4 complete and self-contained chapters that 
are of the greatest interest, in title at least, to the non-linguistic tradition of philosophy, have remained unpublished 
even today - with one exception, 'Philosophy'. Unpublished remain the chapters on 'Phenomenology', 'Expectation, 
Wish, etc.' and 'Idealism'. 
29 Arguably Wittgenstein never renounced the essence of his early conception of philosophy: 'A philosophical 
problem has the form: "I don't know my way about" ... Philosophy leaves everything as it is' (PI 123-4). 
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nature of the relation bcl\\'ccn subjcct and object qua aesthetic attitude to object is that '1 
"contemplate" it' (TPI 221). Thcn. while hinting at his commitment to strict aesthetic criteria of 
judgement. he says. 'I listen to a symphony orchestra playing Beethoven's Seventh Symphony. 
Let us disrcgard cxccptional cases - which are besides on the margin of acsthetic contemplation -
as when I go mainly '''to hcar Toscanini" intcrpret Beethoven' (TPI 222). In Nausea thcre is 
constant rcference to a contcmplati\'c attitude when speaking of art, the aesthetic and the 
imaginativc attitude3o . In What is Literature? Sartre tells us that 'We shall be able to yield 
ourselves to that moderate pleasurc which, as everyone knows. we deri\'e from the contemplation 
of works of art' (WL 21). In thc samc work we are told that the aesthetic attitude 'cannot have 
pure contcmplation as an cnd. For. intuition is silence, and the end of language is to 
communicate' (WL 12). 
These rcfcrenccs to contcmplation indicate that the aesthctic attitude, dis-intercsted will, is 
thought by Satire to be contcmplativc. But it would appear that there is no clear structure between 
this aesthctic contemplation. knowledge and the philosophical attitude. Nevertheless, such a 
structure has becn suggcstcd by T. Busch. He puts forward the phenomenological reduction as 
that which links - via a principlc of distance - the ethical with thc philosophical attitude. 3 ) In The 
Psychologv (?f imagination, [or cxample, wc have thc following: 'But to experience it [the 
Seventh symphony] on thcsc analogues the imaginati\'c rcduction must be functioning, ... it 
therefore occurs as a perpctual elscwhere, a perpetual absence' (TPI 224). In Being and 
Nothingness, in the sections on 'The Origin of Negation' and 'The Immediate Structures of the 
For-itsclf, distance is madc possible by thc reduction. 
The analysis of mdhodological doubt ... has clearly ShO\\11 the ract that only retlective 
consciousness C<1I1 be disassociated from \\'hat is posited by the consciousness relkcted on . 
... a putting bd\\'een parenthesis' (BN 75). 
However, to speak in thc same brcath of the mcthodological doubt and 'parenthesis' is either to 
conflate or offcr a ncw formulation. Bcsidcs. the attitude as phenomcnological doubt im'olves 
30 See for example Nausea, pp37f, 135f, . 157, 246-253 
31 T. Busch (1975) 'Sartre: The Phenomenological Reduction and Human Relationships'. 
questioning: thus its philosophical use and. it would seem to follow, its distinguishing feature 
from the aesthetic attitude. 
Nonetheless. Busch's approach may well be fruitfuL and the possibility of a stronger 
identity between the aesthetic and philosophic attitudes is important and should not be 
discounted. though this is not the place to attempt such a detailed and highly specific inquiry.32 
We continue. therefore, with the structurally weaker identification, potent enough in itself, with 
an aesthetic attitude that in its primary mode is ethical as opposed to epistemological or 
philosophicaL and which discloses itself through aesthetic deeds. 
(II) PART II: (CONCLUSION II): lINGUA-AESTHETIC-(PHILO) DEEDS 
(TRACTATUS AND NAUSEA) 
The reciprocity between attitude and deed having already been established, the point now is 
that it would be a mistake to read either the early Sartre or the Tractatus in the hope of finding an 
answer to the problematic. It is in the practical challenge of experiencing these works - as 
aesthetic deeds - that one attains the goal or purpose of insight into the problematic and thus its 
dis-solving. 
What is an aesthetic deed') [n the present thesis it is specifically a (literary) object (of art) 
that is intended to disclose ethical meaning through its aesthetic construction33 . This entails that 
which has already been stated: a reciprocity between aesthetic attitude (disinterestedness and sub 
specie aeternitatis) and art objects (cf. especially §5.1 'Preliminary Remarks and §2.1). A 
solution to the absurdity of life \\"olild be in terms of aj[{stijicatiol1. So far. the aesthetic attitude 
has been put forward - and what of ;1l1? 'Life is grave. art is gay' (NB 20.10.16). 'Only the work 
of art would give man that justification. for the work of art is a metaphysical absolute' (WD 87). 
32 See Dufrenne (1973, pp24) who distinguishes the natural and philosophic (reduction) attitudes. Also, Ricouer 
(1986, pp209f) who speaks of the reduction as the withdrawal of all reference to empirical reality. 
33 Clearly, as has been indicated, the principle has a broader application to individual actions, deeds that show 
value/meaning; indeed, a life itself, a fa Wittgensteins, could be said to be an aesthetic deed, or at least the attempt 
for such disclosure. But unless a critique of action is undertaken, this aspect is of religious and biographical interest. 
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And so, 'The sole purpose of an absurd existence was indefinitely to produce works of art which 
at once escaped it. That was its sole justification: ... It \\as really a morality of salvation through 
art' (WD 78). In effect. at least for the present thesis. this is a reciprocity bctween determination 
and disclosing or attempting to communicate. Determination, the aesthetic attitude, is, it was 
seen, stmcturally identified with cthics. It may wcll be the case that both Sartre and Wittgenstein 
would sanction the permancnt possibility of artefacts as aesthetic deeds (\\ith a moral purpose). 
This much is at least suggest cd (cf. above): 'The work of art is the object seen sub specie 
aeternitafis: and the good life is the world seen sub specie aeternitatis' (NB 83); 'At the heart of 
the aesthetic imperative \\'e discern the moral imperative' (WD 86). This, with the earlier 
linguistic doctrines, supports the present claim. that specific literary works, namely Tractatus and 
Nausea, are presented as aesthetic deeds. 
A specific aim of Tracta/lfs and .\'m/sea. for example, is to disclose the aesthetic solution to 
the problematic, and do so in such a way that it is graspable by others of similar attitude. (Recall 
a central idea of 'fhaf is Literatllre.'? is that aesthetic creation is through both writer and reader -
'Reading/Writing' is the relation Sartre gives to his own fundamental project in The Words). 
There are, however. at least prill/a .facie, massive differences between Tractatus and Nausea: 
whereas one is to be takcn in thc primary sense as a work of fiction the other is to be taken in the 
primary sense as a work of philosophy. Nonetheless. given the similarities of their authors 
philosophical commitments - on language, self and aesthetics - a deeper affinity can be expected. 
When. thus, considering 7,'ac/a/lls and .vallsea (post ~2 of the present thesis), their use of 
language, and the status of their propositions, this fact strikes us: that for both works, these 
propositions do not treat of anything in the world. Their propositions do not represent (signify or 
denote), states of affairs. They should be takcn as, in broad terms. metaphysical statements. Only 
when taken as referring to the world as a whole do they have sense, sinn, sen. By the doctrines of 
their own authors. these works do not say. they show, they disclose, indirectly, Ie sens and sinn. 
That Sartre and Wittgenstcin chose radically different \'chicles for thcir project is a matter of 
temperamcnt and not that of subject matter and philosophical goals: the differences are 
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superficial. the dccp structurc of both works is constitutcd in terms of (what we ha\'e come to 
know as a Tractarian) saying-shO\\'ing distinction. 
Although it could not rcasonably be claimed that the subject matter of either Trac/a/us or 
Nausea was less philosophical than thc othcr (on Nausea cf. §2.3ii). and although the approach is 
clearly \'cry different. the dccp - saying-showing - principle on \\'hich they are both based is the 
same. And the rcal strcngth of each work lies not in philosophic argument but in examples34, in 
image and metaphor - and in the cffect of the 'whole work upon the reader. Tractatus and Nausea 
are limited wholes, with a transcendcntal message that is shown. Neither work can avoid the 
requirements of propositional discourse and the charge of being unvcrifiable and meaningless 
(§2 . ..j.). More to the point. ncithcr work \\as intended to (l\'oid thesc strictures - quite the opposite. 
An objcction that could bc raiscd hcre is the 'leap' from individual or particular 
propositions to thc work as a whole. from individual propositions that do not treat of anything in 
the world (though some may) and thc ultimate dependence on taking the work (Tractatus or 
Nausea) as a \\'holc. But hcre. this putative difficulty is quickly explained by recourse to a 
(part/whole) principlc. the universal implies the particular. the particular the universal. We are 
familiar with such a principle in Sartrc's early wrilings. Above (§2) was discussed the important 
Sartrian conccpt of man as the univcrsal singular: each individual acts for himself and in so 
doing for the world as a whole. This relation is fundamental to Sartre's philosophy. And 
similarly. in the Tractallls, \\'c should say. based on the results of our inquiries, that language is 
the universal sinb'1liar: thc picturc thcory ensures that all propositions. taken on their own, imply 
the world as a whole. thc totality of language. The self is thc univcrsal singular: Man is never 
truly an individual. human history. my cpoch is the universal. my projects are universalised, a 
synthesis: but it is only the univcrsal pole of self that is beyond signification. the particular that 
can be spokcn mcaningfully of. It is just this bi-polarity which is at thc centre of the problematic 
and which structurcs thc intcntions of the authors of Traclatlls and Nausea. 
34 More could be made of this - as Manser (1966) does in his Chapter 1. 
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S~1I1rc. In the early philosophy of Sartre. signification is limited to semantic employment. while 
sens is deployed as a cognate which refers to the image, to freedom and indeterminacy (§2.3ii & 
passim). This indeterminacy of meaning depends upon a fully determined world: the 'artworld' 
(to borrow G. Dickie's use of Danto's term). the world as a whole. Works of art. claims Sartre, 
embody their meaning, and signirv nothing beyond themselves (TPI). The original or 
fundamental project of their creator is expressed through Ie sens. This is the basis of Sartre's use 
of aesthetic objects as symptomatic of the artists fundamental project in his existential 
psychoanalyses of these artists. The existential psychoanalysis of Being and Nothingness is 
intended to reveal or disclose to the subject his or her fl111damental project. In short, offer a 
solution to the meaning of life. But that art objects arc symptomatic of an artists fundamental 
project is a psychological matter. and not an aesthetic one35 . Aesthetically. the interest in the art 
work is its identification with Ie sens, with the imaginative or aesthetic attitude, and the 
possibility of Showing. disclosing ethical meaning: the subjects project or goal. 
A poem can disclose a metaphysic: but if it is to disclose the metaphysical subject it must 
exist and be appreciated in the right - aesthetic - way. Its depiction of historical events, 
characters. and landscape must surpass being pure exposition or a tract, and can only do so if 
these qualities combine in a holistic structure which is open, dynamic and suggestive, a structure 
that is not descripti"ely determined. It is just this principle that dominates the writings of Sartre, 
his plays. novels and. with no more than a shift of balance, the likes of Being and Nothingness. 
The image - open, indeterminate. creative and free - commands as it integrates with the project of 
showing. We choose .\·allsea (and not say Being and Nothingness) as the work most clearly 
intended to embody the metaphysics of aesthetics that so fascinated the early Sartre, and which 
finds such an unlikely alliance with the Tractatus. (Wittgenstein is dead set against the 
transcendental in his later works - at least at the level of text). 
Sartre. on music:36 . I belie\'c that music in effect signifies nothing, but that it has its 
35 Hence, existential psychoanalysis is very much peripheral to present concerns. 
36 Not only Wittgenstein (which is well known), but Sartre too was greatly indebted to a love and understanding of 
music, it played a 'considerable' part in his life, and Sartre "always played the piano for two to four hours a day" '. 
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meaning (Ie sens)'. Music. like all art. 'gives us a possibility of capturing the world as it was at 
each moment without object'. What the works of an era express is 'something which we all grasp 
without the power to define it well. This '·thing" is the meaning (Ie sens). Bach's music most 
certainly renders the meaning of the Eighteenth Century'. So too, the music of Beethoven for 
example, continues Sartre, 'the expression of the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th 
centuries'. But it is, at the samc timc. 'something incomparably greatcr - a sort of view of this 
time which one may always have from the outside'. (Hoeller, 1993, pp17 & 21). 
'In fact the problem for me is to make myself bc by acquiring the possibility of taking the 
Other's point of vicw on myself (BN 365). Nausea. is a kind of a token (in Richard Wolheim's 
sense) whose expressed aim is to help the other see thc world. and thus themselves, from the 
point of vic\\' of thc othcr ;] nd. idca II y. from t hc point of vicw of God. The authors intcntion, one 
such intention in writing .\'aI/sea, \\'as to 'prcscnt in literary form metaphysical truths and 
feclings'3?, Specifically. this involvcs disclosing the actual nature of thc self38. 'The work of art, 
taken as the sum of its exigcncies. is not a simple description of the present but a judgement of 
this present in the name of a future [andl this awareness of self is a surpassing of self (WL 118 -
my emphasis). Roqucntin's choicc of himself as an artist is a choice to relate to the world 
aesthctically. while this itself mirrors S,l/1re's choice - acsthetic attitude - in writing Nausea. The 
esscntial reciprocity is. ho\\·c\·cr. that bctween Yausea and reader. Roqucntin wants the novel to 
'be beautiful' and 'makc pcople ashamed of thcir existence' (N 252). 
Wittgcnstcin. Wittgenstcin is one of the great German prose stylists. he is in fact regarded by 
many as a supreme artist. a poet. The most common. and the correct response on first reading the 
Tractatlls is that 'it is beautiful'. In correspondence. Wittgenstein again and again states his 
intention that the 7,'actatlls be beautiful. that it exists as a work of art. that he could not spoil the 
'Music, Meaning, and Madness: A conversation with J-Paul Sartre', an interview with L.Malson in Cf. Hoeller (ed.), 
[1993]. 
37 De Beauvoir, quoted in Manser (1966), pp1 
38 As Manser (1966) notes - as also, now familiarly, in 'its particular mode of existence' (WL 7). 
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work with arguments. It is wcll documcnted that although Wittgenstein was a talented musician 
he did in fact want to be a poct. Wc ha\'c also. for example. his now famous letter to Englemann, 
where he rcfcrs to a pocm by Uhland as ·magnificent'. for it is this. the poem. that achie\'es what 
Wittgenstcin set out to achicve with the 'l,Aactatlls; Wittgenstein refers to it in his letter, stating 
that: 'Thc unutterable will be - unutterably - contained in what has been uttered'39. The poem, 
GrafEberhard<> Weissdorlll is. in Kaul Kraus's phrase, 'so clear that no one understands it'. 
In Wittgenstein's Vienna it was believed that prose could near poetry insofar as the 
aphorism was perfected. Kaul Kraus. Wittgenstein's influential contemporary. did much to 
forward this notion. but no more than the two great favourites of Wittgenstein: Lichtenberg and 
Nietzsche. The principlc. thus formativc in Wittgenstein's writing, was that 'an aphorism goes 
beyond tmth with one morc sat::'. The point of the Tractafus is ethical. that is aesthetic, its mode 
of expression is the aphorism. and [or Wittgenstein in Vienna (in a \yay perhaps unprecedented 
before or since). the aphorism was a poetic form. 
As we saw. by its own doctrines the aphorisms o[ the Tracfa/us are placed on the side of the 
lIIysfiche, \"ith ethics and acsthetics, Like Nal/sea. the Trac/afus both contains the doctrine of 
showing and is itself an expression of that doctrine. Unless philosophical propositions are non-
metaphysical, construed as representing possible. contingent. states of affairs, along the lines of a 
scientific or empirical enquiry. then they are trying to say what cannot be said: they are without 
sense (~2.2 & ~2.-1-). But if philosophical inquiry is constmed along the lines of an empirical 
inquiry then. although its propositions have sense. it is not philosophy! 
The COlTcct method in philosophy \Vould really be the following: to say nothing except what 
can he said, i.e. propositions of natural science -- i.e. somethi1lg Ihat has nothing 10 do wilh 
philosophy [my cmphasisl-- ... this method would be the only stricti\' COlTect one' (6.53). 
StrictIy speaking then. and as is wcll known. the Tractatus should not try and say anything 
about the ,,"orld as a whole. its propositions should not treat of matters metaphysical; they should 
limit themselvcs to possible states of aff<lirs in the world, But its propositions do speak of the 
world as a whole. it does make metaphysical claims. contain statements of value. Many of its 
39 P.Englemann, Letters from LW. pp82-5, (9.4.17). 
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propositions are a priori statements made either about the world (even the logical propositions 
tell us something about the world -i.e. 6.l2 .. L 6.13) or about \\'hat is beyond experience, the 
transcendental. This is, Wittgenstein tells us, the only real philosophy. But these propositions do 
not picture or model facts in the world. As a non-empirical. a priori - philosophically consistent 
- inquiry, the Tracta/us should not have been written. Famously. and prevailingly, it appears that 
its very existence is at best paradoxical. at worst erroneous and misguided. Wiugenstein, it is 
charged, should himself have remained silent. Instead, he wrote a "hole book of sense-less 
propositions. 
If the above charge is just. then. although Wittgenstein is clearly not daft, it appears that he 
has made a rather elementary mistake. one that flaws a whole work, and the seven years of life it 
represents. One alternative. and J should say that we need an alternative. is that Wittgenstein 
recognised the paradox. intended it. and embraced it. But there is no internal evidence in the 
Tracta/lis to support this and. moreover, WiUgenstein was not at aIL unlike Sartre, fond of 
paradox. One would hope then for some explanation, one that satisfied not only the internal 
evidence of the work itself. but also external evidence surrounding the authors' aims and 
intentions etc. 
This charge against Wittgenstein and the Tractatlls is prolific (even today), it is made by the 
great and by the giddy. Of Carnap 's assessment. Wittgenstein says 'J cannot imagine that Carnap 
should have so completely misunderstood the last sentences of the Trac/allls - and hence the 
fundamental idea of the whole book' (letter to Moritz Schlick. August 1932). Again, in another 
letter 
You haven't reall\' oat a hold of m\, main contention, to which the whole business of logical 
• e> . 
propositions is only a corollary. llH~ main point is the theory of what can be expressed by 
propositions .. i.c. b~' language .. (and, which comes to the same, what can be thought) and 
what cannot be expressed by propositions, but only ShOWI1 (gezeigf)", which, I believe, is the 
cardinal prohkm of phi losophy.-IO 
Wittgenstein also states the 'main contention' in the preface to the Tractatus: 'The whole sense 
of the book might be summed up in the following words: \"hat can be said at all can be said 
40 Russell, Autobiography (1985) 
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clearly [by propositionsl. and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence [i.e. it can 
only be shO\\I1I' (p3). The statement of the main contention is followed by what Wittgenstein 
takes to be its application in philosophy: 'J therefore believe myself to have found, on all essential 
points, the final solution of the Iphilosophical] problems' (p5). On essential pOints Wittgenstein 
had found the final solution. What. then. had Wittgenstein thought he had shown about the 
essential character of philosophical problems? 
Philosophy can say nothing about the world: 
The rationalists were right in seeing that Philosophy was not empirical, that is, that as 
soon as it becamc cmpirical it became a question for a science of some sort. 
But they wcrc wrong in supposing that there "cre a priori synthetic judgements .... 
The empiricists ... were right in maintaining that ... synthetic propositions were matters 
of c.\pcrience (NB pp79-80. also, cf 1'6.37 J IT and 4. J 1-4.113). 
What Philosophers' had formally tried to say they must now show; the material mode of speech 
must be replaced by the formal mode of speech. In this way Philosophers' can still perform the 
task of making clear the essence - a priori stmcture - of world and self. Moreover, our reciprocity, 
the Philosopher who docs this "ill sllcceed and 'will see the "orld [its essence] aright' (6.54 -
also NB32. ppll 0). 
There really is a scnsc in which philosophy can talk about the self in a non-psychological 
way. What brings the selfinto philosophy is thc fact that 'the world is my world' (5.641). 
The world. the given. is in a sense Illy \\'orld. it is T the metaphysical subject that gives it value, 
meaning - and for Sartre too. 
It may be chmged that here agall1 Wittgenstein's position is flawed as paradoxical: by 
saying it is my world I refute myself: more importantly, this is not something that can be said, for 
'If I wrote a book called The World as J Found if ... in an important sense there is no subject' 
(5.631). The ackno\\'ledged reef of solipsism. that in fact the world - of Value - is my (the 
metaphysical subjects) world. cannot be said but it can - and must - be shown: this in fact is 
Wittgenstein's aim. 
For Wittgenstein at least. solipsism is unavoidable in a philosophical attitude directed 
toward self and value. Moreo\'er. there me comments in the !Yotehooks that indicate a closer 
identification between solipsism and the aesthetic attitude. as is also suggested in scattered 
passages throughout Sal1re's early \\'fitings. But pursuit of this dimension would take us beyond 
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present needs. It needs mentioning ho\\c\'er because firstly it reaffirms the important point with 
which this section opened: that there is a claim to a stronger identification between the aesthetic 
and philosophic attitudes than that already made here. Secondly. the remarks on solipsism occur 
in the contcxt of philosophy. and in thc context that philosophy, the Traclalus itself, cannot say 
and must show: philosophy cannot proffer metaphysical or transcendental statements with sense 
unless these statcments are taken as showing. 
The existence of the Tractallls. as a work of philosophy, a philo-lingua-aesthetic deed, IS 
not, as judged by its own doctrines. a paradox. ifit is seen as such a deed - showing - where such 
a dced is conccivcd in tcrms of an aesthctic consciollsness transcending natural cognition, that 
the subjcct (rcader) can. as its author claims. be shown, 'sec the world aright', For similar 
reasons, it is neither paradoxical or absurd to try and show a philosophical thesis through a novel 
- indeed, given the framework and its principle of showing such a rcmit is the logical outcome. 
• Curtain Down. 
'The profound meaning of my being is outside of me. imprisoned in an absence, (BN 363). 
Prescnce is used to emphasise that which is abscnt: saying gives us showing, relative value the 
possibility of permanent v;llue. Tracfatlls and Val/sea are salvation m~1hs.41 R. Rorty42 identifies 
the Tractatlls as another c\:amplc in the old quarrel bet\\'ecn poetry and philosophy, a tension 
between its recognition of contingency (and meaninglessness) and its effort to achieve 
universality (or the absolute) through if-selJas transcendcncc. 43 
Onc part of Wittgenstein's bi-polar self. the psychological self, is an object in the world 
which may be referred to by languagc. \\'hile the other part of the self. the metaphysical subject, 
is, as \"ith Sartrc's original freedom. both the background to the possibility of language and also 
41 J. Edward's (1990) The Authority of Language, makes a similar claim for the Tractatus - seeing the work as a 
salvation myth, as an image of ascent to a God-like status. Also, Danto Sartre (1975) makes the same claim for 
Nausea (pp91). 
42 R.Rorty, 'The Contingency of Selfhood' in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989) 
43 We may also be reminded of 'perfectionist writing'. This idea found its contemporary revival in the Essays of 
Emerson via Neitzsche (cf. especially The Gay Science). The author is said to arrange the text - or the words of the 
text - such that the readers are dis-orientated from their ordinary conformed relation to the present toward a further 
advanced state of themselves. See Mulhall's discussion 'Wittgenstein and Heidegger: Orientations to the Ordinary' 
in EJP, vol. 2, no.2, Aug. 1994. 
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as such uniyersal. In Sartre. original consciousness, consciousness without object. a pure, actiYe. 
intentional. meaningful (operatiYe). unreflected subjectiyity: a nonsubstantial and therefore non-
referent existence. definable only in terms of either its past or in terms of its absent-present-at-
hand, that is. its concrete situatedness. The pOllr soi is what it is not, it is not determined by its 
freedom, eYer torn away from itself toward its possibilities. The source of the' I', original freedom 
is perpetually beyond language. But Freedom is not beyond image/sens (,poetry' in What is 
Literature?). Poetry, language as art. (through Ie sens) is capable of expressing the pre-reflective 
moment - which is also one of 'totality'. It is only in language as la sens that the universal 
singular - 'man' - is expressed. Freedom and metaphysical subject is not signified by language, it 
therefore will not, cannot, and is not described. not any\\here, including Being and Nothingness, 
Nausea, Tractatlls (and this dissertation). 
Where XallsC!a and Tractatlls (and for the sake of criticism, this dissertation) arc concerned, 
if each. as a matter of stating the authorial intent. if each "ere giYen the sub-title 'The world as I 
found it'. then thc self. as original Freedom or the metaphysical subject. could not be directly 
mentioned, propositionally referred to in those texts. Its presence is in the silences, it is beyond 
the signifying prose. it is at the limit of understanding: only in grasping the meaning in terms of 
the whole docs one grasp the original project and relate to the world in 'good faith'. This 
aesthetic experience is best achieyed through the unreality of works of art (what Part One of this 
thesis lacks) - but can be forcibly integrated into the philosophical enterprise. This does not 
mean, ho"e\'er. that 'the \\ork of ;lrt is not reducible to an idea: first, because it is a production or 
reproduction of a hC!ing, that is. of something \\'hich neyer quite allows itself to be thought; then 
because this being is totally penetrated by an existence, that is by a freedom' (WL 85). By, in fact 
an 'inexhaustible freedom '. and 'When all is said and done, the message is a soul which is made 
object. A soul. and "hat is to be done with a soul? One contemplates it at a respectful distance' 
(WL 21). How docs one do this. making the message effable, the absent present? Through 
aesthetic deeds. through art-and-the-ineffable. 
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§5.4 POSTSCRIPT: THE PROBLEM OF BEING GOD 
There are t\\O issues requiring this PostScript, the one new the other returned to. As to the 
latter, it has been observed passim but especially at §2.3iii on the interpretation of What is 
Literature? that Sartre's commitment to the aesthetic. while not ambiguous may nevertheless be 
ambivalent. This point needs stressing. for Wittgenstein is neither ambiguous nor ambivalent in 
recommending the aesthetic solution to the riddle of lifc. The reason for Sartrc's ambivalence is 
now clear in a way it could not be earlier. Three principle factors can be noted: (a) Poetry and Ie 
sens depend ultimately upon an identity with image and imagination (cf. sub-section on The 
Psychologv of Imagination at ~2.:iii). (b) The aesthetic entails 'distance' and disinterestedness. 
(c) Art and the aesthetic operate within a differing ontology, in the realm of the unreal and the 
un-realisable. All and each of these factors pose a seemingly unavoidable entrapment in bad faith: 
an engaged literature will have to describe social truths and prescribe an ideology, but all three 
principles are a remove from such a remit: they invoke a distance and a sure means for 
identifying one-self or ones projects \"ith an imaginary world of the un-realisable. Art, poetry, the 
symbolic pole of a proposition. all are only indirectly engaged - as the expression of the subject. It 
is of little surprise then that Sal1re is ambivalent: as an artist and poet himself, and as a 
philosopher "ith a solution - an aesthetic solution to the problem - he wishes to embrace the 
aesthetic within his philosophy of freedom. This he does in the early work, but always there is a 
tension, and increasingly over the years he tries, as does the later Wittgenstein, to move away 
from the transcendental to a more directly engaged - (Marxist) - solution: and always then, an 
ambivalence in his recommendation of the aesthetic as a solution to the absurd. Nonetheless, the 
transcendental remains forceful in the early works, and Sartre's occasional reserve has little 
impact on its generally affirmative articulation. a situation encouraged, at least for him 
personally, by the fact that art. poetry and the aesthetic is engaged at the - indirect - but 
foundational level as an e.\pression of original freedom. of the subject as a historical and 
subjective reality. 
225 
The second (nc\\'. and final) issue of this PostScript leads on from the comments on 
ambivalence and bad faith. Gi\'en Sartrc' s account of our extreme freedom, there clearly is the 
problem of bad faith. with which reference to the aesthetic as just notcd. But there are many 
patterns to bad faith, including that which tends to - rightly - dominate discussion, that of self-
deception. 
The standpoint sub $pecie aefernifafis is the standpoint of God, which is that of absolute 
value. This may well be what we all desire (Sartre) or should strive for (Wittgenstein). but in fact 
the demand by a situated embodied subjectivity for absolutc value can nevcr be satisficd. for there 
is an inherent self-deception, the logic of which defeats the aesthetic project. 
Firstly. although Wittgenslein and Sartre believe in at least the idea of God, and 
Wittgenstein appears to belie\'e in the reality, Sartre does not think such a belief to be justifiable. 
Bya logical analysis of the definition of God. Sartrc maintains that 'God' is contradictory - and, 
therefore, cannot exist. Sartre considers. for example, the opposing properties of the meaning of 
the in-itself and the for-itself. lhal these ent:lil the opposition between being/action, object/subject, 
etc. Such differences, though all necessary to a God, cannot bc reconciled, according to Sartre 
and his ontology. Mystics say coincideJltia opposilorulII is possible. and appeal to their 
experience, Sartre says it is not and appeals to his analysis. And yet. God enters into Sartre's very 
definition of man: 'To be man means to reach toward being God. Or if you prefer, man 
fundamentally is the desire to be God' (BN, passi/ll). 
Human reality is the desire for the absolute. But the problematic of each philosopher 
concurs that all choices in the world (of contingency) are arbitrary, The choice of an acsthetic 
attitude is and must be made in the H'orld by the situated subject. The aesthetic choice is itself 
therefore arbitrary, although of course it is treating itself as an absolute. The aesthetic solution is 
perhaps thc only solution - for Sartrc. it is in the imaginative altitude that the human subject most 
ncars the standpoint of God. MorcO\'cr. in Being and Yolhingness, he hints at the possibility of 
escape from the contradiction through a coincidence in terms of 'beauty': an 'ideal fusion of the 
Jacking with the onc that lacks what is lacking' (BN 19-1). Beauty would thus present us with 
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(Wittgenstein's) two Godhcads. it would be 'an ideal state of the world. correlativc with an ideal 
realisation of the for-itself (ibid.). And so. surprisingly. 
In this realisation the essence and the e:-.:istence of things are revealed as identity to a being 
who, in this very revelation, \\'ould be merged \\ith himself in the absolute unily of the in-
itself (BN 19-1). 
But still. the solution ultimately fails: Beauty is a Value. it is unreal. existing in the imaginative 
attitude. 'To the extent that man realises the beautiful in the world. he realises it in the imaginary 
mode' (ibid.): beauty cannot be experienced as real. and the harmony between two real Godheads 
cannot be. The latter. the absolute. can only be possible, an ideal, and to render it otherwise as 
real is self-deception. 
The problem here IS not with the postulating of an aesthetic solution. a scientific or 
religious solution. for example. would be just as nawed. logically. The aesthetic solution suits a 
certain temperament. a certain philosophy of life. a certain problematic. The problem is why 
postulate any. ul1\\"orkable solution. The need for sah'ation may wel1 be a condition of SelfllOOd -
or of the philosophical project for some. Indecd. in terms of a hope for a possible totality. Sartre 
does give this an ontological status. it being a condition of consciousness. Whatever. faced with a 
problematic of existence and an ideal (impossible in Sartre's case). it is the attempt to attain the 
standpoint of God that remains. (alas. it is sometimes feIt. in Sartre's case). the best response to 
an absurd riddle. It is so because within the framework. the attempt for disinterestedness and sub 
specie aeternitatis re\'eals to the self that it is responsible for creating ethical value, and that such 
value, as with itself. can only be shown: 'Only the work of art would give man that justification, 
for the work of art is a metaphysical absolute' (WD 87). The \\"orld cannot be seen from outside; 
but the self can see itself as a transcendental subject. seeing and willing the world from the 
outside. taking itself as the vel)' condition of potential. 
Sartre and Wittgenstein both al10w for the hope for salvation: their philosophies then must. 
as they do. al10w for the possihility of salvation: there is neither ambiguity nor ambivalence here. 
Not now the actual standpoint of God. but the attempt to resolve the problematic through 
choosing one-self as the potelltial for the standpoint of God. and hence acting within and through 
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this potential. An imperfect justification for an absurd riddle, but. rooted in human potential, it 
will do, Through Art. the defeat of the Ineffable 'itself turns into sah'ation' (WL 2~), As Sartre, 
in this very context. was fond of saying. 'the loser wins', 
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I The poem by Rilke (l.12 of SOllllels 10 O'pliells) \\hich follows the Bibliography' was \\Titten around 1922. 
Given the aesthetic attitude, it could m:ll he experienced as showing the essence of what has been said over 
the previous 200 or so pages. The po.:m places not the sign nor temporality (,nimble clocks') as true to life, 
but the symbol is 'real day' and nighL although the poem speaks oC amongst other things, uniting or 
hannonising two spirits, the sciI' as a true relation, at a distance, limits. anxiety, the beyondness of essence 
('ever reach') and transcendence ('bestow'), it does so as a whole and through silln Ie seilS, not through 
signification. (It nw\ be of further interest that Rilke and Wittgenstein admired each others works - and in 
fact, it was Wittgenstein' s mOlle~' that in part allowed Rilke the liberty to pursue his art in the castle at 
Duino where the SOllllers 10 O'l)liells were lTcated. 
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PART TWO 
SHOWING 
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POEM: 
(BY RILhE) 
Hail, the spirit able to unite! 
For we truly live our lives in symbol, 
and with tiny paces move our nimble 
clocks beside our real day and night. 
Still we somehow act in true relation, 
we that find ourselves we know not where. 
Distant station feels for different station -
what seemed empty space could bear ... 
purest tension. Harmony of forces! 
Do not just our limited resources 
keep all interference from your flow? 
Does the farmer, anxiously arranging, 
ever reach to where the seed is changing 
into summer? Does not Earth bestow? 
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